2013 CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY
LEADER DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE
FINAL REPORT

ON THIS 238TH BIRTHDAY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

14 JUNE 2013
2013 CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY LEADER DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT

CHAIRMAN
Lieutenant General David H. Huntoon, Jr.

CO-CHAIRMAN
General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., USA Retired

WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN
Colonel Glenn Waters and Colonel George T. Donovan

AUTHOR AND LEAD RESEARCHER
Dr. Mark Adamshick

CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. Lenny Wong
Colonel Tony Burgess
Colonel Jeff Peterson
Colonel Tom Guthrie
Colonel Brian Preler
Major Jeff Braun

ANALYSTS
Linda Mallory and Steve Condly

EDITED BY
Elizabeth A. Tomlin, Esq.
# CONTENTS

Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... i

Chapter 1: Background, Formulation, and Preliminary Recommendations......................... 1

- Chief of Staff of the Army’s Study Guidance and Intent....................................................... 1
- Study Development, Methodology, and Preliminary Results.............................................. 3
- Recommendations – The Army Must Dedicate Itself to Practicing Mission Command, Developing Leaders, and Managing the Talent in its Officer Corps to Succeed in 2020................................................................. 10

Chapter 2: Embed Mission Command................................................................................. 12

- The Philosophy and War-fighting Function of Mission Command................................. 12
- The Data Demonstrate that Mission Command Benefits the Force and the Force Believes that Mission Command is Valuable to Officer Development......................... 14
- Recommendation to Embrace Mission Command as the Guiding Leader Development Model throughout the Force................................................................. 19

Chapter 3: The Army Must Refocus on Developing Others........................................... 21

- Philosophy of Developing Others.................................................................................... 21
- The Data Demonstrate that the Force Values Development but this Competency has Been Sacrificed in Favor of Other Priorities......................................................... 22
- Recommendations the Army Must be Intentional About Developing its Leaders and Must Reward What it Claims to Value................................................................. 28

Chapter 4: The Army Must Transform Officer Career Management............................. 35

- Background and Philosophy......................................................................................... 35
- Recommendations to Implement More Effective Tools to Manage Officer Talent....... 37

Appendix One: Historical review...................................................................................... 46

Appendix Two: Leader Development Task Force Officer Survey...................................... 60

Appendix Three: Leader Development Task Force Officer Survey Data........................ 92

Endnotes.............................................................................................................................. 217

References.......................................................................................................................... 220
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The United States has been at war for over twelve years with the consequence that the US Army has sustained deployment cycles and an operational tempo unprecedented in our Nation’s history. The Army has fought the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan with inspiring courage, selfless service, teamwork, innovative adaptability, and mission accomplishment as part of a joint and coalition team. This team has operated in as tough a set of conditions as our Nation’s Armed Forces have ever faced. As the current campaign draws to a close, the Army is entering a strategic inflexion point, where it faces significant budget adjustments, as well as new strategic priorities and challenges. In light of this inflexion point, the Chief of Staff of the Army requested an assessment of officer leader development.

Following a thirty-day mission analysis, presentation to the Army Chief of Staff, and incorporation of his guidance, the Leader Development Task Force identified the aim of this study as three major lines of operation: (1) to make recommendations to reinforce and sustain practices that enabled a decade of superb battlefield performance; (2) to reestablish standards as appropriate; and (3) to boldly transform Army systems to best educate, train and inspire leaders for the future. The recommendations from this study, if implemented as an entity, and not fractured into small components, will ensure that the Army of 2020 will continue to be led by an officer corps that is expertly developed to succeed in future military operations.

The pursuit to optimize development in Army officers is not a new idea. Indeed, the development of Army leaders mirrors the development of the Nation. The men and women who left Britain and Europe for the new world in the 17th and 18th centuries were driven by dissatisfaction with their circumstances and enabled by audacious self-reliance. Aristocratic traditions did not transit the Atlantic intact. Our colonial forebears reflected the belief in the power of learning to overcome boundaries dictated by birth. When the Declaration of Independence compelled the creation of a Continental Army, its officers were not obligated by birth but rather called to service by their character and competence. General George Washington, commander of the Continental Army, exemplified leader presence and a dedication to developing the Continental Army. Early defeats in the Revolutionary War drove the
Continental Army leadership, led by Washington, Henry Knox and others, to set in motion leader
development so that Soldiers, and our emerging Nation, had the officer leadership they deserved.
Henry Knox attributed the military failures at both Brooklyn and Kips Bay to inadequate
leadership by ill-trained and inexperienced officers. Though John Adams and Henry Knox each
urged establishment of a military academy, those early recommendations were ignored.

As President, George Washington, in an address to Congress on 7 December 1796, said,
“The Institution of a Military Academy, is also recommended by cogent reasons . . .” President
Washington reminded Congress that “The Art of War, is at once comprehensive and
complicated; that it demands much previous study; that the possession of it, in its most improved
and perfect state, is always of great moment to the security of a Nation.” Washington ended
stating, “an Academy, where a regular course of Instruction is given, is an obvious expedient.”
Washington’s early appeal to Congress, in part, led to the establishment of the United States
Military Academy at West Point in 1802 during the Jefferson Administration.

As the world industrialized and specialized during the nineteenth century, so too did
officer development. The Artillery School of Practice, established at Fortress Monroe, Virginia
in 1824, was the first Army service school and served as a model for others to come. In 1901,
War Department General Order 155 recognized the increasing complexity of modern warfare
and directed the establishment of a General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, as well as a War College at Washington Barracks in the District of Columbia.
Following World War II, the first Noncommissioned Officer Academy was established in
occupied Germany. In 1971, the Noncommissioned Officer Education System was formally
established.

Refinement and innovation in officer development has accelerated since the 1970s in an
effort to keep pace with the national security requirements. Recognizing the value of
development through realistic demanding training, the Army has established combat training
centers at Ft. Irwin, California, Ft. Polk, Louisiana, and Hohenfels-Grafenwohr, Germany, as
well as simulations based training exercises for large tactical formations called Battle Command
Training Program now changed to Mission Command Training Program. Institutional changes
also occurred. The comprehensive Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO),
completed in 1978, resulted in a number of innovations in officer education such as the
Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) in which captains from all branches learn together in small groups. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) began its initial pilot in 1983, and the Center for Army Leadership was established shortly thereafter in 1984. Adult learning and small group instruction became normative in US Army service schools. Courses were begun in 2001 for the strategic leadership development of Army general officers. As the Army expanded to meet the needs to fight the Global War on Terror, the Army Chief of Staff formally designated Commanding General TRADOC as the Army’s Senior Responsible Official for leader development in 2007. Annual surveys called CASAL (Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership) were initiated in 2007 to aid in systematic development of Army leadership.

**SCOPE OF RESEARCH**

An immense scope of research informs the task force’s recommendations. The task force began its work in November 2011 by presenting its mission analysis to the Chief of Staff of the Army. In the twelve months that followed, the task force dedicated its efforts to obtaining primary data from Army officers on current leadership practices and beliefs and secondary data through conducting a comprehensive historical literature review of Army leader development studies. In collecting primary data, the task force interacted in-person with over 550 officers ranging from first lieutenant to colonel by conducting site visits at eight installations, administering a written survey, and facilitating sensing sessions. The task force held command forums with twenty-one company-level leaders, sixteen battalion-level, and eleven brigade-level leaders from across the Army in three separate sessions over two days at West Point. The task force also developed and administered an Army-wide survey completed by 12,022 officer respondents spanning the ranks from first lieutenant to colonel, from the active and reserve components.

Throughout the study, the task force continuously consulted with senior Army leaders. To do so the task force created a senior leader panel from all leader development constituencies, to include, active and reserve components, and institutional and field Army to provide wisdom and senior level judgment. This senior leader panel met four times at West Point.
The task force more fully analyzed the primary data obtained through the site visits, forums, and survey by placing it within the contexts of both current events and secondary historical data from Army leader development studies. The task force began the historical literature review by studying the Army War College’s 1970 Study on Military Professionalism and reviewed every major Army leader development study through the Center for the Army Professional Ethic’s 2012 Army Profession Campaign Study. Accordingly, the task force’s recommendations are informed by extensive interviews at installations, the most comprehensive officer survey ever conducted, senior leader judgment and wisdom, and history. The recommendations are also reflective of the unique inflection point that today’s Army faces after twelve years of conflict.

The task force is keenly aware of the unprecedented strategic national security, fiscal, and moral-ethical context in which it developed and conducted this study, as well as the context in which it supplies its recommendations. The task force reviewed and consulted numerous documents, to include, Army Strategic Policy Guidance April 2012, Army Chief of Staff Marching Orders 2012, Sequestration decisions, doctrinal publications, and continuing emphasis on Army values in execution of leader responsibilities. The Army is poised at a strategic inflection point. On May 23, 2013, President Obama declared that he would “refine, and ultimately repeal” the authorization to use military force passed after September 11, 2001. Thus, the conflict in Afghanistan is clearly drawing to a close. Amid geopolitical uncertainty in the Middle East and Asia, the Army is strategically pivoting its forces to the Pacific rim, and it is doing so in an atmosphere of force and budget constraints, but with a proliferation of technological advances.

The task force was continually mindful of the framework approved and used by the US Army - that leader development occurs in three domains - operational, institutional, and self-study. The task force was also aware of the impressive and extensive leader development organizational system that was over time the direct result of Army Chief of Staff Gen Eric Shinseki’s leader development study done 2000-2002. In 2007 the US Army directed CG TRADOC as the senior responsible official (SRO) to the Army Chief of Staff for coordination of all aspects of US Army leader development. Therefore in all deliberations, the task force coordinated with CG TRADOC, General Cone, as well as working level coordination with CAL
at Ft. Leavenworth. In addition CG CAC, LTG David Perkins was a regular member of the senior leader panel convened on four occasions and was frequently consulted on major directions of this officer study.

The task force was also aware of the many stakeholders in the US Army’s leader development enterprise that includes not only TRADOC, whose CG is the SRO, but also the various major training and leader development policy and resourcing decisions at HQ Department of the Army, not only for the active force, but for the Reserve Component as well. The task force also understood, and in accordance with the survey data that showed close to 90% of respondents said they grew most in operational assignments, the enormous influence of policies concerning assignments, career paths, selection boards for schools, promotions, and command whose responsibility lies in the US Army M&RA and the US Army G-1. Thus, the task force made a concerted effort in panels, briefings, and collaborations to include principals and senior officials from M&RA, Army G-1, and Army G-3/5/7 to gain their wisdom, judgment, and long experience with policies. By the time of the desk-side briefing to Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno in early October 2012, followed by, and at his direction, briefings to US Army Four Stars in December 2012 and March 2013, and a full day discussion of the three strategic recommendations at West Point in February 2013 with senior US Army military and civilian leaders from around the tactical and institutional Army, the task force ensured full collaboration and consultation in this study’s method, analysis, and recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Looking forward, the Army must adapt its method of officer leader development to develop officers best prepared to lead dynamic operations now and into the future. This study has identified three strategic recommendations to prepare officers to lead the Army of 2020: (1) to embed mission command; (2) to strengthen the Army’s focus on the development of others in its leader development system; and (3) to transform officer career management. Through implementing these recommendations, the Army will emerge from this inflection point as a force that is dynamic, dedicated to articulating mission orders, cultivating initiative, developing junior leaders, and managing its talent to allow the best officers to excel in service to the Nation.
The first strategic recommendation is to embed Mission Command in the US Army.

Practiced successfully out of operational necessity during this war, mission command is now approved US Army doctrine for the entire force in all operations and conditions, and it must be embedded throughout the force. Mission command is at once the right doctrine to meet operational requirements and to best and most rapidly develop officers through experience. Based on mutual trust, shared understanding, and a common sense of purpose, mission command enables prudent risk, demands initiative, and permits subordinates their own choices of methods within their commander’s intent. Mission Command is the key enabler of agility in units. As such, it must permeate all the environments in which officers develop -- in units and schools, in garrison and deployed. Embedding mission command will provide the best command environment for officers to grow most rapidly in their professional capacities while also ensuring mission accomplishment in future operational conditions.

The second strategic recommendation is to dramatically improve the professional imperative to develop others.

Long a requirement in the US Army, the professional mandate to develop others has eroded during the conduct of this war. Surveys going back over five years show less than 60% of the officer corps believes that their organization devotes sufficient time and effort to their development. Development must be both transactional and transformational learning to be effective. Development must also be a continuous life-long process that occurs effectively in the operational, institutional, and self-development domains. Officers, in all leadership positions, must remain committed in their mission command climate to developing others for requisite rapid professional learning and development that is necessary for officers to be able to execute future duties. Such emphasis allows and, indeed, demands that developing others is a primary duty of leaders and that leader performance should be judged on execution of this responsibility. The Army also needs to better equip leaders to conduct this innovative and relevant developmental program in their units and other organizations, and better develop emotional intelligence as the quality of empathy. This quality was seen as a requirement for successful command by almost 90% of respondents to this survey.

Developing others demands from the Army both an individual leader response, and an institutional response. Over the course of this war, the priority to send officers to teach and mentor in professional military education declined to meet operational demands. This practice
must be reversed. If the Army indeed values developing others, then from an institutional perspective, the Army must do what it values and see to it that the very best officers are assigned to teaching and mentoring in professional military schools, and the pre-commissioning sources of West Point, ROTC, and OCS. Consideration should be given to making such assignment a key development requirement before selection to command.

**The third strategic recommendation is to dramatically transform officer talent management.**

Transforming officer talent management will build on some initiatives already begun to ensure assignments and developmental opportunities use complete information about officers beyond the current ORBs and OERs. This report recommends the additional use of improved multi source assessments (360), establishing an assessment center at CGSC to measure competencies and personalities, administering the GRE at CCC to measure intellect in a similar way already done in the enlisted force, and establishing leader assignment and development panels to identify officers early with the requisite strategic skills needed by our Army as well as a developmental assignment path that includes broadening assignments. Such rapid transformation will allow the Army to maximize best employment of its officer talent.

**CONCLUSION**

Finally, this report strongly advocates for the implementation of these strategic recommendations as a unified enterprise while ensuring consistency with other actions involving officer leader development. This is needed because officer leader development remains a shared responsibility between TRADOC, ASA (M&RA), G-1 and HRC, OCAR and DIR, ARNG, and G-3, G-5, and G-7. Coordination of appropriate policies, resources, officer assignments, selections, and as appropriate, changes in statues, must be done in a unity of effort reporting directly to the VCSA and Chief of Staff. Previous experience with officer leader development studies and recommendations reveals that if such a strategic enterprise is not managed as a unified enterprise, it loses its purpose and force of implementation, and results in fragmentation of effort and much less than optimal changes to officer leader development to meet the complex demands of the next twenty years.
The following chapter will outline the methodology and background of this study, and the remaining three chapters and appendices provide the data, conclusions and recommendations concerning the three strategic recommendations discussed above.
CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND, FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY’S STUDY GUIDANCE AND INTENT

In October 2011, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) visited the US Military Academy at West Point and directed the Academy along with the Headquarters Department of the Army Deployment Cycle Support (HQDA DCS), G1, G3, G5, G7, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA M&RA), and several other Army agencies to review Army officer leader development.

This directive came because as stated by the CSA:

Our Army stands on the edge of a major transition from the selfless service and sacrifice of our campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to Continental United States (CONUS) based land forces poised to support across a range of military operations for the Nation.

It is my intent to ensure our Officer Leader Development – paramount in our Army Profession – is structured with a broad framework that sustains both our demonstrated battlefield performance and experience, and best prepares those leaders and future generations of leaders to grow professionally and fulfill our future duties to the Nation.

The CSA directed that the review should: (1) conduct a comprehensive appraisal of officer leader development; (2) determine the major leader attributes and leader development experiences that enabled the superb combat performance of the Army; (3) assess where leader development might have eroded over the past ten years; (4) make recommendations to ensure leader development programs continue to develop and sustain an exceptional officer corps to operate across Army, joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations; (5) be inclusive of all Army officer cohorts to include pre-commissioning; and (6) include personnel external to the Army Profession with appropriate expertise.

The CSA explained that the Army is at an important inflection point in history. Namely, the Army is ending a decade of continuous combat deployments and preparing to accomplish future missions in increasingly complex operational environments while accepting budget and personnel reductions. There are numerous factors influencing officer leader development today.
and moving toward 2020. The following list outlines just some of the variables shaping leader development efforts:

- Strategic pivot to the Pacific Rim
- Afghanistan transition in 2014
- Drawdown of deployed forces
- Force posture shift to Regionally Aligned Forces Concept
- End strength reduction
- Plan to reduce active Brigade Combat Teams (BCT’s) from 45 to 32
- Geopolitical Uncertainty
- Speed of technological advance
- Fiscal Realities
- Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s White Paper on Mission Command (2012)
- 38th CSA’s Marching Orders (2012)
- ADP 6-22/ ADRP 6-22 “Army Leadership”
- Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) 2009 and draft ALDS 2013
- Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): 2012
- New Officer Evaluation Report (OER)
- Army Training Strategy (2012)
- ADP/G-9 Mission Command
- Army MC Strategy (DMCS)AR 350-1 Revision (2013)
- Annual Report US Army Profession Campaign, 2 APR 12 (TRADOC)
- Army MC Strategy 2013
- DA PAM 350-58 (Revision 2013)
- DA PAM 600-3 (Revision 2013)

The intent of this report is to recognize the many factors affecting Army officer leader development and leverage this inflection point in the Army’s mission to capitalize on lessons learned, proactively adjust areas of leader development that need improvement, and chart a course for developing leaders for the Army of 2020.
STUDY DEVELOPMENT, METHODOLOGY, AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Lieutenant General (LTG) David Huntoon and General (Retired) Fred Franks served as the co-chairs of this study and assembled a task force of senior leaders from ASA (M&RA), TRADOC (Combined Arms Center (CAC) and Center for Army Leadership (CAL)), HQDA, Director of the Army Staff (DAS), G-1, HQDA DCS, G-3, G-5, G-7, US Army Human Resources Command (HRC), US Army National Guard (ARNG), US Army Reserve (USAR), Cadet Command, Army civilian scholars, and company, battalion, and brigade combat team commanders. The CSA specifically directed this task force to “make recommendations to reinforce and sustain practices that enabled a decade of superb battlefield performance, to re-establish standards as appropriate, and to boldly transform our systems to best educate, train and inspire leaders for the future.”

