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OFFICERS' CALL

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

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

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Hackett, John Winthrop.

THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

The 1962 Lees Knowles lectures
given at Trinity College, Cambridge, by
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LECTURE I

1—ORIGINS OF A PROFESSION

From the beginning of man's recorded history physical force, or the threat of it, has been freely and incessantly applied to the resolution of social problems. It persists as an essential element in the social pattern. History suggests that as a society of men grows more orderly the application of force tends to become better ordered. The requirement for it has shown no sign of disappearing. A completely biataxic society [1] is probably no more than a social abstraction. It may even be a contradiction in terms. On the other hand a society of men in which no resort to force is possible, either for the common good or against it, either for individual advantage or against it, is inconceivable, so long as man remains what he is.

The function of the profession of arms is the ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem. Harold Lasswell [2] describes it as the management of violence, which is rather less precise. The bearing of arms among men for the purpose of fighting other men is found as far back as we can see. It has become at some times and in some places a calling resembling the priesthood in its dedication. It has never ceased to display a strong element of the vocational.

It has also become a profession, not only in the wider sense of what is professed, but in the narrower sense of an occupation with a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its own needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth. In all these respects it has strong points of resemblance to medicine and the law, as well as to holy orders.

What forms has service under arms assumed in western societies in the past and what has been their relation to the parent society? Who joined armed forces and why? Where does the man at arms stand today? What can we conjecture about his place in society in the future? To questions such as these I shall attempt to suggest some answers in these three lectures. I shall first glance at an example or two of earlier forms of military institutions in western Europe, say something of feudal soldiering and then look at the regularization of military service within the framework of national standing armies. In the second lecture I shall speak of military developments in the late eighteenth century, the Napoleonic wars and the professionalization of the profession of arms which followed them. In the third I shall take a look at the military profession in the twentieth century.

I want to say something to begin with about Sparta, which offers an interesting example of a society dominated by the threat of war and given over in effect to warlike practice. In the precarious economic situation which poor soil and growing population thrust upon the communities of post-Minoan Greece, Sparta made very little attempt to solve her problem by colonization or maritime adventure, or both, as others did. She chose to rely, instead, on the conquest on land of immediate neighbors. This led her, after the second and decisive Messenian war in the seventh century B.C., into the position of a garrison state. The Spartans came to the conclusion that their survival was dependent on the subordination of pretty well all other considerations to military efficiency, a conclusion which was reflected in what are called the reforms of Lycurgus. Whoever or whatever Lycurgus was, earlier Spartan institutions were now radically adapted to meet new needs.

The details of the reforms are obscure, since Plutarch,[3] our chief witness, is unreliable, but the centre of the post-Lycurgan system was a *corps d'élite* of heavily armed infantrymen drawn from the whole body of the Spartiates. Each of these supported his family in frugal fashion from an al-

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lotment probably cultivated by, on the average, seven Messenian serf families, *adscripti glebae*. At the battle of Plataea each Spartan hoplite in the Lacedaemonian contingent was attended by seven light-armed helots. Hoplites in other contingents were each attended by one.[4] Spartiate birth, for boy or girl alike, was no more than a sentence to the ordeal of a Spartan education. Even their breeding was regulated for the purpose of producing more and better fighting men. The Spartans, according to Plutarch [5], thought it odd that other people should put mares and bitches to the best sires they could hire or borrow but rely upon the sacred right of husbands, even when these were feeble-minded, senile or diseased, to produce the community's crop of human offspring.

If a select body of elders decided the child was worth rearing, and should not be got rid of by exposure, it was left with its mother until the seventh year. Thereafter a Spartan boy's education was conducted for 13 years in such a way as to fit him best for the compulsory military service which would occupy him from his twenty-first year to his sixtieth. His training, though he learnt to read and write, was almost entirely moral and physical. Even the athletic sports which took so prominent a place in Hellas were largely forbidden the young Spartiate, as distracting him from more professional exercises. Sparta produced the best heavy infantry in the Hellenic world, as much feared by her neighbours as the heavy infantry of the Swiss was feared by theirs nearly 2,000 years later. Her victories over the armies of other Greek city states were the victories of whole-time regular forces over citizen militias, the victories of a state organized primarily for war over others which were not.

Sparta achieved outstanding military distinction. The penalty, however, as is always likely to be the case where uniquely military solutions are sought to political and social problems, was a heavy one. The arts, once flourishing in Sparta, declined. The restless, turbulent flood of creative effort which came out of Greece surged past Sparta on her militaristic island and left her high and dry. In the event, victory over Athens in the Peloponnesian war forced her to spread the Spartiate elite too thinly over subjugated areas. Her defeat by the Theban Epaminondas at Leuctra in 371 (largely through a novel oblique tactical approach, of immense future significance) left her no more than an archaic relic fading into obscurity.

In the city states of Hellas which had not chosen a military solution to their population problems, war was a tragic interruption in the life of the ordinary citizens.[6] It swept him into military service as a heavily armed infantryman if he were a man of substance, as a more lightly armed infantryman (a bowman perhaps, or a slinger) of less military significance if he were not. The obligation to serve under arms at need (and usually to furnish them) was an essential element in a man's standing as a free citizen, and it was not uncommon, as for instance in Athens with the *epheboi*, for young men to be required to establish their capacity to bear arms as a condition of full citizenship.

"The qualities of its courts of law and its armies," said Goethe, "give the most minute insight into the essence of an empire." [7] The organization of these two fundamental types of social institution inevitably reflects the structure and outlook of the society they serve. Thus arrangements for military command in the armed forces of the πόλις in war largely reflect the approach to the distribution of political power in peace. In Athens, for example, at the beginning of the fifth century B.C., the time of the battle of Marathon, there were 10 generals, elected by a show of hands in the assembly of the whole citizen body, the *ecclesia*. Unless this assembly also nominated one of them as commander-in-chief, at the start of a campaign, the 10 στρατηγοι divided their functions. They presided each in turn for one day over their committee while they were in Athens. In the field, if more than one were present, each took it in turn to be commander-in-chief for a day*. The 10 ταξίαρχοι, whom we might call colonels, were elected each in his tribe to command its infantry, assisted by 10 λοχαγοί or captains.

The elective principle for the appointment of officers appears again in the armies of the early Roman republic, and vestiges of it survive into imperial times. It was to be tried out centuries later in the American, French and Russian revolutionary armies, and was to be quickly abandoned in each. It only seems to have worked satisfactorily in the forces of relatively small political units using simple techniques of war, and even

* This at any rate is Herodotus' account of the arrangement. Modern scholars tend to doubt his version.

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then only if what Aristotle would have recognized as democratic processes were characteristic of the parent society, which is not, of course, true of any sovereign nation state in the world today.

Military discipline among the lively and argumentative Athenians was none too good by any standard. It is characteristic that grosser breaches were only punished on the return of the expedition, after court cases which I imagine were usually widely enjoyed. The typical Athenian hoplite, though paid a small wage and a subsistence allowance with another allowance for his attendant, and though he continued to be liable for military service from the time he was passed off as an *ephebus* at 20 until he was 60, remained essentially and always a civilian.

One of my early commanding officers said sadly to me, shortly after I went down from three or four years spent beside the infant Thames with polemarchs, hoplites and such, "you'll never be a soldier: you'll never be much more than an armed civilian." I felt, I must confess, rather chastened, but it did seem that I was in quite distinguished company.

With the Roman army it was different, and most strikingly so after the reforms of Marius in the early first century B.C.[8] Under the kings every citizen had been liable to serve in the army with such weapons as the grading of his property suggested he could afford. The richest class served as cavalry, the next as heavy infantry. The helmet, breastplate, greaves, metal shield and lance, furnished by the soldier himself, were costly. The four next lower classes in consequence served as more lightly armed infantry and the members of the lowest and poorest were often not required to serve at all. The introduction of pay resolved many of the objections to service from the poorer men, and Marius removed all property qualifications for service whatsoever.

By the middle of the second century B.C. (the time of Polybius), the legions were still raised, as required, from a general levy. Tribes were chosen by lot in turn and draftees from each tribe were nominated until the required number of legions was filled. There were even then old sweats known as *evocati* who regularly joined up without bothering to attend the drafting assembly. They were useful men and often became centurions.

Marius introduced a long service regular army in which men enlisted for 20 years. He also reorganized the legion, now some 6,000 strong, into a more flexible arrangement of 10 cohorts, each of something like battalion size and containing six centuries. The legion now received a standard—the eagle—and was soon, in Caesar's time, to be given a distinguishing number as well. This endowed it with a persistence as an entity which was previously lacking. Marshal Saxe was to propose in the mid-eighteenth century that regiments should be given a number, and no longer be known by the names of their colonels, with the same purpose.

Before long names were added to legionary numbers. When Augustus amalgamated his own and Anthony's armies after the battle of Actium in 31 B.C., there were sometimes two and in some instances even three legions with the same number. Those that were not disbanded were then distinguished by names: III Augusta, III Cyrenaica, III Gallica. When new legions were raised later they too were given names.

The legion was now more than ever a continuing and coherent entity. The promotion of the centurion was largely within it, though cross posting on promotion was not uncommon. The loyalty of the soldier was at least in part engaged to it, though he had long since ceased to take an oath to the general on enrolment and had from time of Marius taken an oath to the republic instead, which was later replaced by an oath to the emperor. Legions developed an identity of their own, helped by their being stationed for long periods in the same districts with permanent quarters, the *castra stativa*, under *praefecti castrorum*. The XVII, XVIII and XIX legions, destroyed under Varus in Germany in A.D. 9, were never raised again. Nor was the IX *Hispana*, annihilated near Colchester by Britons under Boudicca in A.D. 61. The legion evoked some at least of the emotional associations of the modern regiment. Its solidity as a group strengthened even further, in battle, a soldiery who were already by temperament obdurate and tough and in whom the habit of obedience had been developed by a stern code of discipline.

Even those who love the Romans most, like Michael Grant, distinguished product of the ancient House which has invited me to give these lectures, would not describe them as kindly folk. They were cruel and expected cruelty. The pun-

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ishments inflicted on the soldier included death for desertion, mutiny or insubordination, and beating for stealing, false witness or culpable physical weakness. Public degradation was not unknown and the grimmer penalties were sometimes visited on whole units, decimated by the execution of one in 10 (chosen by lot), or even killed off completely. In the palisade or turf wall of a legionary camp the front gate, the praetorian, was in the vicinity of the general's quarter and nearest the enemy. Half a mile or so behind it in the middle of the opposite side of the square was the *porta decumana*. "Through this," says Vegetius mournfully, "guilty soldiers are conducted to their punishment. . . ." [9] Punishment and fear thereof are necessary to keep soldiers in order in quarters; but in the field," he says, reflecting the sensible attitude of the Roman military in general, "they are more influenced by hope and rewards." [10]

In peacetime, however, the regime was severe. Tacitus [11] recounts a story of how Corbulo, in his efforts to strengthen discipline in the time of Claudius, had a soldier executed for working on field fortification without wearing his sword, as the order prescribed, and another man because he had only a dagger. In the mutiny after the death of Augustus [12] the soldiers sought out and slew a centurion, old "Cedo Alteram" or "Give-me-Another," who was called this because when he had broken his cane of office on a soldier's back he did not desist but demanded a replacement. The paternal relationship which sometimes existed between officer and man even in Frederick the Great's army, with its brutal and arbitrary discipline, can be sought in the imperial Roman army in vain. The centurion, who acted as company commander and company sergeant-major in one, was a hard master from the same level in society as his men.

Under the empire, while the practice that only Roman citizens should serve in the legions was continued, the disadvantages were realized of confining recruiting to Italians. Non-Italians were enrolled, therefore, and given the citizenship. Before long most legionary recruits came from the provinces. The praetorian and urban guard, however, continued to be found only among Italians.

The method of a centurion's promotion through the 60 centuries of the legion is still uncertain. The cohorts were numbered one to 10, and in each the six centuries followed a set order of precedence, with the same designation in each cohort. It is possible that the steady old file who would never get far was promoted from one century to another through each of the 10 cohorts in order, and if he started at the bottom would become *primus pilus*, if he ever did, on his fifty-ninth promotion. More promising candidates (such as the young men of equestrian birth who had insufficient means to follow an equestrian public *cursus*) might be promoted up through the 10 cohorts in one century, and on arrival in the first cohort go along through its six grades to the senior century of the legion. The *primus pilus*, the senior centurion (in the words of Vegetius), "was not only entrusted with the eagle but commanded four centuries, that is, 400 men in the first line. As head of the legion he had appointments of great honour and profit." [13]

The Roman legionary soldier of the late republic and the early empire was not a pure mercenary, if there is such a thing. He served for pay but though this was small he was rarely led astray by hope of plunder. Booty was divided out and was augmented by donatives. Caesar doubled the soldier's pay. It was then, according to my calculations about the value of £20 a year. But this is really meaningless. What seems to be the case is that though he had to buy his food (the Roman soldier was almost entirely vegetarian) he could live on his pay and even save, putting money by in the legionary savings bank, described by Vegetius,[14] for such purposes as the dignified funeral every good Roman citizen aimed at.

But apart from the financial rewards he seemed to like the strictly ordered life. Dedication to the pursuit of arms came naturally to him. "Their trade was war," wrote the Earl of Orrery in his *Treatise of the Art of War* in 1677,[15] adding, "I thank God ours is not." A French parachutist officer said recently, "We like war and we are tooled up for it." [16] It could have been a Roman legionary soldier speaking.

The legionary machine was complex and highly articulated. The number and variety of titles of its junior officers is impressive.[17] Its weapons were primarily helmet, breastplate and shield, with a throwing spear (*pilum*), a sword of the Spanish type (*gladius*) and a dagger (*pugio*), but it also could call on some fairly sophisticated siege weapons.

Recruits under the late republic and the early empire were usually adequate in number and, be-

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cause of the respectable social standing of a soldier's calling, of good average quality. Marriage was forbidden the soldier but allowed among officers. What very often happened was that the soldier lived with a woman and the marriage was recognized and children legitimized when he got his discharge.

