Trust Erosion and Identity Corrosion

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No profession can survive if it loses the trust of its client; and the Army now has much to do to restore its credibility as a self-policing institution.

— Don Snider, Ph.D.

Professor Don Snider’s warning to the Army in the 2004 edition of The Future of the Army Profession is now more relevant than ever. The U.S. Army spent the last two years studying and debating what it means to be a profession and what qualifies individuals as professionals. It worked to maintain its professional status as an institution and avoid becoming just one more government bureaucracy. However, the critical task that lies ahead requires the Army to identify the future threats to the profession and safeguard against them. This article tackles that task. It identifies challenges to the Army profession in 2020 and beyond, and makes recommendations to overcome them. The primary threats to the Army profession in the next decade are the erosion of the American people’s trust combined with identity corrosion among Army professionals.

There is a growing division between the civilians who control the military and the officers who lead it, brought on by an increasing belief that the officer corps fails to self-police the institution. Senior leaders in the Army exacerbate this perception by committing the very crimes they are charged with policing. While not yet fully manifested in the opinions of the American public, evidence of this loss of trust is rapidly emerging in the form of calls for oversight by the Army’s civilian masters, in both the executive and legislative branches of government.

The threat of loss of trust is significant by itself, and is compounded by corrosion of professional identity in the segment of the officer corps entering its tenure as senior leaders. As the stewards of the profession, these leaders are now inhibiting their own ability to develop the future of the profession and socialize the next generation of soldiers and leaders.

Both of these potential threats, the erosion of trust and the corrosion of professional identity, are by themselves significant challenges. However, set
in the context of the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment of the 21st century, they could result in significant damage to readiness. Set in the context of an impending period of resource reduction, the Army must find efficient solutions to prevent the bureaucratization of the institution and its decay as a profession.

**The Army as a Profession**

The Army’s senior leadership envisioned the purpose of the campaign as facilitating “an Army-wide dialog about our Profession of Arms.” The Army’s senior leaders took a fresh look at the Army as a profession and the impacts that a decade of war had on it. The campaign sought to answer three critical questions:

- What does it mean for the Army to be a profession?
- What does it mean to be a professional soldier?
- After nine years of war, how are individual professionals and the profession meeting these aspirations?

The campaign, headed by the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), answered these questions and yielded important definitions and concepts that are the basis of the work laid out in chapter 2 of Army Doctrinal Publication 1 (ADP 1), *The Army*, and Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1 (ADRP 1), *The Army Profession*. Both are now the accepted standard by which the Army measures itself as a profession.

ADRP 1 describes four aspects that must be met for any occupation to be considered a profession. First, it must provide a vital service to the society that the society cannot provide for itself, but that the society must have to flourish. Second, it must provide the service by working with abstract knowledge and practice developed into human expertise. Such work is rarely routine or repetitive and generally takes years of study and experiential learning to master. It is measured by effectiveness, not efficiency. Third, a profession must earn and maintain the trust of its clients through the effective and ethical application of its expertise. Finally, based on trust relations with the clients, the clients must grant relative autonomy to the profession in the application of its art and expertise. They expect the profession to continuously exercise discretionary judgment as individual professionals self-regulate the profession.

ADRP 1 further describes the essential characteristics of the Army profession:

- Trust.
- Military expertise.
- Honorable service.
- Esprit de corps.
- Stewardship of the profession.

The American people trust their Army as a profession. Trust has always been the bedrock of the Army’s relationship with the American people. As Snider describes it, “Because of this trust relationship, the American people grant significant autonomy to the Army to create its own expert knowledge and to police the application of that knowledge by its individual professionals. Nonprofessional occupations do not enjoy similar autonomy.”