Before embarking on this study, the task force conducted a 30-day mission analysis which GEN Odierno approved on November 10, 2011. To achieve the CSA’s priorities, the task force undertook three avenues of research. First, the task force reviewed historical surveys, scholarly writings, and research on Army leader development since 1970 and obtained information on current officer development endeavors in the Army and Department of Defense (DOD). Second, the task force gathered data during in-person interactions with Army officers via conducting command forums and performing site visits to several installations to administer written surveys and conduct sensing sessions with company and field grade officers. Finally, the task force designed and conducted an Army-wide survey of the officer corps of active duty, reserve, and National Guard components.

The task force began the historical review with the 1970 Study of Military Professionalism conducted by the Army War College and reviewed every major Army leadership study conducted to date culminating with the Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) 2011 Survey/Report. The historical review can be found at Appendix A of this report. The task force identified the major themes of these transition periods and identified changes necessary for today’s Army in transition. This historical review informed the task force regarding how the Army approached leader development during previous transition periods including: (1) the transition from active combat in Vietnam to fighting the Cold War; (2) the transition to small-scale operations in Panama and the relative peace of the
late-1980s to fighting the Gulf war; (3) the transition to downsizing the force in the 1990s and to more sustained joint operations; (4) the transition to peace keeping in Kosovo; and (5) the transition to over ten years of sustained deployments in the Global War on Terror following the attacks on September 11, 2001. The methodology of these historical reports also informed the task force in developing this study’s methodology.

The following table depicts the major Army officer leader development studies conducted from 1970 through 2011:

Table I: Army Leader Development Studies 1970 – Present

|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|

The four themes in bold at the bottom of Table I show how the Army approached leader development in each historical context – from recovering in a post-war context, to institutionalizing leader development during the Cold War, to focusing on joint efforts in the 1990s, and to delicately balancing the demands of war-fighting with the necessity of officer leader development during the past decade. The Global War on Terror has been the Nation’s
longest period of continual conflict, and as the conclusion of war seems imminent, the leader development studies of the past few years provide significant guidance on how the Army should prepare its leaders of 2020. Table II highlights the significant Army leader development studies since 2009 culminating with the CASAL Study conducted by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL).

**Table II: Army Leader Development Studies 2009 – Present**

Since 2005, the CASAL has been an established effort by CAL, Combined Arms Center (CAC) to assess and track trends in Army leader attitudes toward Army leader development, the quality of Army leadership, and the contribution of Army leadership to mission accomplishment. CASAL is the source for authoritative assessments of the state of Army leadership and leader development. The CASAL uses a rigorous scientific approach for survey development, data collection, and analysis. Data are collected from thousands of randomly selected officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and Army civilians. In addition, data are
collected from deployed and garrisoned personnel so that comparisons can be made between leadership and leader development in deployed and garrison settings.

The following list reflects significant considerations that resulted from the CASAL 2011 Survey/Report and directed this task force’s analysis:

• 75% of senior leaders view company-grade leaders as effective in maintaining discipline in their units while deployed (only 10% rate company-grade leaders as ineffective). However, these perceptions do not extend to garrison environments, where only 64% of senior leaders view company-grade leaders as effective in maintaining discipline (15% ineffective).

• The competences of a leader to “Develop Others” continues to be the lowest rated core leader competency across all career levels. This trend has existed since 2007. Only 59% of Army leaders are rated effective at developing their subordinates, and only 45% are rated effective at creating or identifying opportunities for leader development.

• 19% of Army leaders report they “never” receive counseling from their immediate superior. 49% report counseling has had a small, very little, or no positive impact on their development.

• 35% of leaders agree that their organization makes time available for self development. This is a decrease from 41% in 2010.

• 65% of Army leaders rate institutional education courses or schools as effective for preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility.

• About half of Army leaders believe personnel evaluations and promotion decisions are accurate. Only forty-one percent believe duty assignments effectively balance force needs with individual Soldier needs and capabilities. Only 20% believe the system identifies ineffective leaders and places them in positions where leadership skills are not as important as in other positions.

Augmenting the historical data on leader development, the task force also received a detailed overview of the current Army and Department of Defense (DOD) leader development initiatives to understand programs already in planning, resourcing, or executing phases. The task force sought this information to avoid duplicating efforts or overlooking important in leader
development strategies due to incorrect assumptions of past programs and extant leader development projects. The task force learned that there are currently seventy-five leader development initiatives overseen by TRADOC, CAC, HQDA DCS G-1, HRC, HQDA DCS G-3, G-5, G-7, or the US Army War College (USAWC). These initiatives include updating and improving leader development and leadership policies, processes and doctrine, the officer education system (OES), career development considerations, the review of manning cycles, multi-level feedback approaches and 360 evaluations, talent management options, timeline lifecycle analysis, diversity considerations, and other leader development projects.

In addition to historical data and information on current leader development initiatives, the task force also considered feedback and data from two types of in-person interactions. First, the task force conducted three, one-and-a-half day commander forums in which it interviewed groups of company, battalion, and brigade level commanders. These forums provided insights from eleven brigade commanders, sixteen battalion commanders, and twenty-one company commanders. Second, the task force obtained data from eight site visits and one on-site session at West Point conducted between January and August 2012, during which the task force first administered written surveys and then held two-hour focus group sessions with a total of 550 company and field grade officer participants. The intent of the on-site and installation visits was to capture company and field grade officers’ voices regarding strengths and weaknesses in current leader development approaches since these individuals experienced the effects of Army leader development while deployed in combat operations. The visits particularly gathered data on what company and field grade officers believe the officer corps needs to sustain leader development, and what new emphasis, improvements or initiatives should be instituted to improve leader development across the officer corps. Installations visited include: Fort Leavenworth, Fort Knox, Fort Campbell, Fort Benning, Fort Indiantown Gap, Fort Dix, Fort Lee, and Fort Stewart.
The following list includes some insights from the in-person commander forums and installation visits:

- “Through decentralized operations, my leaders created a climate of trust that underwrote honest mistakes.”

- “Leaders need empathy, self-awareness (emotional intelligence) / perception and understanding of what the problem requires and choosing the right tools for the job. Value must be placed on the human dimension of leadership.”

- “Leader development gets paid a lot of lip service rather than actually being exercised. LD seems to have taken a back seat to operational needs and day-to-day duties.”

- “Our PME courses and self development are so watered down that the model is failing…literally ANY warm body can pass OBC/BOLC.”

- “Allow for more developmental opportunities outside a prescriptive career timeline.”

- “We need to evaluate what we value.”

- “RC courses are ineffective because too much is crammed into a two week period, and distance learning is often out-dated.”

- “Operational assignments, while certainly most important, are far overvalued above education, institutional assignments, or self development/broadening.”

Finally, to further capture the perspectives of the officer corps the task force initiated an Army-wide survey in July and August of 2012. This survey was sent to all members of the officer corps. Over 12,000 active duty, reserve, and National Guard officers responded to the survey. The Army-wide survey instrument and data are included as appendices in this report. Major findings of the Army-wide survey include:

- 90% believe to a great extent or very great extent their success as an officer depends upon their ability to practice Mission Command.

- 28% believe to a slight extent or not at all that higher headquarters underwrites prudent risk in deployed operations.
• 36.8% say they are satisfied or very satisfied with how professional growth counseling occurs.

• 28.5% say higher headquarters to great extent or very great extent set clear priorities for leader development.

• 88% believe assigning officers who are most qualified to instruct as instructors in PME courses would be either effective or very effective at improving officer leader development.

• 75% believe an individual personnel management system that moves away from year group decisions and broadens the window for completion of key developmental assignments would either be effective or very effective at improving leader development.

• 83% believe an increased number of broadening assignments would either be effective or very effective at improving leader development.

Of particular interest to this task force, the Army-wide survey demonstrated that empathy is a key trait necessary for an effective officer. As Table I displays, 82.1% of survey respondents indicated that empathy either greatly or largely impacts an individual’s ability to lead effectively. Less than one percent indicated that empathy did not impact a leader’s effectiveness.

Table I

| How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader: Empathy (care and concern for Soldiers and others) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Very little or no impact | Small impact | Moderate impact | Large impact | Great impact |
| 6.7% | 17% | 11.6% | 18.3% | 48.3% |
After gathering the data from the historical review of leader development studies, the current Army and DOD leader development initiatives, the commanders forums, and the perspectives of company and field grade officers gathered during the installation site visits, and the Army-wide survey, the task force reviewed, discussed, and analyzed the data to provide its recommendations. This report provides the task force’s strategic level recommendations based on a thorough analysis of all the data gathered during this study.

RECOMMENDATIONS – THE ARMY MUST DEDICATE ITSELF TO PRACTICING MISSION COMMAND, DEVELOPING LEADERS, AND MANAGING THE TALENT IN ITS OFFICER CORPS TO SUCCEED IN 2020

After carefully studying the historical surveys, current leader development initiatives, results obtained from in-person command forums and site visits, and the Army-wide survey, the task force has made three principal recommendations. The subsequent chapters of this report articulate these recommendations in more detail.

Recommendation 1: Embed Mission Command The task force recommends that all domains of the Army should embrace the philosophy and war-fighting functions of Mission Command. Mission Command has already served the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan superbly out of operational necessity, and it is the method that most rapidly develops leaders. The data establishes, however, that neither the philosophy of Mission Command, nor how it applies in non-operational duties, is well understood in the force. As such the Army must continue to find ways to better teach Mission Command and demonstrate its application in all duties with concrete examples. Instilling an understanding and appreciation of Mission Command among NCOs, and their willingness to assist in its implementation is imperative to embedding the doctrine throughout the Army.

Recommendation 2: Develop Others The Army must strengthen its focus on the development of others in the officer leader development system. This must occur with individual leader responsibility to develop others in their organization as well as with the Army demonstrating an institutional response to practice what it values by assigning the best officers to teach and mentor in professional military education, to include, pre-commissioning sources, and CTCs. The Army needs to consider teaching and mentoring assignments in PME as a pre-requisite for command selection.
The Army begins from a position of great strength in this area due to the superb operational performance in this war over the last decade. However, the time demands placed on officers has relegated the development of others to lower priority levels. Re-emphasizing development needs to focus on the individual leader’s improvement and dedication to developing, mentoring, and forming intentional relationship with subordinates, as well as an on ensuring the institutional Army rewards officers who teach and train others. Developing others begins with the Army as an institution valuing the pursuit and committing to include “developing others” as a required competency. The task for also recommends for a re-emphasizing developing emotional intelligence, growing diversity of the force, and equipping leaders with better knowledge of how to create a command climate that develops others.

**Recommendation 3: Officer Career Management** The Army must transform officer career management. The data gathered from all sources in this study demonstrate that the information contained in OERs and ORBs is insufficient to manage the talent of officers. The task force recognizes that 360 evaluations, the MSAF, and “Second Generation MSAF,” described in chapter four, provide valuable developmental information. However, the task force recommends further discussion concerning using these evaluations in selections for promotion and command. Some pilot initiatives in talent management, such as the Green Pages, need to be assessed and presented to the CSA for implementation across the force.

The Army will benefit in at least four ways from implementing these recommendation. First, officers will become more broadly trained, more versatile, and better equipped to achieve mission success in decentralized operational scenarios of the future. Second, the Army will retain the ability to aggregate forces and effects when required. Third, Army officer leaders will be dedicated to developing warriors capable of serving in dynamic operational environments. Finally, the Army will obtain more detailed information to make informed and precise personnel decisions that will pair officers’ talents with duty requirements to ensure the Army is best positioned to manage its talent and meet the security threats of the future.¹

¹ Appendix C has an enormous amount of opinion data from the Officer corps that is not analyzed in this report but stands available to research analysts and policy makers to use as the Army moves forward in transforming its leader development strategy.
“As we face an uncertain future and declining operational demand, we must develop leaders with the breadth and depth of experience necessary to meet tomorrow’s demands. **First, this requires embedding Mission Command in our professional culture.** We must empower Soldiers, Squads, and Commanders at every level so that they may rapidly respond to the demands of the environment in which they operate. This includes fostering a climate in which shared understanding, mutual trust, and a common sense of purpose are the standard every single day.”

General Odierno, Association of the United States Army Annual Meeting
October 23, 2012

**PHILOSOPHY AND WAR-FIGHTING FUNCTIONS OF MISSION COMMAND**

The Army is poised at a strategic inflection point in American history. The brave Soldiers who have selflessly and courageously served the Nation during the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan must now return home and prepare to help the Nation meet a wide spectrum of new challenges. The Army must act now to develop proactively innovative approaches to leader development based upon the experiences of the past decade. As the 38th CSA outlined in his guidance for this task force, officer leader development must be “structured with a broad framework that sustains both our demonstrated battlefield performance and experience, and best prepares those leaders and future generations of leaders to grow professionally and fulfill their future duties to the Nation.”

The task force has determined that the way to achieve the CSA’s aim is for the Army to embrace the philosophy and war-fighting functions of Mission Command in all domains of the Army Profession. ADRP 6-0 explains that Mission Command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. The philosophy of Mission Command is guided by the principles of:

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
- Create shared understanding
- Provide a clear commander’s intent
- Exercise disciplined initiative
- Use mission orders
- Accept prudent risk

The philosophy of Mission Command when applied to war-fighting enables commanders and staffs to balance the art of command and the science of control. In a war-fighting context, Mission Command should be viewed as a system established by the commander that integrates the arrangement of personnel, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment to enable the unit to conduct operations. How a commander chooses to balance the art of command and the science of control will vary given the operational context. Mission Command is often misunderstood as a philosophy and war-fighting structure in which a subordinate obtains the authority to command autonomously and without input or oversight from the superior. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Mission Command philosophy requires constant adjustments in the level of control, communications, risk, and initiative required of subordinate commanders to accomplish war-fighting functions. COL Tom Guthrie, Director of the Center for Army Leadership, describes the inherent flexibility of Mission Command:

Army leadership is Mission Command leadership and vice versa. Good leaders tailor their leadership approach according to the mission; the operational environment; and the experience, training, proficiency, and skill of their staff and their subordinate leaders and units. Based on these and other factors, commanders decide if more control or decentralization is required. This is not new and has not changed with Mission Command, but it does imply that a certain amount of decentralization is required for Mission Command to be successful, and this is where the Army might resist completely embracing Mission Command, for true decentralization would require leaders to accept the fact that they will be consciously abdicating the responsibility of the outcome to subordinates. If we cannot embrace that sort of true decentralization then Mission Command in execution will be viewed as hypocritical.

The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, which involved an enemy uniquely camouflaged among non-combatants and ever-evolving techniques in counterinsurgency, required disciplined and decentralized decision making by junior officers at the tactical level. More senior leaders had to underwrite prudent risks and trust that their subordinates would act within the
commander’s articulated intent to achieve strategic success. To obtain victory in future campaigns, officers will have to demonstrate these same competencies in Mission Command. Mission Command helps officers to develop and assume responsibilities more quickly and be more capable as senior officers. It also teaches junior officers to create their own Mission Command environment. Early and consistent cultivation of Mission Command will impart to the Army an officer corps capable of achieving mission success in disaggregated, decentralized operational scenarios, while also retaining the conventional ability to aggregate forces and effects when required.

THE DATA DEMONSTRATE THAT MISSION COMMAND BENEFITS THE FORCE AND THE FORCE BELIEVES THAT MISSION COMMAND IS VALUABLE TO OFFICER DEVELOPMENT

Many officers who participated in the study’s forums and site-visits attest to the value of Mission Command. Below are some of the task force’s key research results on Mission Command obtained from the Army-wide survey:

- 90% of the officers surveyed believe to a great extent or very great extent their success as an officer depends upon their ability to consistently accomplish the mission.
- 65% of the officers surveyed agree or strongly agree that Mission Command has contributed to the successes the Army experienced in the campaigns since September 11, 2001.

Below is just a sample of what officers reported during forums and installation visits:

- “1-14 CAV was deploying from Fort Lewis to support JTF-North along the US-Mexico border, which was a high-payoff training and leader development event in several dimensions. It was a decentralized operation that combined interagency (US Border Patrol) border operations (screen missions), urban operations training, and small arms qualification. This stretched our tactical, leader, logistics, and communication skills extensively and was the best training event I’ve ever undertaken.” - BN CDR
- “Through decentralized operations, my leaders created a climate of trust that underwrote honest mistakes.” - BN CDR
- “Operationalize Mission Command. Train like we fight. In order to sustain and develop leaders absent the stimulus of the decentralized and
ambiguous OIF and OEF environments that necessitated Mission Command and ultimately refined and developed the exceptionally adaptive and agile/creative leaders of high “EQ”, we must operationalize Mission Command as the way our Army operates on a daily basis; in garrison and in war. Transition the Army from a centralized to decentralized approach- using intent, standards, discipline.” - Senior Leader Panel member

“Empower junior leaders by avoiding overly centralized operations in garrison.” - CPT, Fort Benning

“Increased flexibility in methods and systems empowers leaders to train within boundaries set by higher authority.” - 1LT, Fort Benning

“I was allowed to show flexibility and initiative. Junior leaders have done a great job.” - MAJ, Fort Knox

Table I below shows that nearly 90% of the officers surveyed (n: 10,791) believe that an environment, such as a Mission Command environment, that encourages initiative is critical to their development:

**Table I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>59.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the overwhelming enthusiasm expressed for Mission Command, the data obtained through the command forums, site visits, and through the Army-wide survey demonstrate that the force is concerned that in winding down from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army will establish stifling, risk-averse, zero-defect command environments instead of embracing Mission Command. Indeed, the Army-wide survey suggests that this
phenomenon has already started to occur. The Army likes to control when it can. The highly kinetic, volatile, and dispersed nature of deployed operations in many cases did not allow battlefield commanders to over-control. Rather, commanders were forced to issue guidance and allow their subordinate commanders to show adaptability and take prudent risks with the commander’s intent. In this type of environment, junior officers excelled. They learned to be decisive and adaptable, and they developed mutual trust and shared understanding with those they led.