Training was tough, realistic and rational. The Romans of the republic and the early empire took their army seriously. Men of education and position found in appointments as officers in it, especially those of tribune, a path to political advancement of which many of the abler and more ambitious took advantage. It is impossible not to be struck by the exactitude with which the Romans matched their personal characteristics, their social structure and their political organization with military institutions which so faithfully reflected them.

When Vegetius wrote his account of the military institutions of the Romans [18] he was attempting to recall the citizens of the fourth century A.D. to the grim virtues and military skills of their ancestors. But the book, though perhaps the most influential of any military treatise between Roman times and the nineteenth century, and well worth reading today, had little influence in its own time. The decay which Vegetius laments in the military institutions of fourth century Rome was not confined to them and was itself only the symptom of a disease. The collapse of the Roman system during the following three centuries, under external pressures which internal tensions made it impossible to resist, carried the legionary system down along with it. Before anything remotely resembling a legion was seen in Europe again, as a result of the military reforms of Maurice of Nassau 1,000 years later, feudalism was to develop and decline.

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2—KNIGHTS AND MERCENARIES

The military structure of medieval Europe was dominated by the castle and the heavily armoured mounted man at arms. It was essentially defensive. Feudal military service was highly regulated. The obligation to service was to a person under a contract clearly understood on both sides. A benefit was conferred (tenancy of land was by far the most common form of it) in return for which service in arms of a fairly restricted nature was promised. The period of service and the distance from home a man might have to travel on service were both small. In consequence extensive aggression was difficult to sustain. In the Hundred Years War England was only able to conquer a large part of France because the English king had feudal claims there. Crusading expeditions to the Near East demanded the invocation of quite exceptional sanctions.

Not only the castle but the knight too represented a heavy investment in labour and capital. The arms and equipment (including the horse) of an armoured mounted soldier in twelfth-century France or England might represent the entire income for several years of a considerable little rural community.[1]

The military resources of a medieval monarch were determined by his position as a land holder. The forces he could summon, even for the limited time permitted in the year by feudal custom, were often exceeded by those available to men who were his subjects, as for example those of the early Capet kings in France were by those of the Duke of Normandy. The permanent forces upon which he could count were never more than modest.

The feudal mounted man-at-arms followed his calling for the maintenance or improvement of the economic and social position of his family as a land holding unit. Military service was one of the only two ways which were in practice open to him (the other being holy orders) for the acquisition of further wealth and prestige. Rank, dignity, administrative responsibility and the rewards thereof, were all closely related to the extent of land held in fief. More extensive benefices could be expected to accrue to the distinguished performer in battle.

Plunder and ransom also came his way. The advantages, finally, of physical strength and skill at arms in the time of diminished public security which followed the collapse of Roman institutions need no emphasis.

The son of a knightly family, which held land in return for military service, was naturally brought up in the use of weapons and in hunting and robust physical sports more or less closely related to the practice of war. It would be less usual for him to learn to read and write. His principal weapons were the horse, the lance and a heavy sword (sometimes two-handed) with choice of a variety of other minor cutting and stabbing weapons such as daggers and short swords, and of bruising and crushing weapons such as the club or mace. He wore a covering of armour later partially extended to his horse. His dominance would have been impossible without the stirrups [2] whose effect on European civilization ever since its introduction into Europe by Eurasian nomads has been enormous—possibly no less than that of printing or gunpowder.

Armour continued to be worn long after massed infantry and musketry had reduced the knight at arms to a figure of fantasy, a quixotic creature on an emaciated horse tilting at windmills. By the mid-sixteenth century it was worn, if at all, more by princes than common soldiers, and not always by the most warlike princes at that. To judge by the museums few princes had more suits of armour than Philip II of Spain (1556–98). But unlike his father Charles V he was rarely in battle.[3] Before long armour became rather like the scarlet tunics and bearskins of the Guards: invaluable for ceremonial but offering fatal disadvantages in battle.

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Missile weapons, such as the crossbow, were scarcely used by the medieval knight at all in war, though he frequently used them for hunting. The second Lateran Council in 1139 forbade the warlike use of the crossbow as a barbarous device, but its neglect by the mounted warrior sprang more from the real practical difficulty of using it from a horse.

The knight of this period fought as an individual. A twelfth-century battle developed almost as soon as it was joined into a number of individual engagements. Group skills found little place in feudal tactics. Field forces, too, were not large. From the eleventh century to the end of the fifteenth no reliable evidence exists of an army of more than 10–12,000 men. Henry V's army at Agincourt in 1415 was scarcely 6,000, the size of one Roman legion or the 1st British Airborne Division at Arnhem. The French army at Agincourt, contrary to a common belief, was smaller.[4]

Embodied with the twelfth-century knight in a French or English feudal array were foot soldiers less well protected and in general more crudely armed (though using some missile weapons), who were themselves also discharging a personal obligation to give military service. Such interruptions to normal life were unwelcome but of short duration. The forces thus produced were usually cumbrous, ill-armed, and of low military value, though a sharp distinction must be made between these and foot soldiers found from free yeomen like the English archers armed with the long bow, whose use had been learned in the Welsh wars.

Where land was scarce and offspring many, military expeditions might originate which were not entirely dominated by the concept of liege service. Such were the crusades. Spirited adventurers also sought their fortune with their swords, singly or in groups, with no pretence of service to anything but their own interests, as several of the 12 sons of Tancred de Hauteville did when they descended on southern Italy from Normandy. Individual free enterprise, related to but outside the framework of liege service, becomes more important as time goes by. The western European mercenary emerges.

The treaty of Brétigny between England and France in 1360 left hosts of soldiers unemployed, of whom many found their way down into Italy. The scourge of marauding armed bands under an elected leader was known elsewhere in Europe. It was only in Italy that the companies of fortune played an important political role.[5]

The city states of northern Italy in the fourteenth century were seeking a form of military organization appropriate to their needs, in circumstances of almost continuous conflict, in which the feudal contract of military service for land tenure had largely ceased to function. The form they settled on was the use of hired professionals. These were raised under a contract, or *condotta*, by military contractor, who was paid by the state which hired him and was responsible on his side for the production of an adequately equipped and trained force and, as a rule, its command in the field. Gian Galeazzo Visconti, for instance, first hereditary Duke of Milan, depended for his military successes upon the mercenary army led by Facino Cane. With it he took Vicenza and Padua from Venice and threatened the safety of Florence, defended by the famous English *condottiere* Sir John Hawkwood.

Ready cash was plentiful in the Italian cities of the Trecento, where the development of a money economy was far advanced. There was plenty of human material as well. Landless men, incapable of craftsmanship or unwilling to work as craftsmen, abounded. The Swiss cantons allowed recruiting and even sold recruits. From Germany a ferocious and disorderly soldiery, both infantry and cavalry, the *Landsknechts* and the *Reiters*, were readily enrolled.

The first 50 years of the fifteenth century in Italy, even more than the closing decades of the fourteenth, throw an interesting light on purely mercenary warfare. By 1421 Milan, under the Visconti, had acquired with the aid of the mercenary general Carmagnola a dominant position in the north. Venice bought Carmagnola away. He was replaced in Milan by an even more able and famous soldier of fortune, Francesco Sforza, son of a *condottiere* from the Romagna and a person of huge vigour and high ability. Carmagnola was no match for Sforza. The Venetian fleet was destroyed. Carmagnola was recalled to Venice and publicly executed. Sforza survived the attacks of the Venetians to become sole master of Milan and its new duke.

The search for security through purely mercenary troops, owing no political loyalty and without personal ties to the city they served often

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brought greater evils in its train than those it avoided. The system was to be passionately attacked by Machiavelli, as we shall see. It is not surprising that occasional efforts were made by the cities to tie the captains more closely to them. Hawkwood was offered in Florence something like a permanent *condotta*, a contract for life. The same city later offered Count Conrad von Eichelberg the same sort of thing. Milan too was feeling its way toward some more enduring system of contract. All the cities found that troops recruited locally by a native *condottiere* were likely to be more reliable than foreign mercenaries under foreign captains.

The problem of how to establish effective control by the body politic over its own armed forces was not solved. Even the execution of Carmagnola by the Venetians did no more than emphasize the difficulty of finding a solution. It was still unsolved when northern Italy ceased to be an arena for the rivalries of Italian city states and became instead a battleground for foreign powers.

The motives of the *condottieri* and their men seem obvious enough; but whatever the reasons are for which a man will allow himself to be killed, or to be put in serious risk of it, money is low among them. A man will suffer great inconvenience and hardship for pay, and inflict a great deal more of it on other people. Men have often been known to kill others for money, but the cases where they will sell their own lives for cash alone are, I imagine, exceedingly rare. A soldier who stands by his contract and thinks he is nothing but a mercenary may find his motives, if he examines them, more complicated. The good fighting man who honestly believes himself to be a pure mercenary in arms, doing it all for the money, may have to guard his convictions as vigilantly as any atheist.

Certainly the cash inducement was found to be insufficient to cause men freely to give up their lives in the Quattrocento. Machiavelli wrote savagely of mercenary companies of horse. "They are disunited, ambitious, without discipline, faithless, bold amongst friends, cowardly amongst enemies, they have no fear of God, and keep no faith with men."[6] The soldiers were the *condottiere's* working capital and he did not want to waste them. As for the soldiers: "they have no love or other motive to keep them in the field beyond a trifling wage, which is not enough to make them ready to die for you."

Battles in fifteenth-century Italy might be protracted but they were often almost bloodless as well. In the battle of Zagonara, a victory "famous throughout all Italy," says Machiavelli, "none were killed excepting Lodovico degli Obizzi, and he together with two of his men was thrown from his horse and suffocated in the mud."

Machiavelli attacked the mercenaries because he saw that the Italian cities had made a serious error, an error which was in fact to prove fatal. He realized the intimate connection between military techniques and political methods, between military organizations and political institutions. He saw that the cities, whose competitive development was bound to lead to conflict, had completely failed to evolve military forms appropriate to their political structure. He went even further and indicted them for failing to regard the political and military spheres as one organic whole, in which political institutions cannot be shaped in disregard of their military implications without disastrous results. Machiavelli dreamed of an Italy united under Florence, and in looking for a suitable military form it was almost inevitable that he should turn to Rome.

The invincibility of the citizen army of the Roman republic was proof to Machiavelli of the rational nature of its organization. In his study of it he followed Vegetius. He probably went further than any predecessor, however, in his analysis of the general nature of war. He saw war as total and all embracing. The whole resources of the state should be applied to it and the only criterion of warlike methods should be their effectiveness. A decision could only come from battle "which is the end for which all armies are raised." The aim was victory and subjugation. Machiavelli was in some important respects a forerunner of Clausewitz, who admired him greatly.

Before long there were indeed to be military developments which would give a new direction to human affairs. But though the military revolution which now followed owed something to the inspiration of the Roman legion, it led in quite a different direction from any indicated by Machiavelli. It began with the introduction of firearms.

The first significant effect of firearms was not to increase firepower on the battlefield but to destroy the immunity of fortresses, as Charles VIII showed

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in his invasion of Italy in 1494. Independently of the introduction of firearms, however, another and at the time no less important change took place: the replacement of the decisive effect of massed heavy cavalry by that of massed heavy infantry. The pikemen of the Swiss squares, already long feared, shattered the chivalry of Burgundy at Nancy in 1477, where Charles the Bold died, 17 years before the expedition of Charles VIII into Italy which first brought mobile artillery effectively into action against fortification.

A highly effective combination of missile effect and mobility in the joint action of longbowman and mounted man-at-arms, which had seen perhaps it most striking demonstration at Agincourt, had now disappeared. Cavalry could not easily be brought to charge a porcupine of pikes.[7] Armed with wheel-lock pistols in the early sixteenth century they were little better off. Sixteen feet was thought a suitable length for the pike. "Few ordinary ammunition pistols," said Lord Orrery, as late as 1677, "do certain execution much farther off." [8]

Hand firearms were in use at least as early as 1364,[9] but they were little more than tubes on sticks. They were far less efficient than crossbow or longbow and were often only effective at close quarters (as is suggested, for instance, in some tapestries) when used as clubs.

The longbow, in rapidity of fire, range and accuracy was so much superior to any hand firearm that a plea was raised as late as the mid-seventeenth century for its reintroduction.[10] The firearm had come to stay, however, if only because it was so inaccurate that it was a waste of time to try to train marksmen with it. Bowmen were skilled men. Arquebus men were not. Unskilled soldiery were the easiest to raise. But firearms were also very frightening and their moral effect alone would have been quite sufficient to ensure their development.

The effort to find a tactical organization in which fire power and infantry shock tactics could be combined led to the major innovations of Maurice of Nassau at the beginning of the seventeenth century. He, too, turned back to the Roman legion, away from the mass of the Swiss square or the scarcely less massive Spanish *tercio*, to a linear formation, in two or three lines, articulated into units of about battalion size.

This time it came off. Gustavus Adolphus developed and applied these methods successfully in war, and the system he evolved persisted in essentials well into the twentieth century. Units were smaller. Tactical deployment and adjustment was easier. A new requirement began to develop for the initiative of junior leaders, of whom more were now needed. Cavalry were released from the profitless pursuit of the *caracole*, advancing to the enemy at a trot and discharging their pistols. They could now develop true shock action. Drill and exercise for the infantry ceased to be merely a means to physical and moral health and became the basis of tactics. Precision in movement demanded marching in step. The group subordination of a living organism which was neither the immobile mass of heavy infantry nor the collection of bellicose individuals of the feudal array demanded better discipline and a more closely coherent whole. Uniforms were not long in coming.

New possibilities for the use of armies were opened up by the restless genius of Gustavus Adolphus. A strategy of extensive operations was now possible. Armies grew in size. Military administration made new demands upon governments. The nature of the soldier's contract soon came under review.

The armies of the wars of religion were largely made up of part-time mercenaries. It was not necessarily the case that only a mercenary army was capable of operating under the Maurician system, though it had advantages for the purpose. The mercenary soldier minded little how far he campaigned from home or for how long. Recruiting through captains saved governments a good deal of trouble. The required standard of discipline and training was more easily produced.