In the Army, military expertise equates to the “design, generation, support, and ethical application of landpower.” Honorable service alludes to the fact that the Army exists to support and defend the Constitution and the American way of life. Army professionals do so by adhering to Army values. Esprit de corps refers to the bond between Army professionals that provides common purpose and the perseverance to overcome obstacles and to win wars. Finally, stewardship of the profession is about the Army being “responsible and duty bound not just to complete today’s missions with the resources available, but also those of the future to ensure the profession is always capable of fulfilling whatever mission our nation gives us.”

As long as the Army’s leaders, soldiers, and civilians maintain their commitment to these five characteristics, the Army remains a profession.

For the sake of this paper the following assumptions apply. First, the Army is a profession by the definitions outlined above. Second, as Snider and others effectively argued, while the Army is inherently a profession, it also possesses many of the characteristics of a bureaucracy. The challenge for the Army to remain a profession must be to strike the appropriate balance between both. When trust erodes, autonomy declines, and the military looks more an obedient government bureaucracy than a profession. That “the Army [strives to be] . . . a vocation comprised of experts certified in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.”
people,” suggests that it aspires to professionalism. With this aspiration defined, one can examine direct challenges to the Army’s “professional” status.

The Erosion of Trust

ADP 1 devotes the entirety of its second chapter to a discussion of the Army profession and begins by defining the profession as being built on trust between individual soldiers; trust between soldiers and leaders; trust among soldiers, their families, and the Army; and trust between the Army and the American people. It further explains the importance of discipline in units as fundamental to building that trust.

Likewise, Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Raymond Odierno, lists one of his strategic priorities as an enduring “commitment to the Army Profession, a noble and selfless calling founded on the bedrock of trust.” He further describes high standards and discipline, as well as integrity, among the most essential guiding principles for the Army. If one accepts that trust is essential, then the profession should pay attention when issues with that trust begin to surface. It appears they have. At a recent Army Leader Day discussion at the Army War College, students clearly understood that Congress is concerned about indiscipline in the military. Some members of Congress are recommending withholding authority under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) from military commanders over a perceived lack of seriousness in dealing with acts of misconduct. When commanders lose the ability to use the UCMJ to enforce discipline in the profession, they lose the ability to self-police, one of the four aspects of being a profession. When the client loses trust and begins to withhold autonomy from the profession, the profession moves a step closer to being just another bureaucracy.

The Army is not without historical precedent of loss of autonomy occurring because of the perception that it was failing to exercise sound discretionary judgment. The late 1990s provide an example of the Army losing its clients’ trust over trainee abuse at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Congress imposed external regulations. Such loss of trust represented a loss of the currency of professions—“If we (the Army) were to lose our trust relationship with the American people, the entire edifice of our profession would crumble.”

The Army lost trust as a result of Aberdeen, and Congress took action.

For the last decade, the Center for Public Leadership at Harvard University has collected and published data in its National Leadership Index about the level of confidence the American public has in major sectors of American society. In 2010, data continued to reflect that “despite a perceived crisis of declining confidence . . . the military remains the most respected sector of our society.” Likewise, a 2012 Gallup opinion poll shows that 75 percent of Americans place a “great deal” of confidence in the military, more than in any other occupation.

Such statistics indicate that the American public’s trust in the Army is not yet an issue, but one needs to look no further than recent congressional proposals to see that some congressional members are losing trust in the Army. The recent actions in the legislative branch of government reveal cracks in the foundation of trust with the military. Some members of Congress have lost faith in the military to adequately deal with indiscipline, and America is tired of reading about sexual assaults, hazing, and Army problems with suicide prevention. Accordingly, constitutional authority is moving to provide oversight to the military through legislation that limits the military’s autonomy to self-regulate these issues. The Army, among the other services, appears at the forefront of issues with sexual assault, hazing, and suicide, and therefore holds its share of the blame for the erosion of trust.