While many units exercise the philosophy and principles of Mission Command, ample data demonstrate that Mission Command has not been implemented universally in the Army. The following comments are indicative of the testimony the task force heard during the forums and installation visits:

“`Our leader development model is out of balance; not an indictment of the model, just an effect of OPTEMPO. Operational requirements trump other leader development opportunities.”’ - CO CDR

“`OPTEMPO and mission consequences make it very difficult to learn from failure. This can result in the best CO CDR in the unit being a LTC.”’ - CO CDR

“`The Army needs to foster an environment that allows junior leaders the ability to learn and make mistakes.”’ - MAJ, Fort Stewart

“`Trust must be incorporated to empower junior leaders so that they can ‘own’ the training.”’ - COL, Council of Colonels, FT Knox

The Army-wide survey polled participants about the extent to which their higher headquarters was guided principles of the Mission Command philosophy. Significant results include:

- 37% of those surveyed believe to a great or very great extent their higher headquarters builds cohesive teams; 38% believe only to a slight extent or not at all.
- 46% of those surveyed believe to a great or a very great extent their higher headquarters encourages mutual trust; 27% believe only to a slight extent or not at all.
- 47% of those surveyed believe to a great or a very great extent their higher headquarters provides clear commander’s intent; 24% believe only to a slight extent or not at all.
49% of those surveyed believe to a great or a very great extent their higher headquarters allows disciplined initiative, 22% believe only to a slight extent or not at all.

42% of those surveyed believe to a great or a very great extent their higher headquarters underwrites prudent risk in deployed operations, 28% believe only to a slight extent or not at all.

37% of those surveyed believe to a great or a very great extent their higher headquarters underwrites prudent risk in garrison operations, 30% believe only to a slight extent or not at all.

To ensure the data were not skewed by a particular part of the sample set, the Mission Command data were cross-tabbed with the demographic data collected in the survey to determine any effects on the responses to the opinion questions asked above. The demographic data used included: rank; component; gender; rank of immediate superior; and assignment location. Effect size was measured using Cohen’s d. The two correlations proved significant. Namely, junior officers did not believe that higher headquarters allowed disciplined initiative to nearly the same extent expressed by senior officers. In fact, junior officer survey participants had a significantly lower opinion of the extent to which higher headquarters allowed them to take disciplined initiative and prudent risks when compared to senior officer respondents. One explanation could be the knowledge and experience junior officers have operating in a Mission Command environment. A more alarming explanation might be that these junior officers are operating in environments that are not guided by these two principles of Mission Command. Tables II through V below summarize these findings:

**Table II**

“To what extent in your current assignment does your Higher headquarters allow disciplined initiative?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>1.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>2258</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>1.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>1.247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale
1: Not at all  
2: Slight Extent  
3: Moderate Extent  
4: Great Extent  
5: Very Great Extent

Table III

Effect Size based upon Cohen’s $d$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2LT</th>
<th>1LT</th>
<th>CPT</th>
<th>MAJ</th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>COL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Small-Med</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV

“To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters allow you to take prudent risks in how you develop or support the development of your Soldiers?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>1.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>2204</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>2258</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>1.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>1.247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale
1: Not at all  
2: Slight Extent  
3: Moderate Extent  
4: Great Extent  
5: Very Great Extent
### Table V - Effect Size based upon Cohen’s $d$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>2LT</th>
<th>1LT</th>
<th>CPT</th>
<th>MAJ</th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>COL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Small-Med</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Small-Med</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Near Med</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RECOMMENDATION TO EMBRACE MISSION COMMAND AS THE GUIDING LEADER DEVELOPMENT MODEL THROUGHOUT THE FORCE**

Mission Command must be universally learned and implemented as the guiding leader philosophy and war-fighting for the Army of 2020. In a Mission Command environment, the Army will cultivate and grow the next generation of leaders. As the data above reveal, there is still a large part of the force that is functioning—or perceived to be functioning—in a command environment that does not practice Mission Command. For officers serving in units that are not guided by Mission Command, it unlikely that they are receiving meaningful leader development.

The Army must embed the principles of Mission Command in officer leader development. Implementing Mission Command requires a comprehensive and continuous education and training campaign throughout the force. As the Mission Command doctrine states,
“Commanders at all levels need education, rigorous training, and experience to apply these principles effectively.” The task force is currently focused on Mission Command at the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Army levels, especially in the form of the relevant doctrinal updates released in 2012. However, consistent with updating the Army leader development strategy, the task force recommends that the CSA direct the Army Leader Development Forum (ALDF) to place implementing Mission Command throughout the force into this strategy.

At a more tactical level the task force offers four recommendations to implementing Mission Command. First, The Army should use the Combat Training Center program to coach, mentor, and train leaders at all levels on the philosophy and war-fighting principles of Mission Command. Second, it is imperative to educate raters and senior raters on how to use the Officer Evaluation Report (OER) to evaluate officers on Mission Command. Third, initiate an Army-wide writing campaign on how Mission Command should be implemented in today’s environment. Fourth, the annual CASAL survey should include questions to determine which areas of Mission Command need emphasis. Finally, the task force recommends teaching Mission Command case studies in professional military education (PME) by means of methods such as the “leader challenge” used by Center for the Advancement of Leader Development and Organizational Learning (CALDOL). This interactive and experiential learning model has proven effective for officer learning at all ranks.

Army officer leader development can occur only if an individual wants to learn, is willing to commit time and energy to learning, is supported by his or her superior in learning, and is part of an organization that values learning. Mission Command is essential to setting the proper conditions for leader development to occur. An important element of this learning construct, and a view expressed by participants in this study, is that Mission Command cannot be confined exclusively to the operational domain. Mission Command is not doctrine designed for combat theaters alone. Leader development occurs in institutional and self-development domains through a continuous and life-long process of training, education, and experience. Without Mission Command, individual curiosity and enthusiasm is reduced, commanders focus more on the mission and less on the people, and the environment for individual growth becomes stagnant.
CHAPTER THREE
THE ARMY MUST REFOCUS ON DEVELOPING OTHERS

“As the Army transitions back to a relatively slower operational tempo, Soldiers are looking for leaders at all levels to re-learn those development skills that served us so well in the decades between Vietnam and the current wars.”


PHILOSOPHY OF DEVELOPING OTHERS

Developing others is an essential responsibility of all members of the Army Profession. Competency in developing others furthers the goal of Mission Command which is so vital to the Army’s success. Professions that fail to develop others forfeit learning opportunities that allow organizations to excel when faced with challenges, crises, or transition. World-class organizations assure their future success by developing their junior leaders. The Army’s goal should be to assure its future leaders are just as talented and equipped, if not more so, than its current leadership. Leader development is not just a transactional arrangement in which performance begets an assignment, reward, acknowledgment, or promotion. Rather the goal of leader development is to transform people throughout a lifelong pursuit in training and education. As described by leadership scholar Dr. Bernard Bass:

Why is there such an interest in transformational leadership? Perhaps it is because transformational leadership, with its emphasis on intrinsic motivation and on the positive development of followers, represents a more appealing view of leadership compared to the seemingly “cold,” social exchange process of transaction leadership. Perhaps it is because transformational leadership provides a better fit for leaders in today’s complex work groups and organizations, where followers not only seek an inspirational leader to help guide them through an uncertain environment but where followers also want to be challenged and to feel empowered if they are to be loyal to high performers.

It is crucial to nest developmental efforts within the strategic planning guidance of the Army so that when

“With a greater proportion of our forces returning to home station, we must ensure that new military expertise continues to be developed and passed on to the next generation of Army professionals.”

ADRP 1 “The Army Profession” 2012
called upon the force is ready to respond decisively to the varied threats it will face in the future. The operational tempo of the past decade is no longer an acceptable alibi for neglecting to develop others. The Army demands better; and our Nation deserves it. If the Army does not commit to the developmental domain of the profession, the treasure of military experience in its current officers will vanish from its ranks as people retire or leave the Army. Soldiers do not need to be patronized or pandered to. Rather soldiers need leaders to impart to them the lessons and experienced gather through the last decade of warfare. Soldiers rightfully need leaders to act selflessly, to place a subordinate’s time above their own, and to commit to establishing developmental relationships that are meaningful and enduring. This development of other must occur in order to maintain the expertise and skills currently present in the Army.

**THE DATA DEMONSTRATE THAT THE FORCE VALUES DEVELOPMENT BUT THIS COMPETENCY HAS BEEN SACRIFICED IN FAVOR OF OTHER PRIORITIES**

The Annual CASAL survey which assesses and tracks trends attitudes from Army leaders about Army leader development has examined how officers view the development of others. The “develops others” category continues to be the lowest rated core leader competency across all career levels. 59% of Army leaders are rated effective at developing their subordinates, while only 45% are rated effective at creating or identifying opportunities for leader development. 59% of leaders agree their organization expects them to participate in self development (other than mandatory training). This statistic is a decrease from 64% in the 2010 CASAL survey. Only 35% of leaders agree that their organization makes time available for self development. This statistic is down from 41% in 2010.

The Army-wide survey that this task force obtained raises some concern regarding the Army’s leader development acumen. For example:

- 53% of survey respondents are either neither satisfied/or dissatisfied, dissatisfied or strongly dissatisfied with their understanding of how professional growth counseling occurs.

“Commanders must once again be held accountable to ensure their units are capable of performing their assigned missions, apply doctrinally sound principles in training, develop their subordinates, and exercise stewardship of resources.”

The Army Training Strategy 2012
• 41% believe to a slight extent or not at all that higher headquarters sets clear priorities for their unit’s leader development plan.

It is alarming that of the nearly 12,000 officers who completed the survey nearly around half do not understand how professional growth counseling occurs. Either this counseling is occurring and the respondents do not recognize it, or it is not happening effectively. The worst possible explanation would be that professional growth counseling is not taking place at all. The findings highlighted above are likely related; if leaders fail to set clear priorities for development of others, there is high likelihood that developing others will be sacrificed to complete competing mission priorities. Developing others must be part of every unit’s mission.

As with the Mission Command data, this data on development was cross tabbed with officer rank using standardized difference between means (Cohen’s 𝑑). Unlike the Mission Command data, however, the difference was statistically insignificant; rank had no influence on the variance between means. Thus, the need to develop others, and the lack of guidance in this area, is equally felt among the ranks surveyed.

The data demonstrate that many participants in the study’s forums and site visits value development. Below is just a sample of what officers expressed during forums and installation visits:

• “Leaders need empathy, self-awareness (Emotional Intelligence) / perception and understanding of what the problem requires and choosing the right tools for the job. Value must be placed on the human dimension of leadership.” - BDE CDR
• “Mentoring and other leader-based ‘passing’ of leader competencies and TTPs is nearly non-existent, yet ought to be prevalent.” – Study Participant (Study Participant (SP)
• “Leader development gets paid a lot of lip service rather than actually being exercised. LD seems to have taken a back seat to operational needs and day-to-day duties.” – SP
• “[The definition of Leader Development] is missing the good/great leaders’ requirement to train up the next generation of great leaders. Mentoring and other leader-based ‘passing’ of leader competencies and TTPs is nearly non-existent, yet ought to be prevalent.” –SP
• “Our PME courses and self development are so watered down that the model is failing…literally ANY warm body can pass OBC/BOLC [Officer Basic Course/Basic Officer Leader Course].” – SP

These statements support that the officer leader development framework must be transformational, multidimensional, continuous, progressive, and lifelong. This development must occur in the operational, institutional and self-development domains. As the Chief of Staff articulated in his 38th CSA “marching orders” set of priorities, the Army must “adapt leader development to meet our future security challenges in an increasingly uncertain and complex strategic environment.” This study concludes that development of others still requires a significant amount of work in order to meet the CSA’s guidance.

There is no doubt that the force wants and needs development. Every successful Army officer has had a mentor, coach, or counselor who invested a great deal of effort in that officer’s personal development. Developmental relationships define the Army and distinguish it from other organizations less interested in developing their human capital. People are the Army’s treasure, and everyone who joins deserves someone to take a close and personal role in his or her life. In addition, the US Army is diverse and diversity in leadership is an invaluable dimension of leader development to ensure that the entire team contributes to mission accomplishment, thus increasing unity strength. There are dimensions of the Army culture that may be perceived to run counter to this notion. For example, at the very heart of the Soldier’s Creed are phrases—“I am a Warrior,” “I will never accept defeat,” and “I will never quit”—that may inspire a sense that a Soldier can do it on his or her own. Nothing could be further from the truth. The second half of the phrase, “I am a warrior” is “I am a member of a team.” Though the Soldier’s Creed relies on individual strength, it places that strength within the mission of the team and with a common adherence to Army values. Development of individuals only strengthens this team. At the core of the Army ethos are intangible motivations of the human spirit that require individual relationships to cultivate and inspire constant personal improvement. Army leaders can do nothing alone. Army leaders must develop others if they hope to lead effectively – the Army fights and wins as a team. Tables I and II below overwhelmingly indicate that survey participants consider developmental competencies (developing subordinates and self-development) to be essential to effective leadership.
The data confirm that the force believes that effective leadership requires a commitment to self-development and the development of others. This is perhaps one of the most rewarding components of being a member of the Army Profession. As stated so clearly in *The Armed Forces Officer*:

Most officers find the shared nature of military service rewarding. Beyond individual reward or status, they value the engagement with similarly motivated peers, superiors, and subordinates in a
common and challenging enterprise of great worth to the nation. Often those individuals with whom one serves become the most instructive teachers and most inspiring role models.

The study concludes that there are two significant reasons why the current developmental environment is not meeting expectations. First, as shown in Table III below, there is a significant part of the force that is not receiving adequate guidance from their higher headquarters regarding leader development.

**Table III**

| To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters set clear priorities for your unit’s leader development plans? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all | Slight extent | Moderate extent | Great extent | Very great extent |
| 16.7 | 26.1 | 28.7 | 20.0 | 8.5 |

42% of survey participants feel that their higher headquarters is doing a poor job of setting priorities for their unit’s leader development plan. The Army-wide survey asked participants “to what extent the following items interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.”

- Insufficient time
- AR 350-1 requirements for mandatory training
- Lack of emphasis or support from your higher command
- Lack of resources (equipment, ranges, personnel present for duty, etc.)
- Lack of available, realistic training scenarios
- Absence of trust within the unit
- Communication breakdowns from/to higher command
- Lack of empowerment (freedom of action) to execute Leader Development
The results were alarming:

- 50% of survey participants said that a **lack of time** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.
- 35% of survey participants said that **AR350-1 requirements** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.
- 33% of survey participants said that a **lack of emphasis or support from their higher headquarters** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.
- 30% of survey participants said that a **lack of resources** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.
- 25% of survey participants said that a **lack of available, realistic training scenarios** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.
- 22% of survey participants said that an **absence of trust** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.
- 33% of survey participants said that **communications breakdowns from/to higher command** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.
- 26% of survey participants said that a **lack of empowerment** to a great extent or very great extent interfered with an effective leader development plan in their current unit or organization.

It is the responsibility of commanders across the force to remove these barriers to successful leader development. In today’s Army there are no excuses for a leader’s failure to understand their unit’s developmental environment, or to adapt and design innovative methods to ensure effective leader development. The results obtained in the command forums, site visits and Army-wide survey are dangerously indicative that the profession is either not taking leader
development serious enough, or that the Army’s leaders are mistaken about their priorities. Regardless of the explanation, leader development is not occurring at the level, quality, and consistency required for maintaining and sustaining a world-class fighting force.

Another reason why the Army’s current developmental environment is not meeting expectations is that the force does not understand many components of the leader development system. Below are some significant findings:

- 27% of survey participants are either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with their understanding of the new Army level initiatives for leader development.
- 26% of survey participants are either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with their understanding of what the Army expects them to do in self-development.
- 37% of survey participants are either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with their understanding of how to obtain a mentor.

**RECOMMENDATIONS THE ARMY MUST BE INTENTIONAL ABOUT DEVELOPING ITS LEADERS AND MUST REWARD WHAT IT CLAIMS TO VALUE**

The study offers two principal recommendations for development. First, the Army must educate leaders about, and enforce their performance of, developmental responsibilities. Second, the Army must strengthen the focus on developing others in the Army leader development system. This task force acknowledges that leaders need instruction on the philosophy and science of effective leader development across the three domains. The study confirms that the force desires effective leader development, but the Army is not meeting the force’s expectations. Current Army leaders have had rich developmental experiences that may be historically unprecedented. It would be an egregious waste of opportunity and experiential capital if the wisdom, talent and knowledge entrenched in the corps was not used to leverage the development of subordinates. Developing others is part of the mission. It is a professional mandate. If neglected, it will be a missed opportunity to help others grow quickly given the vast experience of today’s force. The Army needs and wants an officer leader development framework that is multidimensional, continuous, progressive, and lifelong, that occurs in the operational, institutional and self-development domains. Accordingly, the study recommends that Army leaders must refocus their priorities to emphasize the duty to develop others wherever they are assigned in the force, and they must use all methods available.
The Army must educate leaders about, and enforce their performance in developmental responsibilities. The doctrine exists to educate leaders, but it is not being effectively taught and consequently not representative how Army leaders must develop themselves and train their subordinates. ADRP 7.0 “Training Units and Developing Leaders” clearly outlines the purpose and process of leader development:

Leader development is an individual responsibility and it must be purposefully guided by the institution, leaders, and mentors. Through this process, the synthesis of an individual’s training, education, and experience contribute to individual growth over the course of a lifetime. Leader development is a mutually shared responsibility between the institutional Army (example: schoolhouse), the operational force (example: tactical units) and the individual (example: a correspondence course). As illustrated in the below diagram, the three components of leader development occur in each of the three domains. Stakeholders in each domain cannot abdicate responsibility for any particular component of leader development to another domain. Surrounding the model are peer and developmental relationships that effectively deepen development. These relationships are critical to growth and involve sharing, counseling, coaching, mentoring and role modeling.

Leader development is, in part, an individual responsibility, and it must be purposefully guided by institutional structures, as well as by individual leaders and mentors. Through this process, the synthesis of an individual’s training, education, and experience contributes to individual growth over the course of a lifetime. Leader development is a responsibility shared among the institutional Army (example: schoolhouse), the operational force (example: tactical units), and the individual (example: a correspondence course). As illustrated in the diagram below, the three components of leader development occur in all three domains. Stakeholders in each domain cannot abdicate responsibility for any particular component of leader development to another domain. Under-girding the model are peer and developmental relationships that effectively deepen development. These relationships are critical to growth and involve sharing, counseling, coaching, mentoring and role modeling.
ADRP 7.0 also outlines the Principles of Leader Development:

Every Army leader is responsible for the professional development of their subordinate military and civilian leaders. Leaders execute this significant responsibility by assigning their subordinates to developmental positions and through training, education, coaching, and, in special cases, mentoring. Leader development is an investment, since good leaders will develop not only good training but also other good leaders.