The great victories of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden were won by a conscript national militia, it is true, but in Sweden the social pattern was unusual. Sweden had never been completely feudalized and had never known the domination of the mounted man-at-arms. Serfdom was non-existent and peasant proprietors were plentiful. The military strength of the country lay in its infantry: a conscript militia was both a political and a military possibility. In other parts of Europe it was thought that only a mercenary system would work, and in these a mercenary army became by the early seventeenth century the normal type of land force.

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But even before the end of the sixteenth century the disbandment of regiments at the end of one campaigning season and their re-raising at the start of the next, hitherto the general practice, was seen to be an inefficient and costly way of furnishing the state with soldiers. The practice spread of retaining troops in service throughout the year. Regular standing armies were before long to be the rule. But as Professor Roberts points out the permanent embodiment of armies which developed in this time was the result of military rather than political considerations.[11] A standing army developed not because growing royal absolutism depended upon it, nor because kings had to find employment for privileged or troublesome upper classes. It was the result of a military requirement.

Now that armies were permanently embodied it was not long before they came directly under a sovereign's control, raised, paid, in some respects equipped, and in part housed directly by him. "Once the armies became royal (as the navies already were)" says Professor Roberts, "the way was open for their eventually becoming national."

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3—ARMIES OF THE NATION STATE

The development of armies as long-service, whole-time, regular forces under the sole control of the national authority, what I have called their regularization, was a feature of the stabilization of the pattern of kingdom states in western Europe. It can be seen very clearly in France between the time of Charles VII, when a nation in arms under royal leadership ejected the English, and the French Revolution, when a regular royal army proved quite incapable of saving the monarchy from the nation. From the time of Condé's victory over the Spanish army at Rocroi in 1643 the French army led the fashion in European standing armies for a century. Let me look at developments in France a little more closely.

Very noticeable is the rise in numbers.[1] Henry IV at the beginning of the seventeenth century had an army of some 15,000, of whom 3,000 were Swiss. The Thirty Years War saw a large increase. In the French army of 1678 there were 280,000. The wars of Louis XIV increased numbers further. There were 440,000 men on the strength in 1690, in a population of little more than 20 million. This represents a very high MPR.* After each peace numbers naturally declined. In the peaceful decades after 1713 they fell below 130,000. The general trend is upward. It became common to keep 160 to 200,000 men under arms in peace—12 times as many as at the end of the sixteenth century.

Babeau [2] sees, perhaps not too fancifully, an image of the French people in the structure of the mid-seventeenth century French army. At the bottom are the lowest orders, the valets, carters in the field and labourers for the engineers, who were not allowed to enlist as soldiers. Then came the mass of infantry soldiers, the main body of the nation; then the junior officers, the bourgeoisie; then the higher commanders, the nobility; at the top, the king.

* Military Participation Ratio: another term of Andrzejewski's.

Chivalry ceases finally to be a source of military force in France with the disappearance of the *arrière ban*, the feudal array of the lesser nobility. From 1695, by which time military rank had become distinct from social, the French noble plays a part in the army only as an officer in a regiment.

It is curious that even in a time of almost total absolutism, under Louis XIV, the French regular army was raised by voluntary enlistment. It continued to be raised thus until the revolution. Louvois established a forced militia service in 1689 which was regarded with profound and enduring repulsion among the peasantry. Militia service was considered degrading: professional armed service was not. Even an army of 300,000 in a population of 20 million could still be raised by voluntary enlistment and though not only prestige and promises but even ruses and force were sometimes used to bring them in, general conscription was not. It needed a revolution under the watchwords of liberty, equality and fraternity, threatened by foreign arms and internal sedition, to bring back forced general military service in the *levée en masse* of 1793, and to ensure the pitiless repression of all opposition to it in the massacres in La Vendée.

The fact was that a large reservoir of rough and restless manpower existed in France after the peace of Westphalia. The idle and the ne'er-do-well abounded. Paupers were plentiful. The captains were personally responsible for keeping up the strength of their companies and the initial sum paid to a man on enrolment was their chief instrument of persuasion. Bigger recruits cost more and cavalrymen were dearer than foot soldiers. You could get a man for the infantry, not much above the minimum height of 5 ft. to 5 ft. 3 ins. for a hundred *livres* in the mid-seventeenth century. In 1731 you might pay twice as much and a fine big fellow of 5 ft. 7 ins. was known to cost 600. There were, as you might expect, complaints that rich cavalry officers spoilt the market by paying too much.

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The average age of recruits was 20 to 30 years and 16 the lowest at which they were generally accepted. In the time of Louis XIII the engagement appears to have been for at least six months. As the military advantages of longer service became clearer the term increased. It was three years under Louis XIV, then four. Under Louis XV it increased to six and then eight. As gentler manners became more widespread in the eighteenth century many real recruiting abuses dropped away, but as times grew more settled and the general standard of living rose recruits were harder to find. Not all soldiers were released on completion of their contract. An engagement for six years could easily let a man in for 12. Abuses such as these lessened as the century wore on. The ordinances of 1788 removed many of the last. Institutions often approach their best when they are about to disappear.

Before 1788 there was no medical examination, which made it easier for women to join. There had never, in fact, been much curiosity about a recruit's past and until the mid-eighteenth century only perfunctory enquiry as to his identity. He would nearly always take another name on joining, anyway, a *nom de guerre*, according to a practice almost universal in France from the sixteenth century to the Revolution. Beauvisage, Belhomme, Belamy, Joli-Coeur, could be found in many regiments. There were also La Jeunesse, Bon-Vivant and Belle-Humeur, with Vive l'Armour, Prêt-à-Boire and names of martial air like Sans-Quartier, Pied-Ferme of Frappe d'Abord. Napoleon's Marshal Victor, Duke of Belluno, got his name of Beau-Soleil this way. A soldier only lost his *nom de guerre* if he were disgraced, when his comrades would not use it any more. When the Free French took on *noms de guerre* in the last war, usually to avoid inconvenience to families still in France, many of us were surprised at the ease with which their companions accepted and used them. This was, however, a custom rooted in the pre-Revolutionary French military tradition and reflected in our own time in the Foreign Legion.

The French soldier of the *ancien régime* was not badly paid and he was reasonably fed. The daily ration of one-and-a-half pounds of munition bread which the French soldier was drawing at the end of the nineteenth century was established nearly 200 years before. The regulation prescribed a pound of meat a day and the soldier sometimes got it. He fed better than the peasant, who ate less meat. This was a very important element in a system of voluntary recruiting.

Up to the late seventeenth century soldiers were mostly lodged, in garrison towns, in pairs among civilian households. They were usually idle, often drunk and nearly always a nuisance in a small dwelling where there might be daughters. Barracks were built, usually in frontier districts to begin with, towards the end of the seventeenth century. The burghers were relieved but the soldier lost his freedom. After his days work he was no longer his own master, until (if he were not on guard) the *appel du tambour*. Cavalry units were known to have been compelled to pay for improvements to their uniform on the threat of being removed from village billets if they did not. In barracks, ill-lit and unhygienic, three beds occupied 20 sq. ft. Each was 4 ft. wide and three men slept in it.

Until the mid-seventeenth century the only clothing the king provided was shoes. Foreign troops in French service were the first to be completely uniformed. Louvois wanted to introduce uniform for French troops in 1668 but the captains protested they could not afford it. By the end of the century, however, as was also the case by then in England, uniform was general: white for the French infantry, blue for the German regiments in French service, red for the Irish and Swiss. The cockade was worn from 1710, but was only white from 1767.

Discipline was generally strict but its level of severity varied greatly. So long as the captains were responsible for the recruiting and maintenance the men were treated on the whole gently. In 1762 Choiseuil took away the ownership of companies. The soldier was given a more august authority to which he might appeal, but it was more distant and less personal. Discipline became stricter, more uniform, less paternal. The reign of Louis XV (1715–74) saw reforms which increased the efficiency of the army but were often harmful to the soldier's condition. Before them the men were less well exercised but more contented. In the early eighteenth century it took several hours to form a line of cavalry and no general dared set a large number of squadrons in motion. After the reforms of Louis XV it was said that cavalry exercises were more exactly performed but the horses broke down more frequently.

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On the whole, however, morale remained high and understanding between officers and men was good, as a Dr. Moore reported in *A View of Society and Manners in France*, published in London in 1786. Everywhere it became more strained as the Revolution approached.

Women followed the armies in considerable numbers. Under Louis XIII a provision of four trollops per 100 men was thought to be a prudent way of protecting the womenfolk of the countryside. Wives and children also moved around. In 1718 it was reported that though there were no married men in some companies, others had 40 or 50. In 1772 it was said that the women gave more trouble than four times the same number of soldiers. Permission to marry was often refused, though occasionally senior officers thought a small number of wives were useful. They did some cooking, washing and nursing. Whatever efforts were made to keep them away there were always a few wives around a regiment, and some dogs.

The French soldier was volatile, resilient, gay. He ran away readily in battle but also attacked with a fierce *élan*, going to his death, it was said in Italy in Louis XIII's time, as though he expected resurrection on the morrow. He was often, until the eighteenth century brought in milder ways, savage to the defeated. Prisoners, if there was little chance of getting them ransomed according to recognized scales and they would not change sides (which they often did), were sometimes killed.

Violent pillage, though common up to the seventeenth century, was rare after the time of Louis XIV. It remained common practice, however, to strip the dead of clothing and jewellery. "My friends," said a colonel, showing the well-dressed enemy to his regiment in rags, "go and clothe yourselves."

At the end of the seventeenth century billeting was the rule and quartering in barracks the exception. At the end of the eighteenth the reverse was true. Until the time of Louis XIV the soldier wore on his person, except for the shoes he had from the king, only the clothing he brought with him. Thereafter he wore a uniform furnished by his employer. These two developments, barrack life and the wearing of uniform, have probably done more to set the soldier apart in society than anything else.

Probably the special nature of the soldier's contract and the importance of group identifications in armed forces suggest that a threshold between the civil and military ways of life is inevitable. How much of this now remains? Will the military life lose something important if we try to bring about its total disappearance?

The Spartiate might sleep at home where his wife lived, but never dine there. He had always to eat in the common mess. At the other extreme is the concept of an army as just another industrial group. An undergraduate perhaps had something of the sort in mind recently, when he wrote that he now saw he had been mistaken about the army: he realized that it was in fact "a competitive nine-to-five industry." He meant, of course, competing for him, but even then he was mistaken. An army is not an industry and its members cannot be regarded as industrial workers.

Some of the big military operators in the United States in the Second World War thought that the invasion of Europe was no more than just another large-scale engineering project and declared their intention to treat it as such. They ignored what I shall speak of later as the unlimited liability clause in a soldier's contract. When men are unprepared for this, and it is invoked, the results can be disturbing. The nature of his contract sets the man-at-arms apart. But how far apart? That is an important question today. What I have to say in my third and last lecture will bear upon it.

I leave the French soldier of the mid-eighteenth century with regret, some whiskered muskateer inappropriately named La Violette, perhaps, or Perce Neige, sitting in his insanitary barracks—that "honourable prison"—wondering possibly what to do with his time. With seven hours for sleep, one for meals, two for rest and four for exercises he has 10 hours of free time and must spend most of it in barracks. Perhaps he is reflecting on how to prolong the life of his uniform, for it is expected to last three years and in order to do so must be kept two-thirds of the time unused. Perhaps he is doing another man's hair for him, using some of the cleaning and toilet kit which takes up so much of his carrying capacity in the field. Perhaps he is brooding over the

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growing severity of the exercise and the strictness of a discipline which has come in, like the new military hair fashions, from Prussia.

Of the Prussian military system and its influence in Europe in the second half of the eighteenth century, of the nature of warfare in the age of the Enlightenment, of its rude disturbance by the Napoleonic wars and the professionalization of the profession of arms which followed I shall speak in my next lecture.

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LECTURE 2

4—PRUSSIA AND NAPOLEON

The peace of Westphalia in 1648 at the end of the Thirty Years War brought more or less to an end a period in which fervent Christians were prepared to hang, burn, torture, shoot or poison other fervent Christians with whom they disagreed upon the correct approach to eternal life. The next 80 years, up to the mid-eighteenth century, saw a marked decline in the severity of warfare in Europe. The pitiless cruelty of the wars of religion seemed almost to have produced a revulsion. Nation states were already stabilizing but nationalism had not yet become a supreme ideal. There was nothing yet to take the place of the sectarian fanatic's impulse to destroy.

National ambitions were on the whole modest and nowhere envisaged the complete subjugation of a national adversary. A spirit of European community seemed to be developing. Rational speculation was increasing and with growing confidence in the future of man there was a tendency in human affairs to greater balance and restraint.

In a much-quoted passage Edward Gibbon,[1] reviewing developments in the decades before 1770, wrote that Europe was becoming one great republic. "The balance of power will fluctuate," he said, "but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness." He was convinced that resort to fighting as a means of destroying the independence of other civilized peoples was at an end. The armed forces of Europe were now only exercised in "temperate and undecisive conflicts." The contenders, in fact, aimed at winning a modest purse on points, not a world title by a knockout.

Levels of technology were rising, and with them standards of living, but materials were still too scarce to sustain heavy fighting with improving techniques. War became a matter, in Defoe's words, of "less blood and more money." [2] Several factors in the make up of eighteenth-century national standing armies helped to humanize war. Aristocratic officers found it difficult to hate men of the same sort as themselves merely because they were on the other side. National enthusiasms were rarely high. The quality of men in the ranks was generally low. Discipline was strict.

When decisive battles were fought they were often bloody. At Malplaquet the losses of the allies were 20 or 30 percent.[3] But decisive battles were rare. Marshal Saxe advised that battle should be avoided when possible because its outcome is uncertain and there are many advantages to be gained over the enemy without it. When it cannot be avoided, it must be won at all costs and where possible the enemy's retreat turned into utter rout.[4]

No longer did armies, as in the wars of religion, subsist almost entirely on the country. They now depended more on supply from magazines. This restricted their freedom of strategic movement. At the same time the unreliability of the troops inhibited diffusion of command responsibility and put flexibility of tactics out of the question.