The military retains approximately one-third of its convicted sex offenders. Amendment 3016 to the 2013 Defense Policy Bill, introduced by Sen.
Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, demonstrates Congress’ new interest in this fact. It easily passed in the Senate, and requires any service member convicted of rape, sexual assault, or forcible sodomy to be administratively discharged if their sentence does not already entail dismissal from the service. This is only the first of many acts of oversight aimed at controlling the military’s options when it comes to dealing with sex crimes. The legislation comes from her belief that “sexual violence in the military continues to occur at an alarming rate.” In essence, the Senate is telling the military in general, and the Army in particular, that it no longer trusts the Army to handle the problem.

In the House, Rep. Speier of California sponsored the Sexual Assault Training Oversight and Prevention (STOP) Act, in November of 2011, aimed at providing oversight in sexual assault cases. The proposal calls for “removing authority from the chain of command to investigate sexual assault allegations.” Beyond the STOP Act, Speier advocated further action in 2012, writing the House Armed Services Committee chairman saying “it is imperative that Congress hold the military accountable and truly implement a zero-tolerance policy in response to this problem.” Those are certainly not the words of a civilian authority that trusts the military to police itself.

Most of the proposals outlined in the preceding paragraphs were made formal when President Barack Obama signed them into law as part of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. Clearly this indicates an erosion of trust. Legislation aimed at limiting a military commander’s ability to deal with acts of indiscipline are rare, and the military should view such Congressional oversight as evidence it is losing the faith of its civilian masters.

One purpose of the UCMJ is to give commanders the ability to self-police the profession. It offers a full range of options in dealing with offenses whereby professionals exercise discretionary judgment and do not necessarily have to deal with all cases in the same way. If the Army desires to remain a profession, Congress must allow it to self-regulate within the guiding principles of its own ethic.
The evidence so far could easily lead one to believe that recent congressional oversight is only related to sexual assaults in the military. However, Sen. Patty Murray of Washington introduced similar legislation aimed at overhauling the Department of Defense’s mental health and suicide prevention programs. One could conclude that Murray, and the rest of the U.S. Senate that passed the amendment, has lost confidence in the military to handle the issue on its own.

The executive branch of government flexes its oversight muscles too by forcing military leaders to take a hard look at themselves in light of acts of indiscipline by senior members of the military profession, including prominent retired general officers. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey recently stated, “If we really are a profession . . . we should want to figure it out before someone else figures it out for us.” In the aftermath of misconduct by some of the military’s senior leaders, in effect, he warned that if the military does not get its ethical shortcomings under control, then those who control the military will.

At the time of this statement Dempsey was responding to the Secretary of Defense’s direction to look holistically at the military’s ethical training programs to determine if those programs for senior officers were satisfactory. This is evidence the executive branch’s confidence is waning, and Dempsey’s review of ethical training standards is an attempt to quickly fill newly forming cracks in the foundation of trust.

As in any foundation, cracks do not just happen, they indicate deeper ethical issues that have to be addressed. Snider contended with this point by saying—

The Army’s client, the American people, gets to make the judgment of the extent to which the Army is a profession, and they will do so based on the bond of trust created with them by the effective and ethical manner in which the Army continues to build and employ its capabilities.

Said another way, America’s trust is the lifeblood of the profession. If the Army loses that trust then the profession could cease to exist.

Fortunately for the Army, as it moves forward, it already possesses solid mechanisms to help restore withering trust. A significant outcome of the Army Profession Campaign is the advent of the 2013 “America’s Army—Our Profession” education and training program, developed by the CAPE. The program officially began at Joint Base Langley-Eustis on 3 January 2013 when TRADOC hosted a professional development workshop designed to introduce the program. The education regimen includes quarterly topics Army leaders must address within their units. From October to December 2013, the fourth quarter focuses on trust, the bedrock of the profession. During that period, the Army will emphasize those trust-based relationships both within the institution and with society in general.

As the CAPE’s leaders develop educational packages that address trust, they should incorporate vignette-based scenarios that demonstrate how misconduct becomes the agent that breaks down the Army’s foundation of trust. In developing these values-laden educational scenarios, they must incorporate sound pedagogical models, likely requiring immediate research about how to best use such models.