The Army’s principles of leader development
Lead by example.
Develop subordinate leaders.
Create a learning environment for subordinate leaders.
Train leaders in the art and science of Mission Command.
Train to develop adaptive leaders.
Train leaders to think critically and creatively.
Train your leaders to know their subordinates and their families.

Given the principles of leader development and framework for Army leader development, the task force offers the following observations and recommendations for leader development with respect to each of the three questions the CSA’s posed in his study guidance. The recommendations are broken into the three components of leader development – training, education, and officer experience.
**Question #1:** Determine the leader attributes and developmental experiences that enabled the superb combat performance of our Army. Said even more plainly, “What made our officers successful over the past 10+ years”?

**Training** – The Army generally enjoyed the luxury of training for the “known” based on known Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycles, Patch Chart, and known location of employment. The Army trained to codified standards at both individual and collective levels in accordance with fairly prescriptive deployment preparation/certification requirements. Given the OPTEMPO, albeit high, the Army lived a “scripted” existence. Many things were planned, resourced, and provided.

**Education** - From 2001 to approximately 2003, the vast majority of officers were provided institutional PME prior to assuming their next level of responsibility. This education was critical to officer development.

**Experiences** - Beginning in approximately 2002-2003, an officer’s operational experience was most valued. More responsibility and more initiative were required by young leaders than possibly at any other point in the Army’s history. This OPTEMPO required Mission Command. Whether it was consciously employed or not, senior leaders articulated their intent to junior officers, and junior officer executed the mission. The guidance given by the senior leader paired with allowing junior leaders to execute the mission contributed to the vast success of the Army in the past ten years and allowed junior officers to develop rapidly.

**Question #2:** Assess where officer development opportunities may have eroded over the past 10+ years?

**Training** – Officer development suffered because the Army was not accustomed to training for the “unknown.” Moreover, training Management, the Command Supply Discipline Program (CSDP), and maintenance systems are currently not well understood because all of these components were provided to force, for example, ARFORGEN, Left Behind Equipment (LBE), US Manufacturing Program (MANTECH), and Theater Provided Equipment, (TPE). Resourcing and prioritization decisions were often outsourced to senior Mission Commanders, or Installation Management Command (IMCOM) as opposed to the unit chain of command. Though removing decisions from the chain of command was done, in large part, because of operational tempo and road-to-war timelines, this practice eschewed opportunities for leader
development. Finally, it was not uncommon for commanders to receive “just in time soldiers and equipment” during the lead-up to deployments. This practice looked efficient on PowerPoint slides, but it was not well synchronized with individual or collective training gates leading up to deployments, and some soldiers did not receive appropriate training.

**Education** – In the OPTEMPO of the last two campaigns, PME was treated like deferred maintenance. Also, a pervasive culture emerged that favored “operational experience over education.” This sub-culture incentivized the sacrifice of education in favor of additional deployments. Oftentimes, PME was attended after it was needed or mattered in order to check a box rather than to develop officers. Finally “developing leaders” became removed from units and treated as something “TRADOC did” and slowly became a synonym for “education.”

**Experience** – Though mission tempo was high, in some ways the opportunity and incentive for junior officer to seek ways to broaden their experience and develop eroded. Despite a desire for Mission Command, there was little to no acceptance of leaders taking tactical risks. This resulted in officer position “lock-down” for the duration of deployments and stifled officer development for up to a year. This practice led to the loss of position/assignment progression and promoted “talent hoarding” by the superior at the expense of subordinate development. Additionally, the culture became “more is better” rather than realizing that well-developed officers are better. 36+ months in command, or 4 years in major key developmental (KD) positions was not uncommon. Because of OPTEMPO, there was decreased opportunity for officer “sense-making” at the individual level. Officers did a lot of things but without proper reflection time, did they really learn? Finally, as a result of task/mission requirements, the personal and professional time spent between officer and rater/senior rater decreased (counseling, dialogue, coaching, mentoring).

**Question #3:** Determine the investments that need to be made. Said another way, given all that we think we learned from this study, where do we go from here?

Generally, the officer corps is in very good shape, so the answer to the question comes down to will the Army acknowledge what it truly values in its officers, and will the Army then be willing to reward, resource, and apply energy to what it says it values. Past leader development studies demonstrate that the Army values education and broadening experience, yet it consistently rewards traditional operational experience of the education and broadening
experiences it espouses. The Army cannot afford the hypocrisy of saying that it values certain things such as education and broadened officers and then demonstrate the opposite by rewarding otherwise. The Army must choose what it values and then commit to promoting those values. For example:

- If the Army says that PME is important, it should value what is says by providing quality PME at the appropriate time.
- The Army should establish policies that board selects Captain’s Career Course (CCC) and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) teachers by HQDA or by the proponent and assign them to instruct because they are talented officers and future battalion commanders.
- With a return to “competitive” ILE, the coursework should be relevant and rigorous enough to separate underperforming students.
- If the Army truly values education, then it should increase Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) opportunities without always bringing “utilization tours” into the discussion.
- If another fairly large-scale conflict breaks out the Army cannot empty the schoolhouses to man formations.
- Send the best company commanders in the BCT to an Olmstead Scholarship rather than giving them a second company command which will result in the officers doing more of the same rather than broadening their skill-set and leadership abilities.
- Send the best MAJ in the BCT to a joint assignment, or to instruct, or to train with industry rather than getting a 3rd or 4th KD.
- Send our very best and brightest to teach in the institution in order for them to “give back” and then reward them with promotion and command selection.
- Change board guidance so that the Army truly rewards what we claim to value.
- Developing our subordinate leaders must be a top priority.
- The Army must evaluate a battalion’s or BCT’s leader development program for its comprehensiveness.
- The Army can no longer allow leaders to “hoard talent” in order to make their own lives easier, at the expense of subordinates’ developmental opportunities.
• The Army must develop a program that provides reserve-component officers the opportunity to serve on a variety of Army command staffs.

• The Army must develop a predictive training/operational model for active-component and reserve units to train and then deploy together.

• The Army should incorporate social intelligence as a developmental objective in the Army Leader Development Strategy.

• The Army should renew Project Warrior whereby officers and NCOs are assigned to CHCs then to PME schools. (Project Warrior was kept alive by the MCOE at Ft. Benning for NCOs but operation commitments cause the officer portion to be abandoned.)

A stated previously in this chapter, the current force has amassed an unprecedented amount of talent, skill, and experience in war-fighting. The officer corps is strong. The Army sits poised in a unique position. It can choose to wield this talent to develop junior officers through institutional learning, mentorship, and promoting development within the chain of command. Additionally, the Army can improve the talent that its veteran officers have by broadening their skills through sending them to joint staffs or to teach. If the Army does not seize this opportunity to use the talent in its human capital, it will truly have squandered this unique opportunity. The data are clear that the force values development and wants to be developed. The Army must implement development of others, both by an individual commitment to develop others, and by an Army institutional commitment to assign the very best to teach and mentor PME in the institution, to include pre-commissioning sources, in order to succeed in 2020.
The overarching Army of 2020 goal is to determine how we transition from today’s force to the Army of 2020 in an era of fiscal austerity and still accomplish all that the Army must do as part of the Joint force. This will better support the full range of Joint Force Commanders’ future requirements, creating opportunities to better achieve national objectives.

Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2012

BACKGROUND AND PHILOSOPHY

The personnel management of the US Army’s officer corps has historically been the subject of vigorous study and well-intentioned modifications. One constant theme in officer personnel management has been the desire to move away from monolithic processes and shift instead to a more personalized selection, promotion, assignment, and development approach for officers. For example, in hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in July of 1947, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Chief of Staff, Army stated:

I think that no great argument would have to be presented to show that our promotion system has been unsatisfactory. Until we got to the grade of general officer, it was absolutely a lock step promotion. Specifically, we need to tell the young fellow who is coming in what his prospects are, how he stands, what he needs to do, [and] what standards he has to reach in order to go ahead.¹

The Career Planning Program, one of the many improvements adopted by the Army as a result of the Officer Personnel Management Act of 1947, attempted to tailor officer careers by individualizing officer management. The program’s primary objective was to recognize officers’ desires by employing personnel where their abilities and aptitudes could best be used to accomplish the Army’s missions. Despite adjustments to the personnel system in the post-WWII era, however, officers continued to be selected, developed, and promoted more in step with a timeline than by matching individual officers with the needs of the Army.

The officer leader development system remained largely unchanged until 1970, when, following the My Lai incident investigation, the Chief of Staff, Army directed the US Army War
College to study the state of professionalism in the officer corps. The study concluded that one of the three principal areas requiring change was “the philosophy and mechanics of officer career management.” The following year, the new Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) was introduced. The OPMS was intended to establish high professional and personal standards while giving individual officers more control over their careers. This new system recognized three requirements: a) officers qualified in high command and prominent managerial responsibility; b) officers filling assignments requiring in-depth expertise in specialty areas; and c) officers whose professional qualifications were outside the other categories. According to its architects, the new OPMS would be:

A management system that promotes optimum utilization of individual skills, aptitudes, interests and desires. It insures suitable identification, development, utilization of potential, and retention of officers best qualified for these distinct divisions throughout a normal career.²

Despite the lofty goals of OPMS, officer personnel management continued to fall short of expectations. Congress again attempted to resolve the situation in 1980 with the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). Although DOPMA was envisioned as a radical transformation of the officer personnel management system, it continued to reinforce the “one size fits all” approach to officer career management. A RAND report describes the eventual impact of DOPMA on officer personnel management:

While DOPMA broke new ground (permanent sliding-scale grade tables, single promotion system, augmentation of reserve officers into regular status), it was basically an evolutionary document, extending the existing paradigm (grade controls, promotion opportunity and timing objectives, up-or-out, and consistency across the services) that was established after World War II.³

Unfortunately, the situation today is remarkably unchanged. An examination of today’s officer personnel management system shows that, despite recent paradigm shifts in technology, information management, and war-fighting, critical decisions concerning the selection, assignment, and development of Army officers continue to be made with very little individualized information. Given the dramatic challenges confronting the Army as a result of a complex national security environment as well as operating in an austere fiscal environment, it is imperative to finally make significant steps towards changing officer career management. The
following recommendations harness the ability to use individualized information to make more informed decisions about the selection, promotion, assignment, and development of officers.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPLEMENT TOOLS TO MANAGE OFFICER TALENT

Recommendation 1: Implement the “Green Pages” concept.

For years, International Business Machines (IBM) Corporation had an internal phone directory called Blue Pages that identified its employees and provided standard phone book information. With a shift towards tele-working and hot-desking, however, IBM realized that it lacked an effective system to find expertise across its organization and it desperately needed more information about its employees. With a dispersed workforce, managers could not efficiently identify or match expertise with requirements within the organization. The solution was to add profile pages to the Blue Pages that employees could update and subsequently be tagged with keywords. Blue Pages shifted from a simple directory to a social networking tool enabling the organization to find the right people and skills.

Green Pages takes IBM’s Blue Pages approach and provides the Army with much more information to make critical decisions regarding assignments, development, and selection. Instead of relying solely on the standard packet of Officer Evaluation Reports (OER), Officer Record Brief (ORB), and official DA photo, Green Pages combines information inputted by the officer with official file information to create a comprehensive profile. Individual officers provide a profile containing expertise, experiences, accomplishments gained through the Army, college activities, hobbies, and even family relationships.

The usefulness of Green Pages becomes evident in the assignment process. Typical Army assignments are routinely determined using the OER, ORB, and a preference sheet. Absent from the decision making process, however, are the officer’s interests, skills, knowledge, or life experiences. Knowing that an officer was an exchange student in Moscow during her junior year or that an officer worked for a non-governmental organization before he joined the Army may be critical information in the assignment process. Green Pages can also input information from the gaining unit. Commanders of units and strength managers will be able to provide required and desired talents of available positions. Assignment officers then become matchmakers by aligning individual officers with potential positions. While the Green Pages concept has already been successfully piloted within the Engineer Branch for assignments, as
well as with cadet branching decisions at the US Military Academy, its potential is still untapped. The concept has been briefed to all levels, but no definitive movement towards implementation has been taken. This recommendation advocates the implementation of the Green Pages concept as soon as possible.

**Recommendation 2: Field the “Second Generation Multi-Source Assessment & Feedback (MSAF).”**

The Army has taken huge steps towards acclimating the force to assessments coming from perspectives other than those of superiors. As a result, attitudes have changed drastically towards the acceptance of multi-dimensional assessments. MSAF, a 360° assessment available across the Army, has been a requirement for all officers within the last three years. Despite the penetration of the MSAF into the Army culture, however, the existing MSAF and its administration are less than optimal for many reasons.

First, the actual instrument is too long. Raters cringe when they see an email requesting their input via the MSAF. Giving feedback is valuable, but 80 questions impose a burden on raters. Part of the problem is that the MSAF attempts to measure competencies ranging from “Get Results” to “Extend Influence Beyond Chain of Command.” While it is tempting to create a survey that assesses every conceivable leader characteristic, a key attribute of an effective assessment tool is brevity. Second, the MSAF relies on raters selected solely by the rated officer. Allowing officers to pick and choose who provides feedback is an obvious major flaw that neutralizes much of the validity of a multi-dimensional assessment. Third, while the MSAF is technically mandatory, it is only compulsory to initiate (and not necessarily complete) an assessment every three years. Finally, the MSAF is only viewed by the rated officer and also, if requested by the officer, a professional coach who will contact the officer telephonically. A multi-dimensional assessment has much more potential if coupled with developmental coaching that is systematic as opposed to occasionally requested. The following recommendation does not do away with the MSAF concept. Instead, it suggests a refocusing and more targeted approach towards multi-dimensional assessments. A “Second Generation MSAF” assessment and process is recommended to maximize the development of Army officers and the potential of multi-dimensional assessments.
“After ten years of fighting, toxic leadership needs the CSA’s attention!” - COL, Council of Colonels

The Second Generation MSAF would be much shorter—about 10 questions—as well as offering the opportunity for open-ended feedback. This would relieve much of the administrative burden on raters. The instrument would only assess three general areas: 1) moral and ethical behavior, 2) the development of teams and subordinates, and 3) the approachability of the leader. Essentially, the Second Generation MSAF would assess whether the leader is either toxic or unethical—characteristics of leaders often not observed by superiors. The officer’s ability to get tasks done is already adequately assessed by the OER, so there is no need to gather information on that aspect of leadership in the Second Generation MSAF.

Because OERs provide a perspective from superiors, the Second Generation MSAF would be for peer and subordinate assessments only. Additionally, raters for the MSAF would be determined not by the officer, but by the OER/NCOER system. Whoever the officer rates are his or her subordinates. Whoever else is rated by the officer’s rater are his or her peers. Ideally, the selection (and notification) of peer and subordinate raters would be automated, but the current OER/NCOER system must be upgraded for this capacity.

With the Second Generation MSAF concept, multi-dimensional assessments would be required after key officer career milestones. For professional military education, assessments from peers would be required after completion of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), CCC, the Command & General Staff Course (CGSC), and the US Army War College (USAWC). Assessments from peers and subordinates (identified through the OER/NCOER system) would be required after key developmental positions including platoon leader, company commander, executive/operations officer, and battalion commander. All Second Generation MSAF assessments would be stored in a digital leader development portfolio accessible online.

The portfolio allows officers to view their development over the course of their entire career. The portfolio is accessible only to the officer up until completion of CGSC. If the officer is selected for battalion level command and attends the CSA pre-command course at Fort Leavenworth, the portfolio would be required, for the first time, to be reviewed by someone other than the rated officer. During the two weeks at the Pre Command Course (PCC), senior mentors (retired general officers) would review the portfolio with each officer individually.
Such a session would allow blunt feedback and coaching to the officer about to assume command. The officer has already been selected for command, so the feedback is purely developmental and not part of the selection process. Officers selected for the resident Army War College could request a portfolio review and coaching session, but unlike the PCC, it would be voluntary and be done by a faculty member rather than a senior mentor. Time-intensive coaching and portfolio review can occur at the PCC and USAWC because at those locations the officer population is much smaller and therefore manageable.

By the time an officer reaches the window for brigade-level command selection, he or she will have a rather robust portfolio of multi-dimensional assessments. The officer would have received coaching at least at the PCC and perhaps also at the Army War College. Because the officer will have had a career of development and because the consequences of leadership are so great at the brigade level, the portfolio will be made available to the brigade command selection board in addition to the usual information found in the OER, ORB, and DA photo. Selection boards will be able to recognize the occasional disgruntled subordinate or the jealous peer as outliers if one or two assessments are negative. But selection boards will also be able to recognize trends of toxic or unethical behavior emerging across a career.

The Second Generation MSAF concept takes advantage of the Army’s cultural change in the acceptance of multi-dimensional ratings to maximize the potential of including subordinate and peer assessments in the officer development and selection process. It is evolutionary in its implementation, yet revolutionary in its increased effectiveness.

**Recommendation 3: Establish an assessment center at CGSC.**

- “Critical thinking is rewarded when applied to commanding in combat, but generally not when applied to considering anything but troop time in terms of assignments or developmental opportunities.” - BCT CDR

The shift from company- to field-grade rank requires officers to add a new set of skills to their leadership development. Leadership begins shifting from primarily face-to-face interaction to organizational and staff leadership. To assist in the development of field-grade officers, an assessment center would be established at CGSC at Fort Leavenworth. The competitive CGSC class at Fort Leavenworth is critical because it represents a common location and phase for officers making the transition to field grade.
Assessments would be done in groups of ten to twelve officers and would include typical evaluations such as paper and pencil tests, group exercises, interviews, presentations, or inbox exercises. The assessments would last five to six hours and would be administered by professional industrial/organizational psychologists. The assessments would determine the officers’ personality types and also evaluate their ability to analyze, interpret, synthesize, and communicate information.