Weapon techniques had improved but materials, including those required for shot and gunpowder, were scarce. For the saltpetre supplies essential to powder manufacture animal sources were relied almost entirely. The saltpetre men pursued an active search for suitable nitrogenous substances in the stables, the birdhouses and even, in most scandalous fashion, the bedchambers of the citizen.[5] But even then there was still never enough powder to justify anything but careful use.

From the end of the period of military revolution, in the mid-seventeenth century, until the 1740s, France led the way in western European military affairs. It is in France that the emergence of the standing army as an institution can best be studied and in my last lecture we looked at it there. From the 1740s until the French Rev-

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olution the European military scene is dominated by Prussia.

King Frederick William I of Prussia (1713–40) set up a conscript army under an iron code of discipline. His beheading of von Katte, the friend of his son Frederick, before the prince's own eyes, for trying to help the future Frederick the Great to escape from his father's tutelage, was typical of him. Von Katte had been condemned by the court to perpetual imprisonment. The king ordered otherwise.

In contemporary western European armies severe punishments were not unknown—flogging, running the gauntlet, death by the hangman's halter or the firing squad—but the heavier penalties were rare and the administration of punishment generally rather haphazard. In the French army, indeed, flogging had never been customary. Under Frederick William I in Prussia discipline became vastly more severe.[6] The death penalty for minor infractions was not uncommon and flogging was regarded more or less as a matter of daily military administration. The dominant element in the management of soldiers was fear. Men went on into battle with at least a chance of survival. If they withdrew from it without orders it was into certain death. Frederick II, the Great, who succeeded his ferocious father in 1740, was a cultivated man, well educated and fond of music, tolerant in religious matters, once a friend of Voltaire and in some ways a typical product of the Enlightenment. But when he took on the military machine his father had developed he applied it in war with no relaxation of its brutal discipline.*

"The life the private soldier led," Thackeray makes Barry Lyndon say,[7] "was a frightful one to any but men of the iron courage and endurance." It was not then thought, however, that satisfactory results could be secured by any other sort of treatment. The quality of the private soldier has rarely been lower than in the armies of mid-eighteenth century Europe. In the contemporary European outlook there was no heroic view of war as an ennobling national experience. No especial esteem attached to a warrier class. The common soldier shared with the worker in some heavy industries, such as coal mining or iron founding, a position in society which was almost that of an outcast. No one enlisted unless he was nearly at the end of his tether.

The Comte de Guibert observed in a notable book written in 1772 that the profession of soldier has been abandoned "to the most vile and miserable class of citizen."[8] St.-Germain, as French Minister of War in 1775, was attracted by the Prussian system of conscript service, but rejected it because an army should "consist of those for whom society has no use."[9]

Recruiting into the armies of Europe in the mid-eighteenth century was often by force or fraud. To deaden the reluctance of all but the most wretched to endure the hardship of a private soldier's life, the two commonest anaesthetics of the age of the Enlightenment, the bottle and the club, were freely used.

The unwillingness of soldiery to be killed in a cause which did not greatly stir them itself contributed to milder warfare, particularly when they were armed with better weapons. The bayonet, for example, which was originally developed for the protection of a hunter with an empty firearm against a wounded beast, was issued to troops as a weapon of war in the 1680s.[10] It was at first plugged into the musket. Some time after 1690 the ring and socket was developed. By the early eighteenth century the bayonet had virtually eliminated the difference between the pikeman and the musketeer. It was in the armies of Frederick the Great that it was first much used west of the Oder. But soldiers used it with little enthusiasm and were not easy to bring to close enough quarters for its use. Frightfulness is much more readily acceptable when it is contrived at a distance. The bayonet helped to keep armies apart and thus contributed to those tendencies of the time which encouraged wars of position.

Desertion from the armies in the age of Enlightenment was inevitably high. Frederick the Great gave his generals instructions at some length on how to prevent it—by not camping too near woods, by avoiding night marches where possible, by patrols and guards around night dispositions less to keep the enemy out (the enemy had similar problems) than to keep his own men in, and so on.

*One of his commands, quoted in vol. viii of *The New Cambridge Modern History* (p. 181) was as follows: "if a soldier during an action looks about as if to fly, or so much as sets foot outside the line, the non-commissioned officer standing behind him will run him through with his bayonet and kill him on the spot."

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"Our regiments," says Frederick the Great in his *Instruction for his Generals*, "are composed half of citizens and half of mercenaries. The latter, not attached to the state by any bond of interest, become deserters at the first occasion." [11] "What cared I for their quarrels?" says Barry Lyndon, "or whether the eagle under which I marched had one head or two?" [12]

Even in the American revolutionary wars, when the military calling was already rising somewhat in the esteem of the common man, the two sides were said to be largely composed of each other's deserters.[13]

In battle the eighteenth-century mercenary had even more compelling reasons to run away than usual. Thus evolutions in close order, inflexible and slow, carried out under the close supervision of the officers, were all that was possible. The armies of Frederick the Great were large single units moving into action with the general, whose business it was to lead them to the enemy and then set a good example. In an army whose total strength rarely exceeded 50,000 men, in the Sevens Years War 31 Prussian generals were killed.

Officers in the eighteenth-century armies were not less exclusively aristocratic than they had been before the regular type of army stabilized; they were more so. Officers from the bourgeoisie were not rare in the armies of Louis XIV. Frederick the Great combed them out of his. He was convinced that only aristocrats were sufficiently endowed with honour, courage and loyalty to make good officers and he was determined at the same time to bind the Junkers to his own interests.

The aristocratic officer of the Enlightenment was usually brave and sometimes able, but he was rarely more than an amateur. Up to the eve of the revolution in France promotion was by purchase, as it remained in England for another 100 years, although in both countries the highest military positions continued to be reserved to the highest nobility. The Comte de Guibert was the eighteenth century author who perhaps came nearest to suggesting that warfare was an area of professional activity. His *Essai Général de Tactique* [14] was almost prophetic in demanding a national citizen army and a war of movement. But he too insisted that command in war should be reserved to those whose birth and upbringing ensured that they possessed the necessary intuitive capacity. Even Henry Lloyd, the eighteenth-century Englishman whose approach to war was in some ways more sophisticated still, maintained that command in war was the product of natural genius. He divided warlike practice into two parts. The lower was mechanical and could be taught. The upper lay among the arts and excellence in it could be no more readily learned or transmitted than in sculpture or music.[15]

The situation of Prussia under Frederick the Great brings a passing reminder of that of Sparta. Mirabeau said of it: "*la Prusse n'est pas un pays qui a une armée', c'est une armée qui a un pays.*" [16] The population of Prussia was only a small fraction of that of any of the neighbouring kingdom states—France, England, Austria, Russia. With hardly one tenth of the population of France Prussia increased its army from 28,500 under Frederick William Hohenzollern the Great Elector (1640–88), to 83,000 in 1739, the last year of the reign of King Frederick William I. In that year Prussia still had less than two million inhabitants. Its industrial production was proportionately low. None the less, Prussia was a major power in western Europe. This was achieved in three ways: by subordinating almost all other considerations in the state to military strength; by setting a rational limit upon international ambitions; and by becoming the first state in Europe to make a serious business of war with explosives.

The military instrument of the Prussian experiment, the harshly disciplined and rigidly controlled force of unenthusiastic mercenaries, became the model for the armies of Europe, armies in which, as the Great Frederick himself said, "obedience . . . is so exact that . . . however little a general knows how to make himself obeyed, he is bound to be." [17]

The European system of standing armies was destroyed by the French Revolution. The destruction in France of barriers within the nation, the rejection of caste exclusiveness in national administration, the removal of the deadweight of absolutist forms of government too rigid to be easily modified, all helped to release in France a flood of national feeling. Freedom was everywhere, in the negative but none the less real sense of the removal of restraints. Like any other career a military career was now to be open to the talents. The elective principle was introduced for the promotion of N.C.O.s and officers, in spite of

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its recent failure in the American revolutionary armies. Recruiting at first remained voluntary.[18]

Under the growing threat of invasion, however, conscription was introduced into the French Army in the *levée en masse* of 1793. The elective principle of promotion was soon forgotten. It was true that careers remained open to the talents, but military talents were predominantly disclosed where they might have been expected to occur, that is, among the officers and men already serving under arms at the time of the Revolution. Six of Napoleon's 25 future marshals of France were at this time civilians. But the other 19 were already serving. Nine of them were already officers and every one of these was noble (though mostly of the lower orders), while only 10 of the 25 were common soldiers.

What was new in a Europe in which war had recently been little more than the sport of kings was the enthusiasm of a revolutionary nation in arms. In this the impulse to defend the Revolution was fused with a passion to defend the country.

The nature of the French armies which were now raised largely dictated their methods. Masses of ill-trained men could not hope to operate in the closely disciplined linear formations of Frederician mercenaries. The inclination of French revolutionary troops was to attack. This they did in mobs they called columns, surrounded by skirmishing infantry, the *tirailleurs*. The regulated musketry of the Prussian platoons, with volley fire and evolutions like the countermarch, were quite beyond them. Instead, the *tirailleurs* acted as individual marksmen, operating with great freedom and making good use of cover. Their adversaries, using cover scarcely at all, stood, fired and fell in close order. The main body of the French infantry was assembled in large irregular groups of men whose general direction of advance could be more readily controlled than if they were dressed in horizontal lines. When the French columns charged with the bayonet they carried with them something of the blood lust of a revolutionary mob. Their aim was total destruction of the enemy and humanitarian scruples were few. The age of limited war was over.

Working beside social processes towards the evolution of new forms of war were technical ones. The mobilization of the whole manpower of a nation would not have been possible without the great expansion of production which took place in the late eighteenth century. A marked increase in the output of metals was one notable result of it. This led to increased use of artillery. Accuracy and rapidity of fire were the result of improved methods, as France took the lead in applying mathematics to military purposes. Monge, Minister of Marine, was said to be the inventor of descriptive geometry. Carnot, Minister of War, whom Napoleon described as the architect of victory, was another distinguished mathematician.[19]

Reductions in weight of artillery pieces resulted from better design. This in turn led to higher mobility. Better road surfaces made movement easier. A return to the practice of living off the country cut down impedimenta and reduced the dependence of field forces on supply depots.

The technical prerequisites for the operations of mass armies in war already existed by the close of the eighteenth century. The Revolutionary government was able to exploit them. A national army, raised under a universal obligation to serve, harmonized with the new society. Higher cohesion within the army permitted a greater spread of command responsibility in the field. Desertion, though not uncommon in Napoleon's later years (it was particularly noticeable in the Russian campaign of 1812), never exercised a formative influence on tactics as it did with Frederick the Great.

In the French revolutionary armies a new looseness and freedom now developed, with a predominantly offensive spirit. The combination of increases in mass, flexibility, offensive outlook and firepower resulted in a revolution in tactics.

Better gunnery methods soon led to concentrated fire. The practice developed by Napoleon, himself a gunner, was to direct concentrated artillery fire against a chosen infantry target until it began to weaken and then to assault at that point with the bayonets of his own infantry. Plentiful munitions and higher mobility made it possible to repeat the process. Cavalry kept for shock action at speed could now turn defeat into disaster and retreat into rout. Thus it was, for example, that a French army 65,000 strong destroyed an army of 83,000 Russians and Austrians at Austerlitz in 1805. This is the method used in most of Napoleon's classic victories, a method admirably suited to Napoleon's opportunist approach, impossible to apply 100 years before but still the basis of battlefield tactics 100 years later.

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The development of an enthusiasm for military exploits in the masses, almost unknown in the previous century, together with material progress of many kinds and increased administrative skills, made it possible in the early nineteenth century to keep in the field armies of four or five times the size of those maintained in the religious wars two centuries before. Casualties also rose. When the Duke of Brunswick's well-drilled Prussians were routed on September 20, 1792, by the citizen battalions of Champagne at Valmy, a battle had been fought which was of critical importance. Goethe, who was present, said to his companions: "From here and from today begins a new epoch in world history, and you can say that you were there when it opened." [20] But at Valmy no more than a few hundred men were killed. At Austerlitz 13 years later the casualties numbered 25,000. The Moscow campaign of 1812 cost France in dead, wounded, prisoners, missing and deserters, half a million men. All other considerations apart, exhaustion of manpower and to a considerable extent exhaustion of materials (particularly metals) helped to ensure that peace would follow the final disappearance of Napoleon.

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5—THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY OFFICER

The eighteenth century had seen the regularization of armed service in western Europe. In the nineteenth true professionalism emerges. Before 1800 there was virtually no such thing as a professional officer corps anywhere. After 1900 no world power of any significance was without one. The timing and manner of this development was different in different countries. It happened earliest and most completely in Germany.

A current of opinion already flowing in Prussia during the last years of the old century became a torrent in the early years of the new. It burst its banks in 1806 after Jena. Prussia's problem was to find a defence against the almost irresistible national armies of Napoleon. To many officers it seemed that the only way of doing this was to tap the same sort of resources. Gneisenau pleaded that the Germans should mobilize the whole strength of the people as the French had done. The old rigid formulae bequeathed by Frederick the Great, governing the use of relatively small formations of heavily disciplined mercenaries, were not enough. "Get us a national army," said Blücher, urging that the Prussians forget their "useless pedantries." [1]

General conscription was not easily introduced in Prussia. Not until March 1813, when Prussia in alliance with Russia declared war on France, did the *Landwehr* edict set up an embodied militia. Only in September 1814 was military service made obligatory without exemption on every able-bodied male. The system then introduced of five years service in the regular army followed by 14 in the *Landwehr* remained in force with little change until World War I.