However, beyond 2013’s fourth quarter, the Army must make certification in all aspects of
the profession, including trust, an educational requirement. ADRP 1, *The Army Profession*, is the doctrinal manual for the profession and ensures the Army speaks with one voice across all developmental programs.

The Army should leverage gaming concepts to advance the values of the profession. While some first-person, game-context, ethical-training modules such as the CAPE’s *Moral Combat* exist, the Army should advance this virtual construct further.\(^{35}\) It requires only incremental improvements of scenarios to fuse ethics education with other simulations like those used for combat vehicles and small unit training. Finally, Army senior leaders should direct scenario improvements that force Army professionals to make values-based decisions within realistic collective training events at all levels.

If done correctly, one can envision after action review discussions at the Army’s combat training centers focused not just on competent tactics, but also on sound ethical decisions that enhance the future of the profession. By incorporating such methods, the Army can begin to caulk the cracks in the bedrock of trust and ensure they never reappear.

**Identity Corrosion**

Turning from the threat of erosion of trust, corrosion of professional identity emerges as yet another threat to the profession in the coming decade. One concept surfacing from the Army Profession Campaign is the “renewal of the unique aspect of the identity and role of the strategic leaders of the Army—the sergeants major, colonels, general officers, and members of the Senior Executive Service—as the ‘stewards of the Army Profession.’”\(^{36}\)

However, many of these stewards do not understand what being a professional means in the way emerging Army doctrine defines it. They do not view themselves as professionals. Even more concerning, many do not see the necessity to redefine the Army as a profession or to maintain its professional status. This lack of professional understanding among emerging strategic level leaders should not come as a surprise for at least two reasons.

First, among the conclusions emerging from the 2002 publication of *The Future of the Army Profession* was the finding that junior officers did not view themselves as professionals.\(^{37}\) Now, more than ten years later, those same captains and majors of 2000 are the lieutenant colonels and colonels of 2013. By the Army’s definition they are the stewards of the profession, but the Army has done little in the past ten years to increase this cohort’s sense of professional identity. Beyond one year of study at the Command and General Staff College, which included only one course on leadership, this group received little, if any, formal education about profession identity. The focus on the wars has created some of this problem.

Anecdotal evidence suggests this shortcoming is contributing to corrosion of identity. One only needs to talk to a group of colonels and ask a few pointed questions about the profession. This became apparent following Snider’s address to the Army War College resident class of 2013—his remarks focused on challenges facing Army strategic leaders in maintaining a military profession during the forthcoming defense reductions.\(^{38}\) Ensuing seminar discussions following his address revealed that many War College students saw little relevance in the topic.

In an approaching era of constrained resources, these emerging strategic leaders will likely revert to what they learned during the 1990s. In that previous era of constrained resources, effective business practices of doing more with less led to the initial loss of professional identity and other bureaucratic tendencies in the first place.\(^{39}\) Making this potentially worse, many of today’s generals were the battalion and brigade commanders executing those practices during the last defense drawdown period.

This cohort of colonels lacks professional identity, and they bear responsibility for creating the developmental programs to instill the professional identity in the next generation.
values in the next generation of leaders. The Army recognizes that the Millennials will be the greatest influencers in the Army from 2015-2024, both as seasoned soldiers and fresh recruits. As a group, Millennials are a diverse and disjointed generation. They appear to be a tolerant, pragmatic, ambitious, and optimistic cohort. They believe in their influence and unique identity. They are innately intimate with the digital world. However, most relevant to the Army, their values do not align with the Army’s and remain in flux.

The Josephson Institute of Ethics declared, in extensive surveys of American high school students, over 50 percent report having cheated on an exam, and over 55 percent report having lied to a teacher about something significant in the past year. While these trends have improved slightly over previous years, they indicate significant values problems with America’s youth. Additionally, by many accounts, Millennials are generally driven by “more of an emphasis on extrinsic values such as money, fame and image” and much less by “intrinsic values such as self-acceptance, group affiliation and community.” One should reasonably expect this value gap to continue to widen as the generation of Millennials rises to lead the Armed Forces.