Perhaps the most important feature of the assessment center method is that it relates not to past but rather to future performance. By observing how an officer tackles the problems and challenges presented in the assessment center exercises, the methods would yield a valid picture of how that officer would perform in future leadership positions emerges. This is especially useful since CGSC students are just beginning their transition to field-grade leadership.

Feedback from the assessment would be provided to officers for their individual future development. More important, aggregated feedback would be provided to TRADOC to assess the proficiency levels across the entire officer corps of skills such as those once taught in the Combined Arms & Services Staff School (CAS3). The assessment would also go into the officer’s Green Pages profile where it could be used, if desired by the Army in the future, to assist in assignments requiring specific staff officer skills.

**Recommendation 4: Implement Leader Assignment and Development Panels (LADP).**

- “Reestablish harmony in our leader development model by valuing PME and developmental opportunities.” - CO CDR
- “Allow for more developmental opportunities outside a prescriptive career timeline.” - CO CDR
- “Communicate to the Army through guidance and policy the message that broadening creates strategic leaders!” - MAJ, HRC, Fort Knox

To continue the theme of using individualized information for the assignment and development of officers, this recommendation begins with requiring officers attending the Captains Career Course to take the GRE® revised General Test. The GRE revised General Test is a well-known valid and reliable measure of three key abilities needed in the officer corps. The GRE revised General Test assesses:
- **Verbal Reasoning** — Measures an officer’s ability to analyze, evaluate and synthesize written material. Also assesses the ability to analyze relationships among component parts of sentences and recognize relationships among words and concepts.

- **Quantitative Reasoning** — Measures an officer’s problem-solving ability, focusing on basic concepts of arithmetic, algebra, geometry and data analysis.

- **Analytical Writing** — Measures critical thinking and analytical writing skills, specifically an officer’s ability to articulate and support complex ideas clearly and effectively.

Administering the GRE revised General Test at the CCC takes advantage of the flow of officers through centralized locations prior to company command, incorporates the test into the school environment of CCC rather than the more hectic pace in a unit assignment, and leverages installation assets such as the education center for computer-based test taking or coordination. While the GRE revised General Test will incur a cost for each officer, it is minor compared to the development, validation, grading, and administration costs of an instrument developed by the Army.

The GRE revised General Test would be inputted into the officer’s Green Pages, but it would not be seen by promotion or selection boards. Instead, it would be used primarily for the Leader Assignment and Development Panel (LADP). The intent of the LADP is twofold. First, it identifies the Army’s emerging leaders and ensures a tailored leader development assignment process for those officers. In other words, the LADP is the mechanism to individualize the development of selected officers. Second, and more important, the LADP is the forcing function to change the Army’s current culture of discouraging experiences that develop strategic thinking. Today’s Army culture supports the belief that officer assignments that build strategic thinking ability (e.g., graduate school, Pentagon time, or fellowships) are undesirable. Officers have always tended towards a disdain for any assignment away from troops, but OPMS XXI in the late 1990’s provided the mechanism to embed this way of thinking firmly into the culture. OPMS XXI allowed operational officers to isolate themselves in the world of muddy boots and tactical operations. The responsibility for running the institutional Army, thinking about the Army’s big issues, working with organizations and agencies outside the Army, and manning the
Army’s schools were left to functional-area officers. Non-functional-area officers—the subgroup who remained in line for selection to general officer (and rightly so)—could spend a career focusing on short-term tactical and operational issues. Functional area officers learned to think strategically but were content to peak at the rank of colonel. The LADP, in addition to the focus on individual officers, is intended to bring about culture change in the valuing of strategic leader development across the entire officer corps.

- “We don’t always reward or value the career paths that best prepare leaders for increased responsibility.” - BN CDR

The LADP consists of a group of colonels or senior civilians selected by the CSA who understand the need to develop the strategic capabilities of officers. The LADP is a panel, not a board. It is convened twice a year for company grade officers within six months of finishing company command and twice a year for field grade officers within six months of finishing battalion XO/S3 (or other key developmental position). The LADP identifies those officers most likely to succeed in the non-functional officer career path. The LADP determines through a review of OERs, the ORB, and the DA photo who the top 20% of non-functional area officers are—those most likely to be selected for battalion command. The LADP then reviews the Green Pages information—to include the officer’s preferences for career direction—as well as the GRE scores to get a fuller picture of the officer. The Panel then determines which assignment would best prepare each identified officer for strategic leadership. For captains, assignments such as graduate school (with no utilization tour), JCS intern, legislative liaison, Olmsted Scholar, military personnel exchange program (MPEP), or certain aide positions would be considered. Majors would be assigned to positions such as graduate school (with no utilization tour), congressional fellowship, White House fellowship, legislative liaison, interagency internships, training with industry, OSD or DA staff, 4-star A/XO, or certain aide positions. Selected officers would receive an LADP assignment after company command or XO/S3, but not both. The purpose of the broadening assignments is not to provide skills to be utilized in a subsequent follow-on assignment, but rather to expand the horizons and critical thinking ability of an officer.

Officers not identified by the LADP as the top 20% would receive assignments via the traditional assignment officer route. While individualized assignments for all officers would be ideal, the LADP only addresses the best non-functional area officers. Once officers complete
their LADP selected assignment, they are put back onto the non-functional area career track. Officers identified and assigned by the LADP will most likely continue to be successful in the Army for two reasons. First, the LADP has already determined from their performance ratings that they are the best. Second, a broadening assignment after either company command or XO/S3 time is not so out of the ordinary as to derail a successful officer’s career.

As stated earlier, the LADP has two purposes. The first is to individualize assignments to the best officers. The second purpose is to initiate a meaningful, lasting change in culture. After the best officers receive LADP assignments, they will continue in their careers and eventually be selected for battalion command. As battalion commanders, they become the role models and mentors for the junior officer population. When asked for career advice, these battalion commanders will most likely report that a broadening assignment such as the one they had will not only prepare an officer for future assignments, but may actually add to success in a career. The secret to the LADP changing the Army culture is seeding the battalion (and eventually brigade) command positions with successful officers who have experienced an LADP assignment. After about three generations of the LADP, assignment officers will start receiving requests from the field for LADP-like assignments as the officer corps begins perceiving a broadening assignment as a critical component to a successful career. Evidence that the culture has shifted will be evident when the best officers routinely request broadening assignments. Contrast that with the current culture where the best non-functional area officers seldom even consider any assignment away from troops.

The recommendations contained in this section describe a roadmap to transform the officer personnel management system into an individualized process that combines officer information and desires with the strategic needs of the Army. For too long, the Army has relied on an assembly-line approach to officer management. That approach worked well during the Cold War when positions filled by officers were more important than the officers themselves. Officers were merely interchangeable parts, and the formations were the focus. The Army has learned that in the future it may be impossible to know what formations will be fielded or what challenges will be faced. In such an ambiguous and uncertain environment, the quality of leadership of the officer corps becomes paramount and thus the task of drastically improving the processes of selecting, developing, assigning, and promoting officers takes on renewed importance.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX ONE
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LEADER DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Study of Military Professionalism

From 21 April through 30 June 1970, the United States Army War College (AWC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania undertook a Study of Military Professionalism in which it surveyed 450 Army officers by administering interviews, seminars, and questionnaires to participants in the US Army Chaplains School, Advanced Courses, the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and the AWC. Admittedly, the Study represented an “elite rather than cross section of the Officer Corps as a whole,” but the authors did not claim to represent a cross-section of the Army. Rather, they used the data to make recommendations to improve military professionalism. The authors corroborated their findings with surveys and interviews given by Junior Officer resignees to improve the quality of their suggestions. Overall, the study results showed a near unanimity of written descriptive responses from the sample of Officers that could be used to make recommendations to improve military professionalism.

The study broadly concluded that the subjects of ethics, morals, technical competence, individual motivation, and personal value systems were inextricably related, interacting, and mutually reinforcing and that they produced synergies in the Officer Corps. Consequently, it followed that recommendations for corrective action of professionalism in the Officer Corps needed to be based on comprehensive programs; piecemeal actions would not suffice. Major General Eckland, Commandant of the AWC, noted in his introductory letter to the report: “It may be argued that this report poses a choice between mission accomplishment and professional ethics. The thrust of this report is that there is really no choice.” The attainment of a climate of military professionalism was, for the authors, the essential prerequisite for genuine effectiveness in the Officer Corps.

The Study revealed several frustrations in the Officer Corps, including perceptions that short-term successes were rewarded at the expense of long-term moral and ethical strength. Also pervasive was a belief that communications between senior and junior officers were inadequate and lacked sufficient up-down communication to keep the superior informed and the subordinated contented. Junior Officers also reported that Senior Officers were isolated from
reality and expressed intolerance of superiors and peers they believed were substandard in ethical or moral behavior, or in technical competence. Even with noted problems in the Officer Corps, the Study offered that there was a “healthy reservoir of energetic idealism” in the Corps and little evidence of cynicism. \(^8\)

Recommendations for improving military professionalism were built on the premise that the individual officer was greatly hampered in any local crusade for adherence to ideals of military professionalism by the need to produce results to remain competitive for future advancement. Accordingly, the Study recommended that changes needed to be top-down from the Army in order to be effective. Moreover, the system of rewards such as promotion, selection for advanced education, and desirable and challenging assignments needed to be accorded to those who exemplified traditional ethical behavior.

The report offered thirteen recommendations for immediate institution. The recommendations focused on two goals: (1) dissemination of information with education of long-term ideals of military professionalism; and (2) modifications in current military practices that could assist in achieving those goals. Addressing education, the Study recommended promulgating the AWC’s Study results and the Officer’s Creed and by distributing copies of *The Armed Forces Officer* to the Officer Corps. To modify practices, the Study recommended enhancing uniform and disciplinary standards, revitalizing subordinate counseling, and streamlining measures for officer promotion and service elimination to dissuade promotion boards from rewarding “ticket punching” at the expense of rewarding Officers who demonstrated expertise and integrity. \(^9\)

**Leadership for the 1970’s**

At the request of the Chief of Staff of the Army General Westmoreland, the AWC surveyed officers again in 1971 in the Leadership for the 1970’s Study to determine what type of leadership would be most appropriate as the Army’s personnel sustainment procedures changed from reliance on periodic draft calls to reliance on volunteer accessions only. \(^10\) The 18-person research team selected from a pool of 60 applicants, who were students at the AWC, surveyed 1800 individuals, including eight to ten percent of all General Officers. Working with the premise that there is an “informal contract” that comes into being between the Army and the individual when the professional soldier dedicates his life effort to an Army career, the study
sought to define what Army leadership should look like as the “mediating influence” of this informal contract.11

The study determined that the degree of satisfaction with Army leadership was inversely proportional to grade level. For example, of the one hundred junior non-commissioned officers surveyed, 63 identified themselves as satisfied with Army leadership, 14 were unsure, and 23 reported dissatisfaction. In contrast, of the one hundred general officers surveyed, 98 reported that they were satisfied with Army leadership and only two reported dissatisfaction. The study also looked for differences in satisfaction between racial groups and compared satisfaction rates among Black Soldiers to rates of the rest of the Army. The authors found that leadership satisfaction rates did not vary significantly between Black and non-Black Soldiers.12 The study also concluded that the leadership principles the Army was espousing in 1970, ranging from tactical proficiency to assuming responsibility for one’s actions, were appropriate leadership tenets because the 1800 survey participants had difficulty categorizing any of the eleven leadership traits as “least important.”13 While the surveyed soldiers found the eleven leadership principles relevant, they expressed dissatisfaction in the application of leadership principles by both superiors and subordinates, and a voiced failure of superiors and subordinates alike to recognize their own failures.14

The study assessed the practice of various leadership principles and identified areas ripe for improvement among junior noncommissioned officers (NCOs), Senior NCOs, Junior Company Grade, and Senior Company Grade, Junior Field Grade, and Senior Grade officers. By identifying weaker areas in leadership principles between grades, the authors used the data diagnostically to prescribe training improvements targeted at specific ranks of Soldiers. The authors concluded that small improvements in specific leadership principles could bring about significant improvements in overall leadership.

The authors recommended implementing their findings in several ways, including disseminating the data in the report broadly, using the data to diagnose leadership problems, revising leadership instruction concepts within the Army school system, and establishing an extensive and progressive program of academic and technical education for career NCOs. The authors also suggested development of a program of “coaching” designed to enhance communication and understanding of specific expectations between superiors and subordinates.
Finally, the report concluded that to preclude the evolution of an “anti-leadership” syndrome, the Army needed to centrally coordinate the field of leadership studies to ensure quality control.\textsuperscript{15}

**A Review of Training and Education for Officers**

After the AWC reports, the Army turned its attention to strategic planning to carry Army education through the 1990s. On 30 June 1978, the Department of the Army released a report by the Study Group for the Review of Training and Education for Officers. The prefatory letter by Major General B.L. Harrison, who chaired the study group, diverged markedly from earlier AWC reports on officer development because rather than focusing on leadership and the ethos of duty-honor-country, Harrison focused on the need to educate officers in tactical competence with modern weapons systems that had greater range, accuracy, and lethality than ever before.

Revealing that the Army had truly transitioned from post-Vietnam concerns of adapting from a draftee Army to an all-volunteer force in a Cold War, Harrison underscored the importance of tactical training and pointed out that modern weapons systems left little or no technology gap between the United States and her enemies.\textsuperscript{16} With this lens, Harrison and his Study Group offered a comprehensive five-volume report spanning more than 2500 pages, in which they suggested how best to produce officers with the military competencies necessary in the Cold War and beyond.

The report concluded that training development and education policies and programs needed to combine self-development, unit development, and institutional development in a phased schedule from pre-commissioning through career completion. These long-term objectives were anticipated to extend through the 1990s. The report also found that the officer training system presumed that subsequent training would build on preceding instruction, prepare officers for imminent challenges, and provide the foundation for what would later follow.

The Study Group recommended a system of total career education and training needs by increasing education for military officers at all career levels in both active-duty and reserve components. Even before commissioning, the Study Group recommended that the Army should support test programs like two-year ROTC, College Graduate Officer Candidate School, and a version of the Marine Corps Platoon Leader Course. The Study Group also recommended that the Army should continue to stress tactical Military Qualification Standards. Focusing on mid-career, the report suggested the establishment of a new Combined Arms and Services Staff
School (CAS3) for one hundred percent attendance and considered reducing CGCS to twenty-
percent of officers with all commanders attending pre-command courses.¹⁷

**Sullivan 90-Day Review Study**

Implementation of portions of the Review of Training and Education for Officers study took several years, but in 1987, another study reflecting the persisting Cold War examined the combat training of Army leaders. The study group, led by Major General Gordon Sullivan, completed this 90-Day Leader Development Study at the direction of the TRADOC Commander and concluded that existing doctrinal documents such as the Army Field Manuals linked leadership to battlefield success, but that the Army lacked coordination in its leader development goals, particularly between line units and Army schoolhouses. The report also found that new joint requirements were not well-understood and that assignments away from field units were perceived as “time outs” and provided less combat leader development.¹⁸

In response to the perceived needs to re-focus on combat leader development and to coordinate the leader development system, the 90 Day Review Study recommended creating “common doctrine based standards” for leader assessment as well as the development of an “integrated and rationalized structure that focuse[d] the efforts of the field, school, and TDA” organization.¹⁹ Somewhat parroting the Leadership for the 1970’s Study, Sullivan’s group also noted that the Army leader development system needed coordination and recommended the Center for Army Leadership to assume this role. Finally, the report pointed out that the conclusions and recommendations of prior reports had not been implemented and stressed that the findings must be implemented to institute positive change.²⁰

**Development of Strategic-Level Leaders**

Turning from leader training generally, in 1993, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Fitton focused his study on the development of joint strategic leaders. Fitton concluded that strategic leaders could be developed, and that the US military generally developed leaders well. Fitton recommended several changes to the extant development of strategic leaders by addressing three pillars of development: institutional, organizational, and individual.²¹

Institutionally, Fitton recommended the development of a “definitive strategic leader model” based on military rather than academic language. Organizationally, he recommended
learning about other services to facilitate joint operations. With regard to the third pillar, individual training, Fitton recommended fostering mentor relations, broadening career experiences, and incentivizing post-SSC continued strategic leader development.22

Findings from the 1996 Survey on Officer Careers

Transitioning from Fitton’s theoretical report, the Army subsequently released quantitative and qualitative data about leadership in the 1996 Survey on Officer Careers (SOC). SOC was a continuation of the Longitudinal Research on Officer Careers (LROC) survey research program. The LROC program called for similar surveys to be mailed to a longitudinal sample of company grade officers each year over a number of years. Although the authors in the Human Resources Research Organization did not make recommendations for changes based on this data, they did provide several findings. First, the report concluded that Officers were satisfied with their careers but expected their career prospects would not match their desires. Second, examining demographics, it also concluded that black officers were more satisfied with their careers than white peers. Meanwhile, while female officers expressed less satisfaction with their careers in terms of competing family demands, but they were more satisfied with regard to pay than their male counterparts. Finally, the report concluded that USMA graduates rated their pre-commissioning training higher. However, USMA graduates were the population least likely to report an intent to remain in Army for twenty or more years.23

Office of Personnel Management System XXI Study

In 1997, the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) report prepared for the Chief of Staff of the Army examined how OPMS should best develop an Officer Corps that could meet the demands of the twenty-first century. The report began with the assumptions that OPMS should promote organizational excellence, that organizational excellence is directly tied to experience, expertise, and teamwork, and that OPMS must be redesigned to give officers the greatest opportunity possible to develop the appropriate skills at each level of responsibility.24

The report concluded that requirements for officers exceeded the supply of officers available. As of the report’s publication, the inventory of officers was sufficient to fill fewer than seventy-five percent of the authorized major positions and only slightly more than eighty percent of branch-qualified captain positions. Nonetheless, officers continued to express concern with OER inflation and worried about future assignments, and career security.25
The study made several recommendations to include reorganizing OPMS by creating operations and functional area cones, with competition and success in each area. OPMS XXI would restructure the Army Competitive Category by grouping branches and related functional areas into management categories called “career fields” (CFs). Officers would compete for promotion with other officers in the same CF. The report also recommended creation of a new Officer Development System (ODS) emphasizing character and leader development, and a new Officer Evaluation Report with direction for rating officials to consider each officer as a “whole person.” Finally, the report recommended expanding officer education by sending one hundred percent of officers to the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and colonels to resident SSC equivalents.26

**Army Distance Learning Report 2001**

Despite the recommendation for one hundred percent resident CGSC attendance in the OPMS XXI Study, the Army continued to rely on distance education. In 2001, RAND published a report on Army Distance Learning and Personnel Readiness with the stated goal of helping the Army to maintain readiness and manage personnel efficiently as it implemented distance learning in Active and Reserve component training systems. In contrast to the OPMS XXI study, RAND researchers concluded that the Army should exploit distance learning to alleviate chronic and large skill shortages in career specialties, and to aid officer and NCO development courses that have especially large student loads or long residence requirements. The report cautioned, however, that the value of distance learning would largely depend on the quality of instruction and level of training effectiveness.27

The report recommended increasing the use of distance learning in order to decrease personnel turbulence and its deleterious effects on readiness and to use asynchronous modules that would be readily available on web sites. These modules, the report argued, would provide on-demand training, and make it easier for soldiers to refresh skills and become trained to perform “additional duties,” while simultaneously reducing TDY expenses.28

**The Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study – 2001.**

At the request of the CSA, the ATLDP Officer study was conducted in 2001. The panel collected data on officer training and development from nearly 13,500 Army leaders and military spouses using surveys, focus groups, and personal interviews.29 The panel observed that the
quality and relevance of the Officer Education System (OES) did not meet expectations of many officers. Though OES sufficiently taught branch technical and tactical skills, it did not satisfactorily train officers in combined arms skills. The study concluded that the Army missed shared training opportunities because educational systems were stove piped. Additionally, there was no Army OES accreditation process for either faculty or curriculum.