Meanwhile the restrictions which confined entry into the Prussian officer corps almost exclusively to aristocrats had been modified. A decree of the Prussian government of August 6, 1808, bluntly declared, "All previously existing class preference in the military establishment is abolished, and every man, without regard to his origins, has equal duties and equal rights." [2]

The principle thus enunciated was only imperfectly observed, even in Prussia, and to a varying degree at different periods in different countries. But its explicit formulation marked an abrupt end to the hitherto scarcely questioned assumption that only by noble birth was a man entitled to claim military command, or endowed with the intuitive capacity to exercise it. At the same time innovations were made in operational practice. Linear tactics, platoon fire, close formations began to be replaced by the dispersed approach and individual marksmanship of the French.

Neither the inroads on the aristocratic monopoly of the officer's career nor these tactical innovations found much favour with the Prussian old guard. *Tirailleur* tactics were "suspicious in political respects and superfluous in military." Dispersed fighting might be good enough for the French—"a vivacious race"—but it was entirely unsuited to the Prussian. It was dishonouring, in fact, to the national character to substitute organized disorder for the famous Prussian platoon musketry.[3]

There was an unusual feature of the reforms of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Blücher, Grolman and the Prussian Military Commission, reforms which were the real basis of the growth of military professionalism in the western world. Modifications in civil institutions are often the cause of military reforms. It is rare to find civil reforms springing from a requirement to modify military practice. This, however, is what happened in Prussia. It would have been of absorbing interest to Machiavelli.

The national enthusiasm which alone could enable a German mass army to defeat the French was unlikely to develop among serfs. Emancipation was inevitable. At the same time agrarian reform, some rationalizing of taxation, a lightening of vestigial feudal burdens on trade and other acts of recognition of the importance of the individual seem to have done much to encourage

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support throughout Germany, both of peasants and bourgeoisie, for the effort to withstand the Napoleonic armies in the field. These social reforms were radical but not revolutionary. It is very doubtful if they would have occurred when they did without the pressure of a military requirement.

The completeness of the change from the system of Frederick the Great is suggested by changes in command. Of the 143 Prussian general officers on active duty in 1803 only eight remained in 1812. Of these only two (one of them Blücher) held commands at the time of Napoleon's overthrow.[4]

A thoroughgoing revision of the composition and preparation of the officer establishment was as important as the creation of a mass army. The victory which Germany was to win over France in 1870 was not simply the victory of what had by then become a nation in arms over what had then become a professional army. It was the victory of a nation which had taken professionalism in the profession of arms more seriously.

Class barriers on officer entry had now been lowered. What was wanted next was a liberally educated body of officers (*ein gebildetes Offizierkorps*), then a professionally educated body of officers (*ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps*) and finally a structure of promotion in which criteria of competence should predominate. The integration of the profession into the society it had grown up to serve was to remain a problem, and still does.

In Prussia under the reforms of 1806–12 officer candidates had to graduate from the *gymnasia* with a certificate of fitness to enter a university, or pass a rigorous six-day general examination designed to test mental capacity rather than factual knowledge. Scharnhorst introduced examinations as a condition for promotion. He also raised officers' pay to reduce reliance on outside sources. More important still, perhaps, he established in 1810 the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, which was for a long time the only institution in Europe for the advanced study of war and the higher education of officers in non-warlike disciplines. 40 officers were selected annually by rigorous examination after a minimum of five years service. Attendance at the academy became before long almost a condition of high advancement. The effect of what was in fact already a well-developed military educational system is suggested by an estimate that in 1859 about 50 percent of the military literature in Europe was produced in Germany. 25 percent in that year came from France. One percent came from England.[5]

In France, though several specialist military schools grew up in the early nineteenth century, the only one attempting to do anything similar was the staff school (Ecole d'Etat Major) set up by St. Cyr in 1818. The French military attaché in Berlin observed in 1860, however, that all French military educational institutions were only agricultural schools by comparison with the Kriegsakademie. It was not till after the disaster of 1870 that the French made a real effort to develop the education of their officers. The foundation of the Ecole Militaire Supérieure in 1878 was to open a new chapter.

France continued to lag behind Germany. England, though the beginnings of true professionalism had manifested themselves in her navy, was in her army further behind still. A school opened in 1799 by the Duke of York to educate officers for the staff was reorganized in 1802 as the Royal Military College, with a staff course as its senior department.[6] Only in 1857, however, when the senior department was detached as the nucleus of the Staff College, did this country begin to make any real headway in professional military education. Progress was not fast. An English observer noted in 1859 that the devotion of the Prussian officer to education, no less than the certainty of promotion through merit and not from caprice, set the whole of the Prussian officers far above those found in the English army.[7]

That part of the English public school output which went into the army was not notable for its educational attainment. What was wanted was the sort of men of whom Wellington had said that he could go straight from school with two N.C.O.s and 15 privates and get a shipload of convicts to Australia without trouble.[8]

So long as purchase existed in the British army a true system of professional advancement was impossible. By 1856 a captaincy cost some £2,400, a lieutenant-colonelcy £7,000. Officers' pay stood at the same level as 150 years before. Those who thought with the Duke of Wellington resisted reform. They opposed the substitution of what they called a mercenary army for one whose officers were men of substance, with a real interest in the preservation of the existing social order. Only

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the demonstration of Prussian military efficiency offered by the French *débâcle* of 1870 enabled Lord Cardwell to abolish purchase in 1871.[9] But as late as 1890 it was possible for a British general to say that England was still split between those who adhered to the tradition of Wellington and those who wished to make the army a profession.[10]

Wellington's organization and use of his army has been described as marking in many ways the high water mark of eighteenth century warfare. He had no great regard for soldiers. He was determined to defend his country and at the same time a social system of which an officer class drawn exclusively from its top levels and a body of soldiery drawn almost entirely from its lowest were characteristic. Sir John Fortescue said of him that "he believed in the England that produced such gentlemen and was resolved to save her and them. He took over his army as an instrument to that end . . . but, when his purpose was fulfilled he threw the instrument aside without compunction, having no further use for it and little or no sentiment about it." [11]

England, busy with her industrial development, was safe behind a sea barrier at home while abroad she pursued a policy of colonial expansion and of foreign trade based on her naval supremacy. The value of a navy to her material interests was much more readily apparent than any her army could offer. In consequence, though the professional standing of naval officers was developing, she was very slow to recognize the need for professionalism in the officers of her army. For almost exactly 100 years after Waterloo, England did not have to meet anything approaching an equal on the battlefield, with the exception of the grossly mismanaged war in the Crimea against the Russians, in alliance with French and Turks, in 1854. Her wars were otherwise the wars of expanding empire. Her army officers were gentlemen first, landed gentry almost always, professionals almost never. Her common soldiers were the restless, the misfits, the unhappy. For most of the nineteenth century they achieved little more than the standing of second class citizens.[12]

The Royal Navy, although the elimination of patronage proceeded no faster than the elimination of purchase in the army, developed much earlier an adequate system of professional education. The navy, however, had never suffered to anything like the same degree as the British army under the burden of class restriction on entry. It was in reference to the army that the Duke of Cambridge said in the 1850s: "The British officer should be a gentleman first and an officer second." [13] The very circumstances of a naval officer's occupation set a high premium upon competence in his career. This was not entirely free from the effect of social origins and connection, even after the introduction of limited competition in 1820, and the reduction of the captain's powers of nomination in 1848. But the naval officer's career was never dominated by influence to the same extent as that of an officer in the army. The professional competence of the Royal Navy was rated the world over as very high and its prestige was enormous.

The growth of professionalism in the army in America was also retarded, even more so in fact than in England. The framers of the constitution were opposed to it. "I am not acquainted with the military profession," said one of them.[14] The constitution represented a liberal outlook to which the acceptance of a requirement for armed force was repugnant. Washington in his farewell address at Fraunces' Tavern advised that the nation should be able to "choose peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall counsel." But the last chance of the development of any significant degree of military professionalism in America for many years disappeared with the failure of the conservative federalism of Hamilton.

Something that the American sociologist Huntington calls military technicism [15] took its place. Each officer was expected to be expert in some specialty which he shared with civilians, while the body of military expertness which he shared only with other officers remained small. At the same time Jefferson's concept prevailed of a militia nation, in which a standing army all but disappeared. This contributed to a state of affairs in which professional military institutions, in so far as were military, were very little developed by the time of the civil war. Even West Point, which Jefferson founded in 1802, and which exercised a formative influence over technical education in America, taught little of the liberal arts and almost nothing of military science. "It produced," in Huntington's words, "more railroad presidents than generals."

The Jacksonian period of liberal indifference to military affairs which followed ensured that while there should be no effective standing army there

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should be no efficient militia either. Promotion was only by seniority. In the army there was no retirement system until the civil war. Army officers served till they dropped. There were only three ranks in the navy with only two promotions in a lifetime. It is scarcely surprising that even the British system of promotion by purchase was felt by some to be preferable.

The American civil war, of far-reaching importance for the development of warfare, left the profession of arms in the United States at even lower ebb. The only significant support American military professionalism had ever received, that from the South, now dried up. Business pacifism reduced the army to a body of frontier police. This was actively enough engaged it is true (there were 943 engagements with Indians between the civil war and the end of the century), but the American army as a professional body was isolated, reduced, and rejected.

Paradoxically enough, the isolation of the military was the chief prerequisite to the development of professionalism. Withdrawn from civilian society and turning inward upon themselves the armed forces came under the influence of creative reformers like Sherman, Upton, and Luce, followed by Bliss, Young, Carter, and others in the army, Mahan, Taylor, Fiske in the navy. They looked abroad for most of their ideas: General Upton's report on the organization, tactics, and discipline of the armies of Europe and Asia made for General Sherman and Secretary Belknap in 1875, with especial reference to Germany, is a valuable mirror of the state of the military profession outside the United States.

The years between 1860 and World War I saw the emergence of a distinctive American professional military ethic, with the American officer regarding himself as a member no longer of a fighting profession only, to which anybody might belong, but as a member of a learned profession whose students are students for life. With this view went the acceptance of the inevitability of conflict, arising out of the unchanging nature of man, and the consequent certainty of war. Norman Angell's view in *The Great Illusion* that, because war no longer paid, it was unlikely that any nation would go to war met sharp criticism. It treated man only as an economic animal and disregarded other causes of conflict.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close professionalism in the armed services was everywhere to a greater or less degree apparent. Germany led the field. Prussian military efficiency was the path to national unity, through the unsuccessful war of 1848 in Denmark, the successful expansion of 1864, the victory of 1866 over Austria and the overthrow of France in 1870–71. France, shocked out of her post-Napoleonic apathy and even out of an antipathy to the military which sprang from a bourgeois uneasiness that standing armies could defeat or modify civil purposes, set about putting her professional military institutions in order.

The United States, as I have said, had evolved with remarkable speed a coherent system of military professionalism. England pursued a path of her own with a professional navy and a small regular army whose officers contained a high proportion of what by any criteria could only be described as amateurs drawn almost exclusively from a ruling caste. In one important respect, however, it was Britain that led the field. Nowhere else had civilian control over the armed forces been so effectively and easily established.

A further important development in the ordered application of force as a requirement of government had also taken place in the nineteenth century. This was the clear recognition of the function of police forces as distinct from the military, and their increase and reorganization to meet the newly formulated demands upon them. This happened very clearly in England with Sir Robert Peel's creation of a police force in 1829.

It is the function of police to exercise force, or to threaten it, in the execution of the state's purpose, internally and under normal conditions. It is the function of armed forces to exercise force, or the threat of it, externally in normal times and internally only in times which are abnormal. "Law," says Pascal, "without force, is impotent." [16] The London policeman is unarmed and usually urbane; the New York cop carries a gun; but the degree of force which the state is prepared to apply in the execution of its purpose is little different in England and the United States. It is as much as the government of the day considers it necessary or expedient to use to avoid a breakdown in its function and a surrender of its responsibilities.

When individuals or small groups act in a manner which the community has previously identified as intolerable they are restrained, or seized and

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made answerable if it has not been possible to restrain them. "The existence of civilized communities," says Bertrand Russell, "is impossible without some element of force. When force is unavoidable it should be exercised by the constituted authority and in accordance with the will of the community." [17]

As larger political units develop by the coming together of national groups, once potentially hostile, violence could still be used by one group against another. The business of the constituted authority would then be, as before, to apply force to restrain the parties, just as police are now used to restrain gang warfare. I quote Bertrand Russell again. "There are issues as to which men will fight and when they arise no form of government can prevent civil war."

Let me return to the nation state. It is not surprising to find that the rate of advance in the professionalizing of armed forces has depended in each country on the degree to which national security is threatened or is thought to be. The impulse in Prussia which followed Jena weakened after the collapse of the Napoleonic threat. It quickened after the failure of Prussia against Denmark in 1848. In France the humiliation of 1815 was followed by acceleration in the development of professional military institutions, even though this was to slacken in an army from which conscription was temporarily removed by Louis XVIII and to which class restriction on entry into the officer establishment now returned. The French army remained none the less a professional body in the sense in which the army of Louis XV 100 years before had never been. Its performance in the Crimea was not particularly distinguished but that was a war which represented no real threat to national security. The French nation was not on the whole dissatisfied with its military forces in the mid-nineteenth century and did not greatly desire anything more efficient.

The disaster of 1870 shocked the whole nation into an urgent demand for reform. A wave of military professionalism followed, upon which France was to travel up to the First World War. In England the startling incompetence shown in the Crimea, and events about the same time in India, stimulated professionalism somewhat after 1856. The Prussian victory over France in 1870 was too sudden, too brutal and too close not to engender feelings of national insecurity in England with a further stimulus to professionalism as a consequence. The course and conduct of the South African War had a similar effect after 1902. But it was rather in the navy, upon which Britain's national security chiefly depended, that military professionalism in the country emerged. The army still had a long way to go.