In 2014 the Army will submit its Program Objective Memorandum charting the Army’s future resource allocation decisions for the ensuing six years. This means that the Army has a year to figure out its initial concepts for manning, training, and developing the Army of 2020.

The first condition associated with identity corrosion, lack of professional identity among stewards of the profession, should be relatively easy to overcome. The Army already initiated the aforementioned “America’s Army—Our Profession” education program of 2013. This program incorporates the concept of identity. When the Army’s most senior leaders emphasize the importance of the profession to its emerging stewards, these warfighters will probably internalize the importance of understanding the profession.

One way the Army emphasizes senior leader identity is through the development of a computer-based Virtual Experiential Interactive Learning Simulation (VEILS). The program focuses on senior-leader level ethical decision making. Each scenario developed provides realistic dilemmas and presents the participant with numerous ethical challenges. The Army should continue to invest in, and rapidly field, the VEILS program. Participation should be a gate for professional certification commensurate with service at the level of colonel and above across the Army. Moreover, the Army should continue to invest in other simulations that will help certify identity within the entire force. The Army recognizes that “future learners will prefer independent learning experiences and have a natural affinity for self-development and lifelong learning, and prefer collaborative learning experiences.” The virtual environment provides a relatively inexpensive venue for producing those experiences.

Recruiting and retaining future leaders will require unique adaptations to traditional Army leader-development models and practices. The Army must invest in its moral-development programs to overcome issues with moral fading and rationalization among its professional stewards and to prevent moral disengagement within the next generation of leaders. In nearly all cases of misconduct, both within and external to the Army, individuals understand the ethical implications of the situations in which they
find themselves. They know what should be done, exhibit intent to act ethically, yet fail to do so. They rationalize and disengage morally between intention and action to attain short-term gratification.46 Hannah’s and Sweeney’s research demonstrates that professional identity enhancement occurs through moral jolts attained by immersing leaders in developmental “experiences reflective of the real world, even if they are virtual or vicarious.” They go on to point out the importance of shaping such experiences through guided reflection by “capable mentors.”47

The Army should also invest deeply in how it will shape future generations of leaders to continue to promote professional identity. For example, the Army’s capstone document on leadership, ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership, should devote more than four paragraphs to the concept of characteristic development.48 Fortunately, the Army has a solid basis for understanding moral development in The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations 2015-2024. It highlights the importance of guiding and preparing “commissioned and noncommissioned leaders in their efforts to develop moral and ethical soldiers.”49 It dedicates an entire chapter to the moral component of the human dimension. Army senior leadership should make it required reading for every senior noncommissioned officer course and for every officer as part of the Captain’s Career Course.

Beyond the trust of the client, leaders and leader development continue to be the lynchpin that holds the Army profession together. As Snider states, “the critical point here is that leadership within the Army, specifically the competence and character of its individual leaders at all levels, uniformed and civilian, is the single most influential factor in the Army being, and remaining, a profession.”50 As the Army shapes itself for the future, it would do well to pay particular attention to leader-development systems and ensure those programs include certifications and relevant education about moral reasoning and character development. This is essential as the Army strives to eliminate identity corrosion and bridge gaps in societal values for the future of the profession.

Conclusion

It is clear that the Army faces significant challenges to its status as a profession in the coming decade. One of these challenges is the threat from erosion of trust with the Army’s client, the American people. The Army should remain acutely aware of the erosion of trust evidenced in increased oversight by both the legislative and executive branches of the government and act decisively and convincingly to overcome them. Additionally, the Army profession is challenged by the lack of character-development systems to close values gaps between the Army and American society. The good news is the Army Profession Campaign, begun in 2010 and resulting in the “America’s Army—Our Profession” education program of 2013, has put the Army on the right path to think through the solutions to each of these challenges. Further, these threats are not yet a crisis, and sufficient time to implement solutions to prevent the decline of the profession still exists. However, the Army must act quickly and should not rest on its laurels. It must act now to shape the future, because austere budgets and the pending surge of Millennials within its ranks demand it. If the Army wants to remain a profession, it will find ways in the coming decade to incorporate the recommendations consistent with overcoming the threats from erosion of trust and identity corrosion as this paper suggests. The Army, as the nation’s loyal servant, has no choice but to reinforce the principles that make it a profession. America relies on it, as the nation’s preeminent source of land power now and in the future, to protect its national security and win its wars. MR