The study’s main recommendations were to adapt the OES to meet the needs of the transforming Army and realities of the operational environment because the model had been largely untouched since World War II. The study also recommended revitalizing the training system to improve home station training and modernized CTCs which focus on teaching to standards that are documented, accessible, and digital. Finally the study recommended developing officers so they are self-aware, adaptable leaders and life-long learners.

The Army Training and Leader Development Panel - 2002

In 2002, another report on training and leader development was completed at the request of the Chief of Staff of the Army. This report assessed the development of the NCO corps. The report’s major finding was that surveys of NCOs and Officers expressed one voice, namely, that the NCO Education System (NCOES) and leader development programs needed to improve conceptual and interpersonal skills, provide more training resources, and allow NCOs to lead and train their soldiers and units. The report also found that annual competency testing and self-development needed improvement, the warrior ethos needed re-definition and training support, and the NCO assignment process was inadequate for leader development.

To address these immediate needs, the report recommended re-establishing, updating, and publishing the NCO Guide, linking NCO doctrine updates to officer duties, responsibilities, and authority, and transforming NCOES to restore focus on individual and small-unit training.

The report also proposed reestablishing a competency assessment for NCOs, developing warrior ethos training, and reforming NCO assignments to focus on leader development.

Strategic Leadership Competencies

In 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked the AWC to identify the strategic leader skill sets for officers required in the post-September 11th environment. The resulting report, informed by strategic leadership literature, interviews from corporate leader developers, and key leader developers in the Army distilled the essence of strategic leadership into six
metacompetencies not only to describe strategic leadership but also to provide aiming points for an integrated leader development system. The report identified that the strategic leader possessed six meta-competencies: (1) personal identity as a strategic leader; (2) mental agility; (3) cross-cultural savvy; (4) interpersonal maturity; (5) world-class warrior; and (6) professional astuteness.  

As the Leadership for the 1970’s Study and Sullivan’s 90-Day Review Study previously suggested, this report also recognized the need to assign central responsibility for the leader-development process, including development through training, education, and experiences in lieu of maintaining dispersed training processes throughout the Army. The report also recommended making leader-accession standards uniform and aligning them with the future needs of the Army. Finally, the report recognized that self-development needed to be more dynamic. For example, the study acknowledged that the current Chief of Staff of the Army reading list included only books on history and Army heritage; however, the authors asserted that effective self-development must incorporate dynamic learning via Internet and group formats, corporate paradigms, and activities outside of the Army.

**Army Research Institute – 2004 Report**

The Army Research Institute’s 2004 Report coined the acronym LEVERAGE when it identified several core competencies of Army leader development. LEVERAGE stands for:

- Leading others to success;
- Exemplifying sound values and behaviors;
- Vitalizing a positive climate;
- Ensuring a shared understanding;
- Reinforcing growth in others;
- Arming self to lead;
- Guiding successful outcomes; and
- Extending influence
The report recommended that demonstration of these competencies should be incorporated into evaluation measures, such as OERs, as the central basis of leadership requirements, and that the competencies should be integrated into Field Manual 6-22.

**Challenging Time in DOPMA: Flexible and Contemporary Military Officer Management**

In 2006 RAND released a study that stemmed from the observation that the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 was based on meeting the needs of a cold war-era Army that developed military personnel to meet a known and relatively unchanging threat through fixed-career and promotion-time parameters. However, this model did not fit the changing needs of the Army. The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act and the 2005 National Security Personnel System for Department of Defense aimed, in part, to create a personnel system that would be more flexible and contemporary. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, RAND examined possible changes to law and policy that would support the Secretary of Defense’s desire to have officers serve longer in their assignments and in their careers.37

RAND reported that officers serving in assignments for a longer period of time would gain greater depth in that position, but there would be a trade-off in that the officer would serve in fewer assignments and have less breadth in his/her professional experience. To maintain the breadth of professional development of mid-career officers, promotions would have to be delayed to provide sufficient time for officers to have additional assignments. However, the governing DOPMA regulations precluded delaying promotions.

The report recommended amending current laws in order to transition the promotion system to favor an assessment of specific competencies over traditional officer management systems boundaries, including fixed jobs and timeline requirements. The report also recommended implementing this new system gradually because it recognized that while competencies are often based on subjective assessments, systematic evaluation of competencies would be necessary for a successful transition.38

**OEMA-2009 Towards a US Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Retaining Talent**

The 2009 report released by Strategic Studies Institute focused on understanding the significant decline in Junior Officer retention rates since the 1980s and the long-term
implications this trend could have on the Officer Corps. The report posited that incentives aimed at retaining a quantity of officers were misaligned or misdirected?? and that a focus on quantity undercut the Army’s need for talent, defined as the interaction of skills, knowledge, and behavior.\textsuperscript{39} Recognizing that the Army must compete with the private sector to retain talent, the report recommended the employment of sound human capital theories to encourage managing every officer as a potential talent, rather than cultivating talent only among the consistently top-performing officers.\textsuperscript{40} Undercutting talent-based retention, the report cited that officers are not assigned to career fields best suited to their individual talents, and cited internal poaching (NCO to OCS) to compensate for a lack of officers, and the problem of producing too many officers, a circumstance that caused a talent flight from the Army.\textsuperscript{41}

The report recommended managing the Army officer talent pool to ensure cultivation of a depth and breadth of talent in the Officer Corps. It also recommended reorganizing the personnel system to leverage technology through “green pages,” which could assist in dynamic and regulated matching of what talent Army commanders desire and what talent Army officers possess.\textsuperscript{42}

**The Ingenuity Gap Officer Management for the 21st Century**

A second leader development study performed by the center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2010 identified that the military was facing uncertainty, asymmetries between training and expected performance, and complexity in military operation. The report contrasted the divergence of the increasingly dynamic future and an officer management system that was optimized for static conditions.\textsuperscript{43} This divergence created an “ingenuity gap” between the increasing need for new and creative ideas in officer training and their supply. The report noted that whether or not training and management models changed, two major findings needed immediate attention. First, the responsibilities of junior officers would continue to expand beyond the bounds of their traditional foundational skill sets. Second, Officers at all ranks would increasingly confront unique or ill-structured problems.\textsuperscript{44}

To address these two challenges, CSIS recommended implementing several practices in Officer Management. First, it recommended shifting promotion eligibility from a system focused on time (in service or in grade) to one predicated on competencies. Second, it recommended expanding officers’ experiences by increasing the numbers and types of outside
experiences available to all commissioning sources and increasing efforts to develop “supporting” skill sets such as self-awareness and moral development. Third, it recommended providing feedback on individual strengths and weaknesses throughout an officer’s career. Finally, the report proposed modifying current law to ease movement in and out of the Active and Reserve components to provide Officers with a broader career experience.45

**The Independent Panel Review of Reserve Component Employment in an Era of Persistent Conflict**

A third leader development study was released in November 2010 by an independent review panel led by Retired General Dennis J. Reimer which aimed to provide recommendations for Army policies and programs for the institutionalization of the Reserve Component (RC) as part of the Army’s operation force and for employment of the Reserve Component over the next decade. Through conducting numerous surveys, panel discussions, and interviews, the researchers observed that the RC was used extensively over the last decade and that continued use of the RC as an operational force, while fiscally possible, would be politically challenging. It also observed that the Total Force of the Army, comprised of the Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC), and the Army National Guard (ARNG) had grown closer and recommended making efforts to continue leveraging their experiences.46 It also pointed out that the Generating Force had paid for cuts in AC end-strength, a compromise that could seriously damage the Army if not addressed. Finally, it concluded that while the basic elements of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) work well, Soldiers have experienced shorter dwells than units, and operational requirements in theater have required breaking units up, which has had a negative effect on unit cohesion, morale, and performance.47

Reimer and his team recommended maintaining the Total Army approach to leverage the RC talent distributed in civilian communities across the country to assist with strategic communication of the Army mission and to help ensure that the Army mirrors American society.48 Like the CSIS 2010 report, Reimer’s group also recommended managing the Total Army through a new personnel system to permit Soldiers to move more easily between the AC and RC.49 Further, it recommended developing a hybrid approach to supplying the Total Army with operational forces so that RC units would train to intermediate readiness levels, and provide strategic flexibility while keeping costs low and continuing to rebuild the Generating Force.
Finally, the researchers argued that approaches to Homeland Security and defense should better utilize the Total Army.\textsuperscript{50}

**Division Commander Report**

In 2011 a report was released which compared leader behavior between 2004 and 2010. Overall, important leader behaviors were the same in 2004 and 2010, but the 2010 data indicated that setting a high ethical tone, increasing accountability, encouraging initiative, an insisting on the need for leaders to get out of their headquarters and visit their subordinate commanders were even more important in 2010 than in 2004. Improvements in these areas, the report argued could, improve the identification and adjustment of unproductive policies, increasing the coaching of subordinates. Though command climates remained healthy, comparing the 2010 and 2004 data revealed that the climates were less health in 2010 than 2004. Finally, the report concluded that formal education was important but admitted that leader development readily occurred in assignments.

The study recommended that division commanders should provide for more team-building events, and that division commanders should receive feedback on their leadership and climate earlier in command. It also recommended providing commanders a convenient tool for measuring command climate. Finally, the study recommended revising the selection of colonels for command to avoid promoting toxic leaders.

**Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership Volume 2011-1**

Following the Division Commander Report, the Center for Army Leadership released its 2010 Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) in May 2011. The researchers compared the results of this survey to a similar survey performed in 2009 and determined that leader development programs within units needed improvement. Comparison of the surveys revealed that “developing subordinates” consistently scored the lowest of core leader competencies.\textsuperscript{51} Army Institutional Education also suffered a sharp decline in ratings for effectiveness and relevance. Similar to the Division Commander Report, there was an increase in the reported presence of “Toxic Leadership.” One in five subordinates reporting that they had experienced toxic leadership, and four out of five reported observing toxic leadership.\textsuperscript{52}
The study recommended increasing emphasis on Leader Development, pairing challenging assignments with developmental counseling, increasing day-to-day coaching, and creating a unit leader development handbook. The study also recommended improving the transferability of course materials between units and improving the OER/NCOER by implementing a multi-source assessment and feedback tool.  

Chief of Staff of the Army Transition Test Report, “What We Heard”

In 2011, the Chief of Staff, Army released a report aimed at re-focusing on the Army as the Profession of Arms. The report concluded that the Army needed to increase focus on core competencies and standards, and re-establish a professional norm of high standards and self-policing. The report implied that Army standards had become a lost art in order to meet mission requirements. Though professional military ethics training was valued by the force, such educational opportunities were short-changed to meet mission requirements. The report also found that personnel management was a source of frustration in the force because TRADOC was severely under-staffed and under-resourced. Finally, the report concluded that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, broadening assignments were not valued by promotion boards and that Officers wanted to have more input into their career paths.

Army Profession Campaign CAPE 02 April 2012

The 2011, the Center for Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) joined with eight other Army schools or research centers to assess the status of the Army profession after a decade of war. Through quantitative and qualitative date collecting via Army-wide surveys, discussion panels, and focus groups, the researchers identified seven key areas needing improvement. These areas included: (1) institutionalizing the Army Profession concept; (2) building and sustaining trust relations; (3) improving standards and discipline; (4) certifying Army professionals; (5) investing in leader development for the Army of 2020; (6) strengthening the Army’s culture; and (7) integrating and synchronizing human development. The researchers recommended implementing a list of fifty-one Army Profession Strengthening Initiatives aimed at leader development to address the shortfalls identified in the study. Twenty-seven of these initiatives have been approved for execution, and eleven remain under consideration.
APPENDIX TWO
LEADER DEVELOPMENT TASK FORCE OFFICER SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Officer Leader Development Task force
U. S. Army Survey - August 2012

Instructions.

Your participation is voluntary, but strongly encouraged. Your survey responses will help a study of leader development conducted by the United States Military Academy for the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Your responses are confidential and your anonymity is protected, meaning that your name is not associated with your responses. Results from any individual survey will not be shared with anyone outside the research team. Data from your responses will not be provided to your chain of command or be included in any administrative personnel files. Only persons involved in collecting or preparing the information for analysis will have access to completed survey questionnaires. Only group statistics will be reported. The purpose and procedures of this survey are in accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579).

Respond to each question by selecting the rating that best represents your response to the question or by typing a short answer in the space provided.

To proceed to the next screen, click on the Next page button. If you feel that you have responded to a question incorrectly, use the Back page button to return to the previous page. Use Save to save your responses and use Finish at the last page to complete and submit your responses.

The survey consists of several topics and demographics. Most questions seek ratings about concepts expressed in a few words (“critical thinking,” “adaptability”) and some questions present a full statement to consider and rate. Two demographic questions are required (military status and rank). You must provide an answer to each of these two to move to another page and to finish the survey. In all the survey can take as little as 15 minutes to complete.

If you are unable to complete the survey in one sitting, Save your work and simply launch the survey from the original email invitation to resume work at a later time. The survey software will allow you to resume where you left off.

SURVEY APPROVAL AUTHORITY: US ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
SURVEY CONTROL NUMBER: DAPE-ARI-AO-12-21
RCS: MILPC-3
Which of the following describes your current military status?  
{Choose one}
( ) Regular Army (Active duty)
( ) Army Reserve - Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)
( ) Army Reserve - Currently on ADOS or other full-time orders, including retiree recall
( ) Army Reserve - Drilling Reservist (TPU)
( ) Army Reserve - Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)
( ) Army Reserve - Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or other inactive status
( ) Army National Guard - Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)
( ) Army National Guard - Currently on ADOS or other full-time orders
( ) Army National Guard - Drilling Guardsman (M-Day)
( ) Army National Guard - Dual Status Technician
( ) Retired (not a retiree recall, not an Army civilian)
( ) None of these apply

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on ...  

your satisfaction with how well you do?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

how well your personal career goals are met?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

your ability to consistently accomplish the mission?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess
how you affect the lives of those you serve with?
{Choose one}
 ( ) Not at all
 ( ) Slight extent
 ( ) Moderate extent
 ( ) Great extent
 ( ) Very great extent
 ( ) No basis to assess

circumstances that are outside of your influence?
{Choose one}
 ( ) Not at all
 ( ) Slight extent
 ( ) Moderate extent
 ( ) Great extent
 ( ) Very great extent
 ( ) No basis to assess

the expectations of your raters and senior raters?
{Choose one}
 ( ) Not at all
 ( ) Slight extent
 ( ) Moderate extent
 ( ) Great extent
 ( ) Very great extent
 ( ) No basis to assess

the Army's definition of what it takes to be a successful Army Officer?
{Choose one}
 ( ) Not at all
 ( ) Slight extent
 ( ) Moderate extent
 ( ) Great extent
 ( ) Very great extent
 ( ) No basis to assess

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

I understand clearly what it takes to be a successful Army officer.
{Choose one}
 ( ) Strongly disagree
 ( ) Disagree
 ( ) Neither agree nor disagree
 ( ) Agree
Among the Army officer corps there is a common and shared understanding of what it means to be a successful Army officer.

The Army provides a clear picture of what it takes to be successful at each officer rank.

What information could the Army provide to help you better understand what it takes to be a successful Army officer? (max 2500 characters)

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters provide subordinates maximum freedom of action in determining how to accomplish missions?

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters build cohesive teams?