The British army was still dominated by the principle that officers were gentlemen and non-officers were not, a principle which did no more than project the pattern of the parent society. Remember the legend of the gallant captain whose visiting card had written on it, below his name, the legend "The celebrated coward." He had been a junior officer in the South African War. His superior had given him in battle an order so able that success in the operation was certain. This would have meant his superior's promotion. But the captain strongly believed that the British army should be officered only by gentlemen. His superior wasn't one. Therefore the captain ran away. He was cashiered of course, but he had ensured the failure of the operation and prevented for ever the advancement of his superior. When this triumph of principle over self-interest was made known the captain was at once made an honorary member of a score of London clubs.

Though military professionalism developed at different rates in the western world conditions in the nineteenth century were generally favourable to its growth. They included a great increase in the complexity of military skills, the growing competitiveness of nation states, the growth of the power of the middle class at the expense of landed aristocracy, and the development of democratic political institutions which demanded a more responsive articulation in armed forces. How far conscript service contributed to professionalism is obscure.

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Huntington suggests a close link.[18] He argues that nationalism and democracy led to the concept of a nation in arms and thus to an army of conscript citizens. "The shift in the officer corps from amateurism to professionalism," he says, "was virtually always associated with the shift in the rank and file from career soldiers to citizen soldiers." Experience in his own country does not bear this out, nor does it in Great Britain. The shift to professionalism in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries preceded by a handsome margin the introduction of conscript service in World War I. In the British army there was a significant development of professionalism in the 1930s. This preceded by only a few years the introduction of conscription in World War II, but it cannot be linked with it. As national service fades out in Britain professionalism in the services looks like increasing rather than the reverse.

The fact seems to be, to one who has served both in a conscript army in peace and war and in a voluntary army (which had its share of warfare) in peace, that in one important respect universal national service inhibits professionalism. Junior and middle-rank officers spend so much time and effort in the training of conscripts in elementary military skills that attention is to some extent withdrawn from the study of more advanced techniques.

Conscription nowadays produces good soldier material, but only for a short time. It probably reduces volunteer potential in the general community. It also probably makes it harder to build up the cadre of non-commissioned officers in the service. For the parent society conscript service is of high social significance. It is unfortunate when party political interests confuse this issue. To avoid comment on those of our own country I shall look at this question for a moment through French eyes.

Marshal Lyautey wrote an article in a French journal in 1891,[19] when universal military service had already been reintroduced in France, on the social role of the officer. National service gave the nation a unique opportunity and the officer corps a heavy responsibility to society which was now no less moral than military. The officer's opportunity for service to society was now greater than any hitherto furnished by rare and fortuitous appearance on the battlefield. The young men of the nation were all being introduced at an impressionable age to an orderly life under the care of older men who, unlike the body of private industrial employers, did not draw financial profit from the labour of their workmen. The interests of both groups were not opposed. They were, or should be, the same. National service offered a vast field for social action. The officer should see himself as the educator of the nation.

I ask myself whether any nation has yet taken full advantage of the opportunities for social service offered by a system of universal military service. I used to feel that in Britain, though the moral and physical benefits of national service to very many young men were undoubted, we regular members of the service were not on the whole equal to the demands it made upon us. This was in part because we had been formed in a service whose function had been only that of defence. It was also because our masters in the state did not encourage us to find any other function in a national service army. The suggestion has been made in extenuation that there was little response to those officers who took their social duty to the men more seriously. The difficulty of working in stone, however, carries little weight when judgment is being passed upon a sculptor. The arguments for a long service professional army are strong. But, setting aside military considerations, we in this country have thrown away a great opportunity for social service to the nation. Whether we should ever have used it, even if we had kept it, is another matter. Let us at least make the best use of the very considerable opportunities which remain open to us, even in regular armed services.

I have one last question to raise. It is doubtful whether the unwritten clause of unlimited liability in the contract under which the man at arms engages to serve can easily be reconciled with conscript service. Of this contract I shall have a little more to say, as well as something of developments in warfare and their impact on the profession of arms in the twentieth century, in my last lecture.

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LECTURE 3

6—SOCIETY AND THE SOLDIER: 1914–18

I come now in these lectures to the twentieth century, in which reflection upon the profession of arms soon compels us to face critical issues of our time. I do not wish at once to dwell upon the very grave dilemma created by the introduction into war of weapons of mass destruction, for this, though important, should not be allowed to obscure everything else. Before coming to it there is one thing I wish to say about the purpose of armed forces, the characteristics of armed service and of those who embrace it as a calling, and the relation of these institutions and men to their parent societies.

It is the business of armed services to furnish to a constituted authority, a government, in situations where force is, or might be, used the greatest possible number of options. A government can have as many options as it will pay for. The greater the strength and variety, the better the equipment and training of its armed forces, the higher will be the number of options which will be open to it.

There are, of course, always limits to the amount any government will spend on defence. "How great can the number of standing soldiers become," asked a German critic of the 'eighties, "in comparison with the number of working subjects, before neither have anything to eat?"[1] This question arises today in somewhat different forms; it is the same question.

So long as sovereign states exist, however, the constituted authority of any one of them would be unwilling and unwise to abandon all power to direct the application of force in any situation where conflict between groups of men has resulted, or is likely to result, in violence. It must decide for itself how much it will spend, that is, how many options it will pay for.

Now man normally lives in a group. He is a social animal, a πολιτικὸν ζῷον[2]. The phrase is Aristotle's and the argument can be developed on something approaching Aristotelian lines. Anything can be called better or worse if it discharges a specific and distinguishing function more or less well. A good knife cuts well. A less good knife cuts less well. It is a distinguishing function of man, the πολιτικὸν ζῷον, to live in a society. The better able he is to do this, other things being equal, the better he is as a man. The better he is able to live in a city the more civilized he is, the better adapted to living in a polity, if you like, the politer. But living in a group demands some subordination of the interests of self to the interests of the group. The military contract demands the total and almost unconditional subordination of the interests of the individual if the interests of the group should require it. This can lead to the surrender of life itself. It not infrequently does. Thus in an important respect the military would appear to be one of the more advanced forms of social institution.

This argument may appeal little to the average young officer. Since I am suggesting, however, that it is not only now more important than ever before for intelligent men to join the military, but that it is the act of a rational man to do so, I think I am bound to set the argument out.

The military life is lived in order that an authority properly constituted over a significant group of men (such as a tribe, city, nation, state or federation) may be furnished with professional armed forces. If those bearing arms act in ways not consonant with the interests of the constituted authority, if they usurp it powers or dominate it, or in important ways put their own interests first, we have militarism. The proposition that militarism is suicidal has been described as "almost a truism."[3]

But although militarism may be a suicidal perversion, though war may be bad, fighting may be bad, application of physical force among men may be bad (none of which is self-evidently true, but assuming it to be so), the military life, which

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would disappear if violence vanished among men, is in many important respects good.

Why this should be so is not difficult to see if we look at what have been called the military virtues. These, to quote an impartial witness in Toynbee, "confront us as a monumental fact which cannot be whittled down or explained away." But the military virtues are not in a class apart; "they are virtues which are virtues in every walk of life . . . none the less virtues for being jewels set in blood and iron." They include such qualities as courage, fortitude and loyalty.

What is important about such qualities as these in the present argument is that they acquire in the military context, in addition to their moral significance, a functional significance as well. The essential function of an armed force is to fight in battle. Given equally advanced military techniques a force in which the qualities I have mentioned are more highly developed will usually defeat a stronger force in which they are less. Thus while you may indeed hope to meet these virtues in every walk of life and a good deal of educational effort is spent on developing them as being generally desirable, in the profession of arms they are functionally indispensable. The training, the group organizations, the whole pattern of life of the professional man at arms is designed in a deliberate effort to foster them, not just because they are morally desirable in themselves, but because they contribute to military efficiency. A digest of Cicero's *de Officiis* might well figure as a military training manual.

In consequence the moral tone in a military group tends to be higher than in a professional group where the existence of these qualities is desirable but not functionally essential, where their presence will make life for the members of the group more agreeable but will not necessarily make the group functionally more efficient. This is one reason why officers do not always find it easy at first to settle down and earn a living in civilian life, where the functional aspects of moral obligation are less apparent and the ex-officer is distressed to find, for reasons he cannot always comprehend, a moral tone lower in some important respects than that to which he is accustomed.*

Mussolini said in the early 1930s: "War alone brings all human energies to their highest tension, and sets a seal of nobility on the people who have the virtue to face it."[4] This is rubbish, and dangerous rubbish at that. War does not ennoble. Kant's view that war has made more bad people than it has destroyed is probably nearer the mark.[5] But the interesting thing is that although war almost certainly does not ennoble, the preparation of men to fight in it almost certainly can and very often does.

Men have joined armed forces at different times for different reasons.[6] I do not see many young men joining for the philosophical reasons I have suggested earlier, though I believe that reflections of the sort outlined then may help officers to realize the nature and the value of the life they lead. Almost always the desire for an active life has been prominent among reasons for taking up the profession of arms, but there have usually been contributory motives. These have often been ephemeral in value, and in kind accidental rather than essential. Sometimes the terms of reference have changed and disappointment has resulted.

Young Frenchmen of good family joined the armies of the *ancien régime* often because they had nothing else to do, or because they were expected to do so, but very often there was also a real attachment to the concept of monarchy and some desire for distinction in the service of the king.

Young Prussian Junkers might be similarly motivated in entering the service of Frederick the Great. Frenchmen joined the revolutionary and Napoleonic armies on a surge of national spirit. Young Englishmen took commissions as Britain's empire grew thinking that it was worthwhile doing something for the empire, and hoping to have an exciting life into the bargain.

But the scene can change. Alfred de Vigny, of royalist family though he was, joined for *gloire* in Napoleon's time. Napoleon vanished into exile and *gloire* faded. De Vigny was left seeking a more enduring cause for the real satisfaction he and others about him derived from the soldier's life and finding it in abnegation. The

*It is going too far to suggest, as Evelyn Waugh does in *Men at Arms*, that where there are gentlemen in charge of military operations conducted under stress there will be order and where there are not there will be none. To maintain this is to adhere to the eighteenth century notion that the qualities essential in the good officer will only be found in "gentlemen," using the term, as Waugh seems to, in its eighteenth-century connotation.

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British empire has dwindled too, and some who joined the British armed forces when the sun still had not set on government house found little comfort in the rising Commonwealth.

I suppose there are some, in western countries, who have become professional fighting men to fight communism, though I hope not. I suppose there are some, in eastern countries, who have become professional fighting men to fight capitalism, though I hope that this is not so either. Certainly east-west divisions are likely to persist and if a young man has reasons such as these for joining armed forces today they are unlikely to go cold on him, like poor de Vigny's *gloire*.

Are reasons such as these valid, however, or do they suggest a faulty distribution of emphasis between essence and accident? I cannot help thinking that they do. Officers in the British service do not always fully understand their own reasons for taking the shilling, and are happily reluctant to discuss the more important ones. I know one undergraduate who went on record in 1932 as saying that since a second world war was inevitable he would take a regular commission because he found it tidier to be killed as a professional than as an amateur. I hope you will be glad to hear that this logically-minded man, though wounded now and then in World War II, is very much alive (and still serving) today.

The military institution, however, is a persistent social form. The essential reasons which induce rational men to devote their adult lives to it, with its well-understood demands and accepted risks, are unlikely to be discreditable. Our difficulty here lies in identifying reasons of constant validity and separating them from others of temporary and often, it seems to me, dubious worth: any officer who honestly tries to do this will not, I think, be disillusioned.

I want to take up the thread again now at the point I reached in my last lecture in giving an account of the rise of professionalism in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century.

On the ground in Europe the chief powers had four million men under arms, eight times the numbers in the early eighteenth century. Before long they would mobilize nearly 10 times as many.

Now wars are not started by military commanders. De Tocqueville said more than a century ago, "in a political democracy the most peaceful of all people are the generals."[7] Events since then suggest that this may be true under other forms of government as well. The advice given by the German general staff to the Kaiser before World War I, for example, was on the cautious side. Hitler's generals received the *Führer's* proposals for a war against France, a quarter of a century later, with no enthusiasm and his willingness to accept a war on two fronts with dismay. In no country are the professional men at arms less likely than in Britain, where civilian control has become by evolution pretty well complete, to push us into war.

Even when a war has begun, it is still the politicians who play the biggest part in conducting it. But whatever responsibilities the politicians may have to bear, the social consequences of intellectual inadequacy in high military command have in this century already been appalling.

While the French were ordering national defence with the urgency born of their recent humiliation by Prussia, a new and visionary trend in military thinking began to appear in France. There were protests against a materialistic view of war. Nietzsche had already raised them in Germany. Writers like Ardant du Picq echoed and developed them in France, and evoked wide response when they spoke of the spirituality of war. Clausewitz had already urged the sovereign virtues of the will to conquer and the unique value of the offensive, delivered with unlimited violence. A military voluntarism began to develop in France. When General Colin emphasized the importance of material factors he was laughed at. The business of the intellect was to overcome and rule out all consideration of losses, to bring about a disregard of all material obstacles to the offensive.

Engels was one of those who knew better than to underrate material factors: "force is no mere act of will but calls for . . . tools . . . the producer of more perfect tools, *vulgo* arms, beats the producer of more imperfect ones."[8]

Already by 1894 the basis of all French tactics was once more the mass attack. Foch, who became head of the Ecole de Guerre in 1908, taught that the tactical fact of battle is the only argument in war and that battle demands, above all, offensive action *à outrance*.[9] The French army, said Grandmaison in 1912, more extreme even than Foch and (in Liddell Hart's words) the precipitator of disaster in 1914, no longer knows any other law than

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the offensive, which can only be carried through at the expense of bloody sacrifice.[10]

Napoleon had said in 1805, "all my care will be to gain victory with the least shedding of blood." How far he may have meant what he said is doubtful. But Napoleon was only quoted by the French military in the nineteen hundreds when he was useful and this observation was ignored.