NOTES

2. Ibid., 1.
4. Ibid., ix.
5. Ibid., ix.
7. ADRP 1, ix.
8. The seven Army Values are comprised of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. For further explanation of how the Army defines each of its values, refer to ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: GPO, August 2012), 3-1 through 3-3.
9. ADRP 1, ix.
12. ADP 1, 2-2 through 2-6.
14. ADRP 1, ix.
15. ADRP 1, ix.
the Army, January 2012), 2.


17. This quote refers to an investigation that revealed drill sergeants at Aberdeen Proving Ground were “systematically abusing trainees.” The issue was long-standing and widespread, and because “the Army failed to self-police adherence to an appropriate Ethic, Congress passed legislation with very specific language on how to train and lead our soldiers.” This incident and others like it, such as prisoner abuse and unlawful or indiscriminate noncombatant deaths, can also deplete the Army’s reservoir of trust. The quote and this information comes from An Army White Paper: The Profession of Arms, 8.

18. Ibid.


23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


27. This is an example of discretionary judgment regarding sex offenses given a commander might not think that an 18-year-old female private, who is otherwise a top performing soldier, who grabs the butt of one of her male peers at a party, is deserving of the same treatment under the UCMJ as a 26-year-old drill sergeant who rapes one of his trainees in an Army basic training unit. Under the UCMJ, both are sex offenders, and under the new legislation, both cases would be handled in the same manner.

28. This particular piece of legislation seeks to standardize programs across each of the military services and is an effort to reduce the alarming rate of military suicides which “has not abated despite major investments in new programs and outreach efforts across the services.” This quote and this information comes from: Adam Ashton, “Senate Passes Murray Measure to Reform Defense Suicide Prevention Programs,” The News Tribune, 5 December 2012, <http://blog.thenewstribune.com/military/2012/12/05/senate-passes-murray-measure-to-reform-defense-suicide-prevention-programs> (13 December 2012).


30. Ibid.


33. The “America’s Army—Our Profession” quarterly education plan directs that the first quarter of 2013 focus on standards and discipline, doing the right thing in all situations, and those aspects of the profession that set the Army apart from common living. The second quarter addresses Army customs, courtesies, and traditions and sustainment of esprit de corps and stewardship of the profession. The third quarter theme aims at military expertise and what it means to be a certified Army professional. This information comes from: Maj.Gen. Gordon B. “Skip” Davis Jr. and Col. Jeffrey D. Peterson, “America’s Army—Our Profession,” Military Review (January-February 2013): 45-47.

34. Ibid., 47.

35. Army Game Studio for CAPE, “Moral Combat” (West Point, New York, Center for the Army Profession and Ethics, 29 November 2009) <https://milgaming.army.mil/Entrance/Product.aspx?prodId=2> (27 January 2013). This website is requires a CAC card to run and is therefore only available to DOD personnel.


39. Ibid.


44. The author, Col. Vermeesch, volunteered to participate in a VEILS validation program at the Army War College in early December 2012. Participants completed exercises as either a civilian senior executive servant, an Army colonel serving on the Department of the Army Staff, a brigadier general leading a humanitarian assistance joint task force in Africa, or as a senior level command sergeant major.

45. TRADOC, The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension, 28.


47. Ibid., 156.

48. ADRP 6-22, 3-5 through 3-6.

49. TRADOC, The U.S. Army Concept for the Human Dimension, 19.