( ) Strongly agree

( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree

( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree

( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess
encourage mutual trust?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

provide clear commander's intent?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

allow disciplined initiative?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

underwrite prudent risks in deployed operations?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

underwrite prudent risks in garrison operations?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess
set clear priorities for your unit's training plans?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

set clear priorities for your unit's leader development plans?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

allow you to take prudent risks in how you develop or support the development of your Soldiers?
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

How effective is your immediate superior at establishing trusting relationships with others?
{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess
"Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them." (ADP 6-0)

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

Mission Command has contributed to the successes that the Army has experienced in the campaigns since Sep 11, 2001.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

I am satisfied with the amount of freedom or latitude I have in my job.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

Encouraging subordinates to show initiative accelerates their development as Army officers.
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

Army Values
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Empathy (care and concern for Soldiers and others)
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Warrior Ethos
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Maintaining subordinate discipline
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Enforcing standards for subordinate conduct
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Military and Professional Bearing
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Total fitness (physical, health, psychological, spiritual, behavioral, social)
{Choose one}
   ( ) Very little or no impact
   ( ) Small impact
   ( ) Moderate impact
   ( ) Large impact
   ( ) Great impact
   ( ) No basis to assess

Confidence
{Choose one}
   ( ) Very little or no impact
   ( ) Small impact
   ( ) Moderate impact
   ( ) Large impact
   ( ) Great impact
   ( ) No basis to assess

Resilience (mental strength to endure extreme stress)
{Choose one}
   ( ) Very little or no impact
   ( ) Small impact
   ( ) Moderate impact
   ( ) Large impact
   ( ) Great impact
   ( ) No basis to assess

Mental agility (thinking quickly and acutely, breaking out of mental blocks)
{Choose one}
   ( ) Very little or no impact
   ( ) Small impact
   ( ) Moderate impact
   ( ) Large impact
   ( ) Great impact
   ( ) No basis to assess

Sound judgment
{Choose one}
   ( ) Very little or no impact
   ( ) Small impact
   ( ) Moderate impact
   ( ) Large impact
   ( ) Great impact
   ( ) No basis to assess

Critical thinking
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Importance of Leader Attributes

Innovation (new ideas, creative thinking, forward thinking)
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Interpersonal tact
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Technical expertise
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Tactical expertise
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess
Joint expertise
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Geopolitical expertise
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Cross-cultural expertise
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Unified action partner expertise (military, governmental, nongovernmental and private sector organizations with which Army forces operate) (ADP 3-0)
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Adaptability (a change in response to better fit changing conditions)
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess
Flexibility (ability to make changes)
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Trustworthiness
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Which leader attribute has the most impact on being an effective leader?
{Choose one}
( ) Adaptability
( ) Army Values
( ) Confidence
( ) Critical thinking
( ) Cross-cultural expertise
( ) Empathy
( ) Enforcing standards for subordinate conduct
( ) Flexibility
( ) Geopolitical expertise
( ) Innovation
( ) Interpersonal tact
( ) Joint expertise
( ) Maintaining subordinate discipline
( ) Mental agility
( ) Military and professional bearing
( ) Resilience
( ) Sound judgment
( ) Tactical expertise
( ) Technical expertise
( ) Total fitness
( ) Trustworthiness
( ) Unified action partner expertise
( ) Warrior Ethos

Which leader attribute has the second most impact on being an effective leader?
How much of an impact does each of the following attributes have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader?

Establishing trusting relationships with others

{Choose one}

( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess
Leading and influencing subordinates
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Extending influence (e.g., to unified action partners)
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Leading by example
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Communicating (encouraging a shared understanding)
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess

Creating a positive environment
{Choose one}
( ) Very little or no impact
( ) Small impact
( ) Moderate impact
( ) Large impact
( ) Great impact
( ) No basis to assess
Self-development (preparing self to carry out his or her responsibilities)

{Choose one}
- ( ) Very little or no impact
- ( ) Small impact
- ( ) Moderate impact
- ( ) Large impact
- ( ) Great impact
- ( ) No basis to assess

Developing subordinates (e.g., counseling, coaching, mentoring)

{Choose one}
- ( ) Very little or no impact
- ( ) Small impact
- ( ) Moderate impact
- ( ) Large impact
- ( ) Great impact
- ( ) No basis to assess

Stewarding the profession

{Choose one}
- ( ) Very little or no impact
- ( ) Small impact
- ( ) Moderate impact
- ( ) Large impact
- ( ) Great impact
- ( ) No basis to assess

Getting results to accomplish the mission successfully

{Choose one}
- ( ) Very little or no impact
- ( ) Small impact
- ( ) Moderate impact
- ( ) Large impact
- ( ) Great impact
- ( ) No basis to assess
Importance of Leader Competencies

Which competency has the most impact on being an effective leader?
   {Choose one}
   ( ) Establishing trusting relationships with others
   ( ) Leading and influencing subordinates
   ( ) Extending influence (e.g., to unified action partners)
   ( ) Leading by example
   ( ) Communicating (encouraging a shared understanding)
   ( ) Creating a positive environment
   ( ) Self-development (preparing themself to carry out his or her responsibilities)
   ( ) Developing subordinates (e.g., counseling, coaching, mentoring)
   ( ) Stewarding the profession
   ( ) Getting results to accomplish the mission successfully

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

Cooperation between AC and RC units contributed to the successes that the Army has experienced in the campaigns since 11 SEP 2001.
   {Choose one}
   ( ) Strongly disagree
   ( ) Disagree
   ( ) Neither agree nor disagree
   ( ) Agree
   ( ) Strongly agree
   ( ) No basis to assess

In what ways could have cooperation between AC and RC units been better? (max 2500 characters)
   {Enter answer in paragraph form}

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

AC and RC officers attending PME courses together is a necessary element of future success in the Army.
   {Choose one}
   ( ) Strongly disagree
   ( ) Disagree
   ( ) Neither agree nor disagree
   ( ) Agree
   ( ) Strongly agree
AC and RC units participating together in collective training is a necessary element of future success in the Army.

{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following?

What the Army leader development system is.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

How the Army leader development system applies to me.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

New Army-level initiatives for Army leader development.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

What the Professional Military Education (PME) courses are.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess
When I can attend my next PME course.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

How operational assignments contribute to my development.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

What is required of me for my next promotion.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

How performance evaluations (OERs) contribute to my development.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

How professional growth counseling occurs.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess
What the Army expects me to do in self-development.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

How unit training exercises contribute to my development.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

How to obtain a mentor.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

What broadening opportunities are available.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

How 360 assessments (Army Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback) contribute to my development.
{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess
How informal activities (on-the-job training and experience, discussions with peers, temporary assignments or duties) contribute to my development.

{Choose one}
( ) Very dissatisfied
( ) Dissatisfied
( ) Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
( ) Satisfied
( ) Very satisfied
( ) No basis to assess

To what extent have the following interfered with an effective leader development (LD) program in your current unit or organization?

Insufficient time
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

AR 350-1 requirements for mandatory training
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess

Lack of emphasis or support from your higher command
{Choose one}
( ) Not at all
( ) Slight extent
( ) Moderate extent
( ) Great extent
( ) Very great extent
( ) No basis to assess
Lack of resources (equipment, ranges, personnel present for duty, etc.)
{Choose one}
  ( ) Not at all
  ( ) Slight extent
  ( ) Moderate extent
  ( ) Great extent
  ( ) Very great extent
  ( ) No basis to assess

Lack of available, realistic training scenarios
{Choose one}
  ( ) Not at all
  ( ) Slight extent
  ( ) Moderate extent
  ( ) Great extent
  ( ) Very great extent
  ( ) No basis to assess

Absence of trust within the unit
{Choose one}
  ( ) Not at all
  ( ) Slight extent
  ( ) Moderate extent
  ( ) Great extent
  ( ) Very great extent
  ( ) No basis to assess

Communication breakdowns from/to higher command
{Choose one}
  ( ) Not at all
  ( ) Slight extent
  ( ) Moderate extent
  ( ) Great extent
  ( ) Very great extent
  ( ) No basis to assess

Lack of empowerment (freedom of action) to execute LD
{Choose one}
  ( ) Not at all
  ( ) Slight extent
  ( ) Moderate extent
  ( ) Great extent
  ( ) Very great extent
  ( ) No basis to assess
Leader Development Practices

How much do you agree or disagree with each item that completes the following phrase?

More time should be allotted in the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) A (pre-commissioning) for instruction on ...

Interpersonal communication
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

Writing skills
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

Critical thinking
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

Problem solving
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess
Foreign languages
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

Cultural awareness
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

Technical subjects such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics
{Choose one}
( ) Strongly disagree
( ) Disagree
( ) Neither agree nor disagree
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
( ) No basis to assess

In order to optimize development, the minimum time serving as a Platoon Leader should be .

{Choose one}
( ) 6 months or less
( ) 7 to 9 months
( ) 10 to 12 months
( ) 13 to 15 months
( ) More than 15 months
( ) None of these
Improvements to Army Leader Development

How effective do you anticipate each of the following prospective changes would be at improving education for Army leader development?

Improve pre-commissioning education and training.
{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

Arrange the time an officer attends each PME course to occur on a set schedule.
{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

Assign the officers who are most qualified to instruct as instructors in PME courses.
{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

Increase hours in PME (BOLC A, BOLC B, and CCC) to allow for more coverage on the basics of the officer profession, such as customs, traditions, courtesies, character development, and stewardship.
{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess
Increase emphasis in units to focus on the basics of the officer profession, such as customs, traditions, courtesies, character development, and stewardship.

{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

How effective do you anticipate each of the following prospective changes would be at improving assignments for Army leader development?

An individual personnel management system that moves away from year group decisions and broadens the window for completion of key developmental assignments.

{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

Requiring officers to apply for promotion.

{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

Requiring directions be given to promotion boards to consider institutional assignments equal in value to operational assignments.

{Choose one}
( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess
Increased number of broadening assignments.

{Choose one}

( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

How effective do you anticipate each of the following prospective changes would be at improving Army leader development?

Create habitual organizational relationships between ARNG/USAR units and AC units.

{Choose one}

( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

Create regular, rotating positions for RC officers to be assigned to AC units.

{Choose one}

( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess

Evaluate commanders on the trust (and empowerment) placed in subordinate commanders.

{Choose one}

( ) Very ineffective
( ) Ineffective
( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
( ) Effective
( ) Very effective
( ) No basis to assess
Evaluate commanders on how well they hold their subordinates accountable.

{Choose one}
- ( ) Very ineffective
- ( ) Ineffective
- ( ) Neither effective nor ineffective
- ( ) Effective
- ( ) Very effective
- ( ) No basis to assess

If you could recommend one bold transformation in our officer leader development program, what would it be? (2500 characters max)

{Enter answer in paragraph form}

What is your current rank?

{Choose one}
- ( ) 2LT
- ( ) 1LT
- ( ) CPT
- ( ) MAJ
- ( ) LTC
- ( ) COL
- ( ) Other [__________]

What is your source of commission?

{Choose one}
- ( ) Officer Candidate School (OCS) In-Service Option (OCS Traditional)
- ( ) Officer Candidate School (OCS) Enlistment Option (OCS Completed 4-year college degree)
- ( ) Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)
- ( ) United States Military Academy (USMA)
- ( ) Direct Commission
- ( ) Other [__________]

As an officer, what is your Year Group (YG) or commissioning year?

{Choose one}
- ( ) 2012
- ( ) 2011
- ( ) 2010
- ( ) 2009
- ( ) 2008
- ( ) 2007
- ( ) 2006
- ( ) 2005
- ( ) 2004
- ( ) 2003
- ( ) 2002
How many total years of military service (AFMS) have you completed?
{Enter text answer}

How many uniformed Soldiers do you directly supervise?
{Enter text answer}

What additional comments about Army leadership or leader development would you like to make? (2500 characters max)
{Enter answer in paragraph form}
Demographics and Background Information

What is your current position?
(Choose one)
( ) Platoon Leader
( ) Company/Battery XO
( ) Company/Battery Commander
( ) Other company grade officer position (please specify below)
( ) Battalion Primary Staff (please specify below)
( ) Battalion XO
( ) Battalion Commander
( ) Brigade Primary Staff (please specify below)
( ) Brigade XO
( ) Brigade Commander
( ) Other field grade officer position (please specify below)

If answered "Other..." above, please specify what other position
(Enter text answer)

Of the institutional courses/schools listed below, which one did you complete most recently?
(Choose one)
( ) Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B
( ) Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) III
( ) Captains Career Course (CCC)
( ) Intermediate Level Education (ILE) common core (Ft. Leavenworth)
( ) Intermediate Level Education (ILE) common core (satellite)
( ) Intermediate Level Education (ILE) distributed learning (dL)
( ) Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course (AOWC)
( ) Army War College (AWC) or other Senior Service College Program (SSC)
( ) Army War College (AWC) nonresident
( ) I have not attended any of these courses

What was the method of attendance for the course/school you selected?
(Choose one)
( ) Resident (PCS or TDY)
( ) Non-resident (Distributed Learning dL)
( ) Blended (resident and dL phases)
( ) Does not apply
( ) Other [                                ]

What year did you complete the course/school you selected?
(Choose one)
( ) 2001 or earlier
( ) 2002
( ) 2003
( ) 2004
What is your race?
{Choose all that apply}
( ) American Indian or Alaska Native
( ) Asian
( ) Black or African American
( ) Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
( ) White

What is your gender?
{Choose one}
( ) Male
( ) Female

Are you Hispanic, Latino or of other Spanish origin or ancestry?
{Choose one}
( ) Yes
( ) No

Please select the rank of your immediate superior, supervisor, or first line leader. If you are currently attending a course/school, please select the rank of your most recent immediate superior or first line leader.
{Choose one}
( ) General officer
( ) COL
( ) LTC
( ) MAJ
( ) CPT
( ) My immediate superior is an Army civilian
( ) Other [ ]

My immediate superior is in another Service (Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Allied Force)
{Choose one}
( ) Yes
( ) No
Please select the position of your immediate superior, supervisor, or first line leader. Use Other to describe a position not listed. DO NOT include any unit-identifying or organizational information for the position (e.g., 1-13 Inf BN, Ft. Hood, Army Materiel Command).

(Choose one)
( ) Brigade commander
( ) Brigade XO
( ) Brigade Primary Staff (please specify)
( ) Battalion Commander
( ) Battalion XO
( ) Battalion Primary Staff (please specify)
( ) Company/Battery Commander
( ) Company/Battery XO
( ) Platoon Leader
( ) Other [                              ]

Where are you currently located?
(Choose one)
( ) At a CONUS site (continental United States)
( ) Afghanistan
( ) Iraq
( ) Elsewhere in SW Asia
( ) Elsewhere in Asia
( ) Korea
( ) Africa
( ) Europe
( ) At another OCONUS site (outside continental United States)

What kind of assignment are you currently in?
(Choose one)
( ) Maneuver, Fires & Effects (MFE) (TOE units only)
( ) Operations Support (OS) (TOE units only)
( ) Force Sustainment (FS) (TOE units only)
( ) Special Branches (SP)
( ) Joint Assignment
( ) Allied/Multinational assignment
( ) Institutional Command (TDA units only)
( ) Other Command (TDA units)
( ) Does not apply; I am currently assigned to a school or course
( ) Do not know
( ) Other [                              ]

This is the end of the survey. Select Final to complete the survey and submit your responses. Thank you for your time.
Basic Demographic Statistics

The total number of respondents for the survey was 12,022. With 135,852 invitations, the overall response rate was 8.85%.

Figure 1. Current Military Status

Which of the following describes your current military status?

- Regular Army (Active duty) 65.8%
- Army Reserve - Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) 6.1%
- Army Reserve - Currently on AGR or other 3.0%
- Army Reserve - Dlying Reserve (TRU) 3.0%
- Army Reserve - Individual Mobilization 7.9%
- Army Reserve - Individual Mobilization 1.1%
- Army National Guard - Active Guard/Reserve 4.3%
- Army National Guard - Currently on AGR or other 0.9%
- Army National Guard - Dlying Guardsman (TRU) 6.1%
- Army National Guard - Dual Status Technician 2.8%
Figure 2. Current Military Status (simplified)

Which of the following describes your current military status?

![Bar chart showing current military status percentages: Regular Army 55.8%, Army Reserve 17.1%, Army National Guard 17.1%]

Figure 3. Current Rank

What is your current rank?

![Bar chart showing current rank percentages: 2LT 4.9%, 1LT 10.9%, CPT 25.1%, MAJ 27.7%, LTC 21.5%, COL 10.3%, Other 0.5%]
Figure 4. Commission Source

What is your source of commission?

![Bar chart showing commission sources]

Figure 5. Current Position

What is your current position?

![Bar chart showing current positions]
Figure 6. Recent Institutional Course/School Completion

Of the institutional courses/schools listed below, which one did you complete most recently?

- Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) III
- Captains Career Course (CCC)
- Intermediate Level Education (M.B. common core/w. Leveine study only)
- Intermediate Level Education (M.B. common core (2018))
- Intermediate Level Education (A.D. distributed)
- Advanced Operations and Warning (Course Work)
- Army War College (AWC) nonresident
- Army War College (AWC) resident
- Have not attended any of these courses

Figure 7. Method of Attendance

What was the method of attendance for the course/school you selected?

- Resident (PCS or TDY)
- Non-resident (Distributed Learning dl.)
- Blended (resident and dl. phases)
- Does not apply
- Other
Figure 8. Course/School Completion Year

What year did you complete the course/school you selected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 or earlier</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not apply</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9. Race

Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Indian or Alaska Native</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African American</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 10. Gender

![Gender Distribution](image10)

Figure 11. Hispanic Origin

![Hispanic Origin Distribution](image11)
**Figure 12. Rank of Immediate Superior**

Please select the rank of your immediate superior, supervisor, or first line leader. If you are currently attending a course/school, please select the rank of your most recent immediate superior or first line leader.

![Bar chart showing the rank distribution of immediate superiors](chart12.png)

**Figure 13. Other Service**

My immediate superior is in another Service (Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Allied Force)

![Bar chart showing the percentage of individuals whose immediate superior is in another service](chart13.png)
Figure 14. Position of Immediate Supervisor

Please select the position of your immediate superior, supervisor, or first line leader. Use Other to describe a position not listed. DO NOT include any unit-identifying or organizational information for the position (e.g., 1-13 Inf BN, Ft. Hood,...

Figure 15. Current Location

Where are you currently located?
Figure 16. Current Assignment

What kind of assignment are you currently in?

- Maneuver: Fires & Effects (MFE) (TOE units only): 22.6%
- Operations Support (OS) (TOE units only): 11.3%
- Force Sustainment (FS) (TOE units only): 9.6%
- Special Branches (SB): 2.9%
- Joint Assignment: 7.7%
- Allied/Multinational assignment: 14.1%
- Individual Command (IDA units): 14.0%
- Other Command (IDA units): 4.0%
- Do not know (School or course): 2.7%
- Other: 12.0%

Percent
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How many total years of military service (AFMS) have you completed?</td>
<td>10080</td>
<td>15.11</td>
<td>8.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many uniformed Soldiers do you directly supervise?</td>
<td>10018</td>
<td>60.88</td>
<td>314.474</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Basic Descriptive Statistics

Table 2. To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on….

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>your satisfaction with how well you do?</td>
<td>11575</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how well your personal career goals are met?</td>
<td>11566</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>your ability to consistently accomplish the mission?</td>
<td>11550</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>how you affect the lives of those you serve with?</td>
<td>11514</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>.888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circumstances that are outside of your influence?</td>
<td>11460</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the expectations of your raters and senior raters?</td>
<td>11513</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Army's definition of what it takes to be a successful Army Officer?</td>
<td>11339</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17.