The impact of modern techniques was misunderstood or disregarded. In the 80 years between Clausewitz and 1911 the rate of rifle fire had increased from three rounds a minute to 16, the range of guns from one thousand yards to five or six. Of artillery one responsible French officer said, "we have rather too much of it." [11] Arrangements for ammunition even for what there was failed to take into account "the appetites of quick-firing guns." In spite of the experiences of the American civil war Foch argued that a greater volume of small-arms fire favoured the attack. Of aviation and "all that sport," he said, "it's zero." [12]

After the war was over Foch was to say, "we then believed morale alone counted, which is an infantile notion." Before it, the elderly theorist who had never been in a major battle taught that victory is won by a single supreme stroke at one point. Later, when he had himself risen to supreme command of the allied armies on the western front and contributed more than any other single man to allied victory, Foch was to say that "victory is won by bits and scraps." "I have only one merit," he said quite early on in the war, "I have forgotten what I taught, and what I learned." [13]

From the very outset, however, in 1914, the French were totally committed to a policy of attack. General Joffre, the Commander-in-chief, pressed on under what was known as Plan XVII with an all-out offensive eastwards in Lorraine. He had plenty of evidence that the Germans were doing exactly what the general he had replaced was dismissed for saying they would do, that is, enveloping the French northern flank. He disregarded this and pressed on to the east.

The offensive in Lorraine failed. Within three weeks the French had been thrown back everywhere with the loss of 300,000 men and the Germans were threatening Paris Plan XVII was in ruins and with it the French prewar army. Very soon and for the rest of the war the western front was dominated, as the Russo-Japanese war had already indicated would probably happen, by entrenchment, barbed wire and bullets from automatic weapons.[14]

As the war dragged on, French devotion to the all-out offensive died hard. Many men died with it, often fighting only to gain ground in accordance with the sterile doctrine that ground, simply in and for itself, gave an advantage. The French dead in World War I amounted to nearly one and a half million. Four and a half million were wounded. Three-quarters of the eight million men mobilized in France were casualties. They were mostly young men. The memorial tablet in the chapel of the French officer-cadet school at St. Cyr, destroyed in World War II, contained one single entry for "The Class of 1914." [15] The population of France had not doubled between Valmy and the Marne [16] but the number of lives lost in defending the Ile-de-France had been increased one hundredfold. The social results to the nation of these losses, which make themselves more powerfully felt as time goes by, are still incalculable. They cannot fail in the aggregate to be enormous.

Very many of these deaths were the direct consequence not only of failures in management and faults of technique but also of error in the formulation of general principles. The French came into World War I the slaves of an abstract military concept which was totally invalid but from which they only painfully struggled free.

The British also made costly errors, not so much of abstract thought as of practical applications. The commander-in-chief in 1914, Field Marshal French, was a cavalryman like many other senior commanders in World War I, including Douglas Haig, who was first a corps commander and then the Field Marshal's successor as commander-in-chief. Both French and Haig had shown marked ability as administrators, trainers and commanders of troops, with distinguished records in the South African War. Neither had the intellectual capacity to evaluate the importance of new techniques, or the imagination to break the bonds of his own experience.

French was often quite plainly out of his depth, besides being a little suspicious of his allies. "*Au fond*, they are a low lot," he wrote, "one always has to remember the class these French generals mostly come from." [17] Both he and Haig planned

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to use large masses of cavalry in exploitation of infantry success, even when conditions on the Western Front had long condemned mounted troops, used as such, either to idleness, in a phrase of Michael Howard's, or suicide. Ian Hamilton had reported from the Russo-Japanese war, when bullet, wire and trench became dominant, that the only use for cavalry there had been to cook rice for the infantry, but he was thought by some to be insane. Haig had said earlier on that artillery was only effective against demoralized troops. He had written in a minute to the Army Council in April 1915 that the machine gun was a much overrated weapon, and two per battalion were more than sufficient [18]; a number fortunately increased a little later on to eight and then, largely on civilian pressure, to 16.

Examples could be multiplied of the failure of the professionals to realize the "terrible transformation in the character of War which," says Toynbee, " . . . took our generation by surprise in 1914." [19]

The sad tale of what took place on the second day of the battle of Loos has recently been written again. It is probably worth choosing here as an example of what could happen.

Two new infantry divisions were committed on the morning of September 26, 1915, to the continuation of a mass attack on German positions, of which the front lines had been penetrated the day before. The barbed wire of the reserve positions was heavy and intact. For the British attack there was nothing that could be called artillery preparation. Twenty minutes of desultory shell fire, which appears to have caused the Germans no casualties, was followed by a pause of about half an hour. Then 12 battalions, 10,000 men, on a clear morning, in columns, advanced up a gentle slope towards the enemy's trenches. The wire behind which they lay was still unbroken.

The British advance met with a storm of machine-gun fire. Incredulous, shouting in triumph, the Germans mowed the attackers down until, three and a half hours later, the remnants staggered away from the "Leichenfeld von Loos," having lost 385 officers and 7,861 men. The Germans, as they watched the survivors leave, stopped firing in compassion. Their casualties in the same time had been nil.

"Good-morning; good morning!" the General said
When we met him last week on our way to the line.
Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of 'em dead,
And we're cursing his staff for incompetent swine.
"He's a cheery old card," grunted Harry to Jack
As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack.

But he did for them both with his plan of attack.[20]

It is not only the battle of Loos which these lines of Siegfried Sassoon written in 1917, call to mind. The lives at Loos were thrown away. Nothing was gained at all except a painful lesson we could do without. But there are many other occasions in four years of war which included Neuve Chapelle, the Somme, the battles around Ypres, Passchendaele, when inadequacy in command caused grievous loss of life for no return. The total of British dead was around the million mark. Casualties were about half those in France where the productive and creative capacity of a whole generation was pretty well taken clean out. The social historian of the future, however, is likely to find their results significant.

Let us not minimize the responsibilities of others besides the military commanders, but these have much to bear. In the examples I have chosen the French and the British each made cardinal errors in spheres which were peculiarly their own, the French in their failure to evolve a valid concept, the British in their failure to evaluate current techniques.

Now these generals were not all wicked men nor always stupid men and they were very rarely cowards themselves. Their errors were more those of blindness than malignity. Where they failed was an understanding the techniques of their time. In consequence they could not formulate sound principles and their handling was faulty. Sometimes, as in Foch's case, they found they had to modify radically in practice what they once had preached. Whatever their many good qualities they were often unequal to their task, and when they made mistakes the results were often ap-

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palling, with the most serious consequences for western society.

What thought, in our own society in Britain, was given in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to preventing these mistakes? The army was left largely where it was. Its other-rank personnel was improving with a rising standard of living; but its officer corps was still the preserve of young men of good social standing who had the outlook of amateurs and usually were. They were ill-paid, with "half a day's pay for half a day's work," and so had to be of independent means. This meant that most were hard to teach and many were unteachable. They were not well trained and were expected to be neither industrious nor particularly intelligent. From men such as these came the commanders of World War I. As a foreign observer had put it, among the officers of the British army bravery had often to compensate for lack of ability.[21]

What a society gets in its armed services is exactly what it asks for, no more and no less. What it asks for tends to be a reflection of what it is. When a country looks at its fighting forces it is looking in a mirror; if the mirror is a true one the face that it sees there will be its own.

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7—TODAY AND TOMORROW

After World War I, in England, we did better. A conscious effort was made in the 1930s to build up a more professional and modern army and there was progress. A more professional outlook developed, with better pay and brighter promotion prospects leading to harder work and higher efficiency. The British commanders of the second German war were in consequence generally much better at their jobs than those in the first, even if they were not better, braver, finer men, which on the whole they were possibly not. Most knew their business, not as of yesterday, like some of the senior commanders in the first war, but as of today.

It has, in our time, been customary to think of war and peace as though one must be at war if one is not at peace and vice versa. This is nearly always wrong, and certainly so at any time when war is not total, as it was not in the mid-eighteenth century. When Sterne set out from England on his Sentimental Journey in 1762 he had forgotten that England was at war with France. He had no passport and was given one at Versailles by, it was said, the foreign minister himself, who was then actively prosecuting the Seven Years War against England. "Un homme qui rit," said the minister, "ne sera jamais dangereux."[1] When England and France were in a state of war most people continued to be unaffected, and very many would never even have heard about it at all.

All that changed with the French Revolution and Napoleon's unmannerly intrusion into a world of limited war.[2] Through the nineteenth century, even in times of deceptive peace, forms of political thought and of professional military practice continued to develop along lines leading straight towards total national war.

We owe a great deal here to the Germans. The response to the Napoleonic challenge, which had led to the collapse at Jena, was the overhaul of German military institutions and the development at the same time of a national frame in which to house them. The movement towards national unity and sovereignty gathered strength as the Prussian army became more formidable. A military philosophy, that of Clausewitz, appeared just when it was most wanted. The Germany of our time was founded in war in the nineteenth century and tested in war as the century progressed. Bismarck's three wars of Prussian aggression established the German state as we came to know it in our time. The two great world catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century revolved around Germany as the central figure.

Just as the last of these two world wars ended the missing piece dropped into place and the pattern was complete; the concept of total war between sovereign national states was now matched with a technique of total destruction.

As a result, if by war we still mean total war, as Clausewitz did, war can no longer be what Clausewitz called it—the continuation of policy by other means. It is difficult to argue, though I know some do (e.g. Herman Kahn in *On Thermonuclear War*), that unrestricted war between powers of high and roughly equal nuclear capability can possibly be brought about by a rational act of deliberate policy. General war can result, it seems to me, from miscalculation, or aberration or mischance. It just possibly might come back into play as a rational act of policy, for a short time, in the very unlikely event of a radical technical advance which gives one power an overwhelming, if temporary, superiority over the rest. War in the sense of general unrestricted war, however, can no longer be regarded as a normal continuation of foreign policy or an alternative to peace.

Unfortunately we are often the prisoners of terms, like "war" and "peace". Forms of national organization are still closely related to this outworn dichotomy. In Great Britain, as elsewhere in western Europe and in the United States, much legislation and many administrative arrangements (particularly those relating to the armed forces) are only comprehensible in terms of it. Confusion and inefficiency readily result.

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What is required (in addition to whatever preparations may be thought necessary for total war) is the ability to deploy that degree of warlike effort which the circumstances demand, in gentle gradation from something very small to something which, though pretty large, is still short of general mobilization. This is more easily contrived in the United States than in Britain. Here we are still burdened with a system distinguishing between war and peace, on the assumption that each is an identifiable and uniform state excluding the other. To this we have made a few makeshift adjustments. But we are still far from a smoothly working concept of partial war and partial peace in varying degrees of either.

Even if it were universally accepted, however, that total war had disappeared entirely as a valid act of deliberate national policy, this would still have done nothing to lessen tensions between men or the causes of conflict between sovereign states. War, total war, we have to avoid. Warfare, acts of organized violence between groups of men which in sum amount to less than total war, which we are unlikely to be able entirely to prevent, we must do something about.

How do we avoid total war? One widely supported suggestion is that general war could not take place if we all agreed to do away with the means to wage it. General and complete disarmament is therefore put forward as the answer, perhaps with nuclear disarmament first. Others argue that, so long as sovereign states exist, no such agreements, even with far better guarantees than the great powers are at present likely to agree upon, can be foolproof. The argument goes as follows: there is now a high degree of transferability between civil and military skills. Since techniques cannot be abolished, an attempt to lock the weapons up is not a very sensible way of trying to prevent conflict. An agreement for general and complete disarmament would probably raise more problems than it would solve. The prevention of total war, therefore, can best be approached through arms control.

I mention these arguments not to take sides but to make a rather obvious point. In the prevention of total war, whatever means are chosen, the state will rely heavily upon professional agencies in the military sphere. Neither a working system of arms control nor an effective state of general disarmament is possible without the military agent.

Still less can you dispense with the military if some discriminate form of nuclear warfare emerges. The search for it, the study of it, its conduct if it were to take place, would make heavy demands on the capacity of military professionals.

It must be admitted that warfare of some sort cannot be seen as anything but quite inevitable. No one can say in advance when or how armed conflict between groups of men will emerge. What goes on at this moment—speaking in November, 1962? An armed force of a Commonwealth country, India, is fighting Chinese. A United Nations force is fighting in the Congo. There is civil war in the Yemen. United States Federal troops have recently intervened to enforce at the point of the bayonet the enrolment of an unwelcome undergraduate in the state of Mississippi. Praetorian states exist in many places and have their own troubles. Kashmir, Berlin, Indonesia, Angola, Quemoy—to name only a few—are among many places lying under the threat of force if not suffering its immediate impact.

Who could have predicted all this a year or two ago, when there was already fighting in the Trucial States, in Algeria, in Cyprus, in Malaya, in Kenya, or a year or two before that when there was already fighting or soon would be in Hungary, in eastern Germany, in the Suez Canal zone, and *coups d'état* had taken place or were about to in Syria, Pakistan, Iraq, the Sudan and Burma? Who will predict with any confidence what the pattern of violence may be in the next few years, or the next half-century? The mathematical resources of the social scientist may be of help here in the long run, but they are not yet sufficiently reliable to furnish much guidance to makers of policy. It is difficult to say how conflict will emerge or what form it will take. All we can say with confidence is that it will occur.

Edward Gibbon in the late eighteenth century predicted the early disappearance of warfare between nations.[3] He was wrong. World War I was "the war to end war." It was followed by World War II. World War III cannot be allowed, but its prevention will make little if any difference to the tendency to minor outbreaks of violence, except perhaps to increase their frequency. For if you can take a club to your neighbour without bringing down a thunderbolt you will club him the more readily.

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Now, since fighting is bound to take place, situations are easily conceivable in which the only hope of avoiding something worse may lie in taking a hand in it. We may well be working towards a position in which the main purpose of the profession of arms is not to win wars but to avoid them; that is to say, by timely warfare to lessen the risk of general war. In my opinion we are there already.

If this is so the chief function of the armed forces maintained by properly constituted authorities, whether these are nation states or something else, now becomes the containment of violence. We may thus be moving towards what Janowitz calls a constabulary concept. Within such a concept the function and duty of the military professional remain the same. His function is the orderly application of armed force. His duty is to develop his skill in the management of violence to the utmost and to act as the true subordinate of the properly constituted authority, whatever this may turn out to be.*

Engels drew attention to the close reflection of the dominant political characteristics of nineteenth-century states in their military establishments.[4] This correspondence has not been confined to the nineteenth century, as I have suggested in these lectures, and it is not only the political structure of a society but its social characteristics as well, which are reflected in the pattern of its armed forces.