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on your satisfaction with how well you do?
Figure 18.

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on how well your personal career goals are met?

Figure 19.

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on your ability to consistently accomplish the mission?
Figure 20.

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on how you affect the lives of those you serve with?

Figure 21.

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on circumstances that are outside of your influence?
Figure 22.

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on the expectations of your raters and senior raters?

Figure 23.

To what extent does your success as an Army officer depend on the Army's definition of what it takes to be a successful Army Officer?
Table 3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I understand clearly what it takes to be a successful Army officer.</td>
<td>11587</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among the Army officer corps there is a common and shared understanding of what it means to be a successful Army officer.</td>
<td>11582</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Army provides a clear picture of what it takes to be successful at each officer rank.</td>
<td>11574</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>1.055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 24.
Figure 25.

Among the Army officer corps there is a common and shared understanding of what it means to be a successful Army officer.

Figure 26.

The Army provides a clear picture of what it takes to be successful at each officer rank.
Table 4. To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>provide subordinates maximum freedom of action in determining how to accomplish missions?</td>
<td>10534</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>build cohesive teams?</td>
<td>10548</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>encourage mutual trust?</td>
<td>10592</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>1.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide clear commander's intent?</td>
<td>10641</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow disciplined initiative?</td>
<td>10319</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>1.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>underwrite prudent risks in deployed operations?</td>
<td>5725</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>underwrite prudent risks in garrison operations?</td>
<td>8977</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set clear priorities for your unit's training plans?</td>
<td>9779</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>1.162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>set clear priorities for your unit's leader development plans?</td>
<td>10129</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allow you to take prudent risks in how you develop or support the development of your Soldiers?</td>
<td>9463</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>1.133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters provide subordinates maximum freedom of action in determining how to accomplish missions?
Figure 28.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters build cohesive teams?

Figure 29.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters encourage mutual trust?
Figure 30.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters provide clear commander's intent?

Figure 31.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters allow disciplined initiative?
Figure 32.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters underwrite prudent risks in deployed operations?

- Not at all: 10.9%
- Slight extent: 16.8%
- Moderate extent: 30.1%
- Great extent: 28.8%
- Very great extent: 13.4%

Figure 33.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters underwrite prudent risks in garrison operations?

- Not at all: 9.9%
- Slight extent: 20.0%
- Moderate extent: 32.8%
- Great extent: 26.8%
- Very great extent: 10.6%
Figure 34.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters set clear priorities for your unit's training plans?

Figure 35.

To what extent in your current assignment does your higher headquarters set clear priorities for your unit's leader development plans?
Table 5. Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How effective is your immediate superior at establishing trusting relationships with others?</td>
<td>10440</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>1.195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission command has contributed to the successes that the Army has</td>
<td>10002</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>experienced in the campaigns since Sep 11, 2001.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am satisfied with the amount of freedom or latitude I have in my</td>
<td>10867</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>1.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>job.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouraging subordinates to show initiative accelerates their</td>
<td>10791</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>.860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development as Army officers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 38.

Mission command has contributed to the successes that the Army has experienced in the campaigns since Sep 11, 2001.

Figure 39.

I am satisfied with the amount of freedom or latitude I have in my job.
Figure 40.

Encouraging subordinates to show initiative accelerates their development as Army officers.
Table 7. How much of an impact does each of the following attributes have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Values</td>
<td>10720</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (care and concern for Soldiers and others)</td>
<td>10727</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrior Ethos</td>
<td>10717</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining subordinate discipline</td>
<td>10717</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>.748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing standards for subordinate conduct</td>
<td>10718</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>.765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and Professional Bearing</td>
<td>10732</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fitness (physical, health, psychological, spiritual, behavioral, social)</td>
<td>10742</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>10730</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience (mental strength to endure extreme stress)</td>
<td>10725</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental agility (thinking quickly and acutely, breaking out of mental blocks)</td>
<td>10726</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound judgment</td>
<td>10737</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical thinking</td>
<td>10729</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>.673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation (new ideas, creative thinking, forward thinking)</td>
<td>10664</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal tact</td>
<td>10678</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical expertise</td>
<td>10675</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>.828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical expertise</td>
<td>10569</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint expertise</td>
<td>10326</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>1.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical expertise</td>
<td>10387</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-cultural expertise</td>
<td>10551</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified action partner expertise (military, governmental, nongovernmental and private sector organizations with which Army forces operate) (ADP 3-0)</td>
<td>10011</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability (a change in response to better fit changing conditions)</td>
<td>10658</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility (ability to make changes)</td>
<td>10661</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustworthiness</td>
<td>10684</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>.628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 43.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader: Warrior Ethos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very little or no impact</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small impact</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate impact</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large impact</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great impact</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 44.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader: Maintaining subordinate discipline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very little or no impact</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small impact</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate impact</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large impact</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great impact</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 45.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Enforcing standards for subordinate conduct?

Figure 46.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Military and Professional Bearing?
Figure 47.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Total fitness (physical, health, psychological, spiritual, behavioral, social)

Figure 48.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Confidence
Figure 49.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Resilience (mental strength to endure extreme stress)

Figure 50.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Mental agility (thinking quickly and acutely, breaking out of mental blocks)
Figure 51.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Sound judgment

Figure 52.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Critical thinking
Figure 53.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Innovation (new ideas, creative thinking, forward thinking)

Figure 54.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Interpersonal tact
Figure 55.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Technical expertise

Figure 56.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Tactical expertise
Figure 57.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Joint expertise

Figure 58.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Geopolitical expertise
Figure 59.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader: Cross-cultural expertise

Figure 60.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader: Unified action partner expertise (military, governmental, nongovernmental and private sector organizations with which Army forces operate) (ADP 3-0)
Figure 61.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Adaptability (a change in response to better fit changing conditions)

Figure 62.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Flexibility (ability to make changes)
Figure 63.

How much of an impact does the following attribute have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Trustworthiness

Percent

Very little or no impact: 0.3%
Small impact: 0.6%
Moderate impact: 4.0%
Large impact: 21.1%
Great impact: 73.7%

Figure 64.

Which leader attribute has the most impact on being an effective leader?

Percent

Adaptability: 8.6%
Army Values: 12.1%
Critical thinking: 11.4%
Crisis/cultural expertise: 5.3%
Empathy: 2.6%
Ethical standards (for subordinate): 1.1%
Geopolitical expertise: 3.8%
Innovation: 6.5%
Joint expertise: 4.6%
Keeping military/moral discipline: 1.8%
Military and professional bearing: 1.9%
Resilience: 14.8%
Sound judgment: 17.8%
Technical expertise: 2.1%
Tribal culture: 1.1%
Total fitness: 1.2%
Trustworthiness: 0.1%
Victory ethos: 0.1%
Table 8. How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishing trusting relationships with others</td>
<td>10531</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading and influencing subordinates</td>
<td>10514</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>.598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extending influence (e.g., to unified action partners)</td>
<td>10304</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading by example</td>
<td>10509</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicating (encouraging a shared understanding)</td>
<td>10513</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a positive environment</td>
<td>10503</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-development (preparing self to carry out his or her responsibilities)</td>
<td>10507</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>.745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing subordinates (e.g., counseling, coaching, mentoring)</td>
<td>10489</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stewarding the profession</td>
<td>10347</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>.904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting results to accomplish the mission successfully</td>
<td>10441</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>.703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 66.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Establishing trusting relationships with others

Figure 67.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Leading and influencing subordinates
Figure 68.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader: Extending influence (e.g., to unified action partners)

Figure 69.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual’s ability to be an effective leader: Leading by example
Figure 70.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Communicating (encouraging a shared understanding)

Figure 71.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Creating a positive environment
Figure 72.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Self-development (preparing self to carry out his or her responsibilities)

Figure 73.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Developing subordinates (e.g., counseling, coaching, mentoring)
Figure 74.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Stewarding the profession?

Figure 75.

How much of an impact does the following competency have on an individual's ability to be an effective leader: Getting results to accomplish the mission successfully?
Table 9. How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between AC and RC units contributed to the successes that the Army has experienced in the campaigns since 11 SEP 2001.</td>
<td>9242</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC officers attending PME courses together is a necessary element of future success in the Army.</td>
<td>10267</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC and RC units participating together in collective training is a necessary element of future success in the Army.</td>
<td>10239</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>.860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 77.

Cooperation between AC and RC units contributed to the successes that the Army has experienced in the campaigns since 11 SEP 2001.

Figure 78.

AC and RC officers attending PME courses together is a necessary element of future success in the Army.
Table 10. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What the Army leader development system is.</td>
<td>10166</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How the Army leader development system applies to me.</td>
<td>10114</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Army-level initiatives for Army leader development.</td>
<td>8771</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>0.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What the Professional Military Education (PME) courses are.</td>
<td>9985</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I can attend my next PME course.</td>
<td>9697</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How operational assignments contribute to my development.</td>
<td>10073</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>1.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is required of me for my next promotion.</td>
<td>10164</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How performance evaluations (OERs) contribute to my development.</td>
<td>10252</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How professional growth counseling occurs.</td>
<td>10146</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What the Army expects me to do in self-development.</td>
<td>10158</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How unit training exercises contribute to my development.</td>
<td>9881</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to obtain a mentor.</td>
<td>9919</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What broadening opportunities are available.</td>
<td>10003</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How 360 assessments (Army Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback) contribute to my development.</td>
<td>9645</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What the Army leader development system is.</td>
<td>10166</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>1.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How the Army leader development system applies to me.</td>
<td>10114</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>1.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Army-level initiatives for Army leader development.</td>
<td>8771</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What the Professional Military Education (PME) courses are.</td>
<td>9985</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I can attend my next PME course.</td>
<td>9697</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>1.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How operational assignments contribute to my development.</td>
<td>10073</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>1.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is required of me for my next promotion.</td>
<td>10164</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How performance evaluations (OERs) contribute to my development.</td>
<td>10252</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How professional growth counseling occurs.</td>
<td>10146</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>1.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What the Army expects me to do in self-development.</td>
<td>10158</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>1.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How unit training exercises contribute to my development.</td>
<td>9881</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to obtain a mentor.</td>
<td>9919</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What broadening opportunities are available.</td>
<td>10003</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How 360 assessments (Army Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback)</td>
<td>9645</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How informal activities (on-the-job training and experience,</td>
<td>10180</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discussions with peers, temporary assignments or duties) contribute to my development.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 80.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following: What the Army leader development system is.

Figure 81.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following: How the Army leader development system applies to me.
Figure 82.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
New Army-level initiatives for Army leader development.

Figure 83.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
What the Professional Military Education (PME) courses are.
Figure 84.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following: When I can attend my next PME course.

Figure 85.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following: How operational assignments contribute to my development.
Figure 86.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
What is required of me for my next promotion.

Figure 87.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
How performance evaluations (OERs) contribute to my development.
Figure 88.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
How professional growth counseling occurs.

Figure 89.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
What the Army expects me to do in self-development.
Figure 90.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
How unit training exercises contribute to my development.

Figure 91.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
How to obtain a mentor.
Figure 92.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
What broadening opportunities are available.

Figure 93.

How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your understanding of the following:
How 360 assessments (Army Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback) contribute to my development.
Table 11. To what extent have the following interfered with an effective leader development (LD) program in your current unit or organization?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient time</td>
<td>9752</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR 350-1 requirements for mandatory training</td>
<td>9114</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of emphasis or support from your higher command</td>
<td>9633</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of resources (equipment, ranges, personnel present for duty, etc.)</td>
<td>9504</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of available, realistic training scenarios</td>
<td>9239</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of trust within the unit</td>
<td>9570</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>1.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication breakdowns from/to higher command</td>
<td>9518</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of empowerment (freedom of action) to execute LD</td>
<td>9506</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>1.343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 95.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: Insufficient time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight extent</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate extent</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great extent</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very great extent</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 96.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: AR 350-1 requirements for mandatory training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slight extent</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate extent</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great extent</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very great extent</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 97.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: Lack of emphasis or support from your higher command

Figure 98.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: Lack of resources (equipment, ranges, personnel present for duty, etc.)
Figure 99.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: Lack of available, realistic training scenarios

- Not at all: 25.0%
- Slight extent: 25.8%
- Moderate extent: 24.8%
- Great extent: 14.6%
- Very great extent: 9.7%

Figure 100.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: Absence of trust within the unit

- Not at all: 42.4%
- Slight extent: 21.5%
- Moderate extent: 15.9%
- Great extent: 11.1%
- Very great extent: 11.1%
Figure 101.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: Communication breakdowns from/to higher command

Figure 102.

To what extent has the following interfered with an effective LD program in your current unit or organization: Lack of empowerment (freedom of action) to execute LD
Table 12. More time should be allotted in the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) A (pre-commissioning) for instruction on…

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal communi</td>
<td>9482</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing skills</td>
<td>9530</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>.989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical thinking</td>
<td>9518</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem solving</td>
<td>9508</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>.796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign languages</td>
<td>9430</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural awareness</td>
<td>9481</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical subjects</td>
<td>9437</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>1.140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 103.

More time should be allotted in the BOLC A for instruction on: Interpersonal communication

Percent

0 10 20 30 40 50
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
1.5 5.1 12.7 43.1 57.7
Figure 104.

More time should be allotted in the BOLC A for instruction on: Writing skills

Figure 105.

More time should be allotted in the BOLC A for instruction on: Critical thinking
Figure 106.

More time should be allotted in the BOLC A for instruction on: Problem solving

Figure 107.

More time should be allotted in the BOLC A for instruction on: Foreign languages
Figure 108.

More time should be allotted in the BOLC A for instruction on: Cultural awareness

- Strongly disagree: 6.2%
- Disagree: 18.0%
- Neither agree nor disagree: 26.7%
- Agree: 34.0%
- Strongly agree: 16.2%

Figure 109.

More time should be allotted in the BOLC A for instruction on: Technical subjects such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics

- Strongly disagree: 7.6%
- Disagree: 23.2%
- Neither agree nor disagree: 31.0%
- Agree: 24.6%
- Strongly agree: 13.5%
Figure 110.

![Bar chart showing time serving as a Platoon Leader](chart.png)

Table 13. How effective do you anticipate each of the following prospective changes would be at improving assignments for Army leader development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An individual personnel management system that moves away from year group decisions and broadens the window for completion of key developmental requirements.</td>
<td>9611</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requiring officers to apply for promotion.</td>
<td>9724</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requiring directions be given to promotion boards to consider institutional assignments equal in value to operational assignments.</td>
<td>9709</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>1.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased number of broadening assignments.</td>
<td>9738</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>.818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 111.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving assignments for Army LD: An individual personnel management system that moves away from year group decisions and broadens the window for completion of key developmental

Figure 112.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving assignments for Army LD: Requiring officers to apply for promotion.
Figure 113.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving assignments for Army LD: Requiring directions be given to promotion boards to consider institutional assignments equal in value to operational assignments.

Figure 114.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving assignments for Army LD: Increased number of broadening assignments.
Table 14. How effective do you anticipate each of the following prospective changes would be at improving education for Army leader development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve pre-commissioning education and training.</td>
<td>9790</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>.849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrange the time an officer attends each PME course to occur on a set schedule.</td>
<td>9783</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign the officers who are most qualified to instruct as instructors in PME courses.</td>
<td>9956</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase hours in PME (BOLC A, BOLC B, and CCC) to allow for more coverage on the basics of the officer profession, such as customs, traditions,</td>
<td>9948</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>1.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase emphasis in units to focus on the basics of the officer profession, such as customs, traditions, courtesies, character development, and stewardship.</td>
<td>10024</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>1.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 115.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving education for Army LD: Improve pre-commissioning education and training.
Figure 116.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving education for Army LD: Arrange the time an officer attends each PME course to occur on a set schedule.

Figure 117.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving education for Army LD: Assign the officers who are most qualified to instruct as instructors in PME courses.
Figure 118.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving education for Army LD: Increase hours in PME (BOLC A, BOLC B, and CCC) to allow for more coverage on the basics of the officer profession, such as customs, traditions.

Figure 119.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving education for Army LD: Increase emphasis in units to focus on the basics of the officer profession, such as customs, traditions, courtesies, character development, and
Table 15. How effective do you anticipate each of the following prospective changes would be at improving Army leader development?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Create habitual organizational relationships between ARNG/USAR units and AC units.</td>
<td>9669</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create regular, rotating positions for RC officers to be assigned to AC units.</td>
<td>9702</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>1.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate commanders on the trust (and empowerment) placed in subordinate commanders.</td>
<td>9833</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate commanders on how well they hold their subordinates accountable.</td>
<td>9890</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>.919</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 120.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving Army LD: Create habitual organizational relationships between ARNG/USAR units and AC units.
Figure 121.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving Army LD: Create regular, rotating positions for RC officers to be assigned to AC units.

Figure 122.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving Army LD: Evaluate commanders on the trust (and empowerment) placed in subordinate commanders.
Figure 123.

How effective do you anticipate the following prospective change would be at improving Army LD: Evaluate commanders on how well they hold their subordinates accountable.
Chapter Four


Appendix One

5 Ibid., iv.
6 Ibid., i.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., iii.
9 Ibid., 12-29, 78, 22.
11 Ibid., iii, 2-3.
12 Ibid., 14-15.
13 Ibid., 16.
14 Ibid., 19-23.
15 Ibid., 57-70.
17 Ibid., 1-2.
19 Ibid., 26.
22 Ibid., 25-29.

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., vi-xvi.
28 Ibid., 67-68.
30 Ibid., O-11.
31 Ibid., O-22.
33 Ibid., 2-20.
35 Ibid., 11.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid., xvii - xix.
40 Ibid., 16-22, 27.
41 Ibid., 2-8
42 Ibid., 16-22, 27, 32.
44 Ibid., v-viii, 18-19.
47 Ibid., 6-10, 57.
48 Ibid., 53.
49 Ibid., 59-61.
50 Ibid., 62.
52 Ibid., 9.
53 Ibid., 16-17.
55 Ibid., 5-17.
REFERENCES