The pattern of society in Great Britain is evolving and the pattern of her armed forces will evolve in conformity with it, whether we in this country like it or not. Some of an older generation possibly do not. They may like it as little as the Duke of Wellington liked the proposals to abolish purchase. But it is the business of those in responsible positions in our armed forces today to see that modification of structure to correspond to a changing pattern in society is facilitated, while careful attention is paid to the preservation of what is worth preserving.

Where does the "gentleman" stand in the officer establishment today? I have no time to pursue this far. A view set out in the U.S.A. in 1950 in an official publication seems reasonable: "the military officer is considered a gentleman . . . because nothing less . . . is truly suited for his particular set of responsibilities."[5]

In relations between young officers and men, when consistency, firmness and sincerity are important and warmth of personal feeling must be tempered with some degree of detachment, the implications of what is said here are just. They are above all important where disciplinary questions arise, as happens inevitably under the terms of the military contract. These make heavy demands on the young officer, who has to be made to remember that only a person of liberal mind is entitled to exercise coercion over others in a society of free men.

It is worth remarking here that as an officer rises higher in his profession the demands made upon him in the administration of justice increase. The machine is efficient but must be most jealously watched. A senior officer who confirms punishments often has the power to modify or lessen them. He will not do so without most careful inquiry, to which he will also bring compassion and common sense. This can tax a whole mind and it brings its own rewards.

Whatever may be thought now about "officers" and "gentlemen," a change of critical importance in our time is in the rejection of the assumption that the qualities required of an officer are to be found only in one stratum of society. Criteria of social standing in deciding a man's suitability for officership, which have been applied for close on 2,000 years in western society, with only rare and short-lived challenge, are now being modified.[6]

The vestiges of the eighteenth-century distinction between gentle and simple, as reflected in relationships between officers and non-officers, are vanishing. An article in a popular weekly paper[7] pointed out recently that the disappearance of what it calls the old feudal relationship, "typical

*It would be idle to pretend that a dilemma cannot arise here. The French forces in Syria and Lebanon, the Troupes Françaises du Levant, after the fall of France, fought the British, their former allies, who were prosecuting the war against Germany. They did this on the orders of a metropolitan government: it had capitulated, but their duty as professionals still lay to a government whose legitimacy they could not question. On the other hand many German professional officers who detested Nazism were unable to deny that legitimate authority in Germany lay with the Nazis. They therefore continued to fight against the allies, in whose victory lay the only hope for Germany, as many knew. They were, of course, much helped in their confusion by the insistence of the allies that the German nation was their enemy, and not only the German government.

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of the pre-war professional," is not without disadvantages. "Many officers today," says *The People*, "are nine-to-five types." The problem is to retain group coherences and a rational pattern of discipline and command without relying on moribund features in the social structure. This is a problem which the British army, as the paper points out with considerable penetration, is trying to solve.

The distinction between officer and N.C.O. is unlikely to disappear. There is, however, much to be said for a reexamination of the pattern of distribution of responsibilities between officers and N.C.O.s. It probably still takes too little account of the results of rising standards in living, education and general information amongst people almost everywhere in the western world. The better and maturer minds required among officers in armed service today, moreover, will not be so readily attracted to it if the demands made upon the junior officer are too low. A consequent tendency has been evident to increase the responsibilities of the N.C.O. and to liberate the junior officer from some of the duties which make few demands on the mental qualities expected in him. This tendency is likely to continue. If it results in further significant adjustment of areas of responsibility it could bring about a modification of the numerical relationship of officers to non-commissioned officers as well as of patterns of promotion and discipline.

On the officer side an interesting distinction is emerging in the British army between those who are likely to become competitors for the higher posts and those who are not. A double career structure is being set up to take account of it.*

A distinction is worth pointing out here between professional education in the profession of arms and that in some others, such as medicine or the law. In these emphasis is placed on a single long and concentrated dose, after which the practitioner, though he has very much to learn, is recognized as qualified. In armies and to a lesser degree in navies and air forces the initial professionel educational dose is only enough for the earliest stages. Thereafter the officer who gets on in the service frequently goes back to school. In specialist courses, in staff and command schools, in advanced courses, he spends not less than one fifth of his professionnl life on studies intended to prepare him for an extension of his experience or for greater responsibilities. This is vastly greater than the amount of time spent in this way in the law and rather more than in medicine.

The pattern of professional education in the armed services is progressive. There is consequently no intolerable waste of preparatory effort in the policy announced by the War Office in 1960 under which those who are unlikely to rise high in their profession or are unwilling to stay in it long may leave early in order to reestablish themselves elsewhere while they are still young enough to do so. It is hoped to make their sojourn in the service attractive and to bring them out of it not less well placed to start somewhere else than if they had never joined.

Whether we have yet succeeded in the British army in a policy which has admittedly only lately been introduced has recently been questioned by a Cambridge sociologist. Dr. Abrams* says with some justification that the resettlement both of the officers who leave in their 30s and those who serve on to 55 years of age "remains the outstanding challenge to those who would create a modern military profession in Britain."*

The military profession in Britain is changing in pattern as the parent society changes. Officer qualities are now sought in a deeper section of society than they were. Educational standards at entry and at various stages thereafter are rising. Command by domination has in significant degree given way to command by management. Professionalism is more respected. In the army, the least technical (in a non-military sense) of the three services in Britain, the requirements for technical awareness in ambitious officers have risen steeply in the last few years and are still rising. Material rewards are not unsatisfactory during an officer's service and although pillage

*Dr. Abrams has offered an interesting and valuable comment on the new pattern of retirement of the British officer; he suggests that the sort of occupations found for the admittedly impressive numbers of officers already resettled is unlikely to attract young men to join the armed forces, and draws the conclusion "that there is no better way to get to the top of English society than to start there." But useful though this analysis is, it has omitted to emphasize that the policy has been in operation for a very short time, and the material for resettlement is pretty well exclusively the product of an earlier period, when less thought was given to resettlement. He has gone, as it were, for evidence on animal behaviour more to the dead animal than the living, more to South Kensington than Whipsnade.

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now plays no part in his expectations he can look forward to a pension when he retires which compares very favourably with what he could put by in other professions. Career prospects in terms of promotions are rational and the criteria for advancement are sensible.

Improvements such as these have long been urgent. I hope, and believe, they have been made in time. Others must follow. The social results of inadequacy in the management of violence in two world wars have already been enormous and remain incalculable. Since war became total we have acquired weapons which in total war can destroy mankind. The penalty of inadequacy was high before. It could now be final.

We struggle to escape from this situation. Opinion tends to move between two absolutist extremes. At one end are those who are convinced that total war must come; that it should be prepared for as a matter of the highest priority; that a favourable opportunity for it should be welcomed and even sought. Such unlikely companions as the pure Marxist-Leninist and the champion of unrestricted capitalist free enterprise (both rather old-fashioned types) can easily find themselves together here. At the other extreme are all those who see no hope for mankind except in the rejection and suppression of *all* means of war, starting with the most destructive and making a brave and desperate gesture of voluntary surrender, if need be, in the hope that others will follow.

Somewhere between these two positions you will find most of the more intelligent professional officers. They are more pessimist than optimist in that they see little cause to suppose that man has morally so far advanced as to be able to refrain from violence. They tend to be more pragmatist than absolutist in that they reject the inevitability of total war at one end as totally intolerable, while they regard the notions of the total disarmers at the other as scarcely practicable. They do not, in sum, see why man, in spite of his ineradicable tendency to violence, should be unable to manage the affairs of the world without blowing it up, even though he now knows how to do it and cannot be forced to forget; but they realize that the solution of these problems demands more good minds in the profession of arms than have been found there in the past.

The regularization of the profession was accompanied by a marked rise in the threshold between the military and civilian areas of activity. Barrack life, uniforms, increased specialization in military skills, the growth in extent and complexity of formal military administration were among the factors contributing to set the soldier more apart from the civilian. The distinction between the specialist in warfare on land and at sea also grew more marked.

As the profession grew more professional, first at sea and then on land, the sailor and the soldier moved further apart from each other and the functional area in which both operated, the military, grew ever more sharply distinct from the non-military. The development of aerial warfare in the early twentieth century led to the specialization of a third type of armed service whose relation to the other two has varied from time to time and country to country and whose future locus and function are at present obscure. All that can be said is that they are likely to be largely determined by technical developments.

As professionalization proceeded the professional was allowed more of a prescriptive right to authoritative judgment in his own sphere. Not unnaturally this was most noticeable where the rate of advance in professionalism was highest, that is, in nineteenth-century Germany. Here the success of the military in ordering their own affairs and the obvious national advantages which resulted led to a widespread belief in a capacity in the military for successful organization in non-military areas. They claimed the expertness of the initiate and were accorded as well a discretionary right of judgment in other spheres than their own. In mid-twentieth century Germany the area of activity within which the military establishment is encouraged to operate has been sharply curtailed. Conversely, in other states of which all too many instances will come to mind, the effectiveness of the military in maintaining an orderly structure when civil political constitutions prove too frail to do so has resulted in assumption by the military of civil functions. Praetorianism is widespread: its growth must be watched with deep misgiving.

It is worth saying here that the degree of recognition of what might be called purely military factors seems to vary roughly as the degree of freedom of the military from civilian control. It remained high in Germany until World War II. It was higher in France in 1912 than it is now

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50 years later. It is higher now in the United States than it was in 1912. It has never been high in Britain.

The movement of the military away from the civil has now in general been reversed. They have come closer together. Military skills are less exclusively specialist. The military community lives less apart. Uniforms are less worn in civilian society. The working clothes of a general in the field are very like those of a machine minder, though he still has something rather more grand put by for special occasions. All soldiers like to put on pretty clothes now and then, but I should prefer not to pursue the topic of dressing up too far, here, where I am a guest in an ancient university.

How far will this tendency to reintegration go? Not, I am sure, as far as a complete merger. The special nature of the military calling will persist, and although the threshold between civil and military has in recent years got lower, and may get lower still, it is unlikely in my opinion to disappear. It is the task of those in charge to determine its optimum height, or, to put it another way, to see how close the military can be brought to the civilian without destroying the value of the soldier to society. One thing is recognized as particularly important: to minimize the difficulty of reintegration when the soldier wishes to cross the threshold and become a civilian.

I have mentioned this before and do so again only to emphasize its importance, which has risen sharply in the last two decades. Probably in no country has the requirement yet been fully met, but in every one the effort is being made. A civilian qualification for every military professional, or at least skills saleable in civil life is the ideal. In this country where currently more than 200 young officers out of a small army are reading for university degrees in the army's time, on the army's payroll, and the other services are certainly doing in other ways no less, we have at least made a start.

How then does the military calling look to one who has all his adult life followed it? It is one of the fundamental pursuits. There are occupations in which what is demanded of those who pursue them cannot be entirely regulated by contracts between men. The compulsions exerted in these occupations arise mainly from the nature of the task itself. They include those of the priest, the healer, the lawgiver, the craftsman, the teacher, the scholar, the seaman and the farmer. They are not merely mechanical pursuits*. The profession of arms is prominent among them.

The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the man who embraces this life somewhat apart. He will be (or should be) always a citizen. So long as he serves he will never be a civilian.

There are many ways of looking at a soldier. He can be regarded as no more than a military mechanic: a military operation can be considered as just another engineering project. This is a mistake. It can lead to unfortunate results when the unlimited liability clause in the unwritten contract is invoked as the operation unfolds.

He can be regarded, rather emotionally and too simply, as a hired assassin. Only those who do not know many soldiers can maintain this view with confidence. If soldiers were only paid killers their calling would have done something to them which you can look for in vain.

The soldier can be thought of as one of de Vigny's great shaggy dogs of grenadiers, mournful, sweet-tempered and doomed. He has been romanticized, reviled, esteemed, derided.

He has been the target of some of the best invective, Voltaire's [10] for example or Shaw's. I particularly recommend the preface to *John Bull's Other Island* (*Down with the soldier*) as sane and refreshing reading for the regular officer. To see how far Shaw is wrong today is as important as to see how far he is still right, and to make sure we continue to steer the profession of arms away from his picture of it. Shaw is as angry as Voltaire and for the same reason: man obstinately remains what he is and declines to become what the radical reformer thinks he ought to be. The very existence of the profession of arms is a constant reminder that this is so and the rancour it sometimes arouses in the radical breast is easily understood.

The man at arms is different things at different times to the same people. "Our God and soldiers we alike adore | ex'n at the brink of danger; not before." [11] He can be looked at in a thousand different ways, for he is an inevitable phenomenon in human society. More poetry has been written about him and his doings than about anything else on earth.

*I should be inclined to describe them as abanausic.

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In his professional environment he lives an ordered life. It is the sort of life which Cicero admired, lived *ordine et modo*.[12] Its orderliness is liberating rather than oppressive. It is far from incompatible with Christianity. The record of the actions of Jesus Christ in the gospels show him forbearing to soldiers, even kind. He was rough with politicians, lawyers, financiers, professors and divines.

There is a satisfaction in service, there is a satisfaction in an ordered life, there is satisfaction in the progressive mastery of complex skills, and there is satisfaction in professional association with men of a high average level of integrity. But the service has to be service to what is worthwhile, and the ordered life has to lead somewhere. The professional skills must be interesting and around them must be a wide area of choice in other pursuits. It is upon these points that the young man considering armed service must satisfy himself. I do not think he will be disappointed.

The primary function of an armed force is to fight in battle. This is nowadays impossible without a highly complex system of supporting activities. Among these a man may find not only the chance of self-fulfillment in a closely coherent group of human beings, where confidence is generally high and everyone receives from others what he is prepared to give. He will also be offered an opportunity for pretty nearly every pursuit that appeals to the rational man.

I only know one general now serving on the Army Council who has had a picture hung in the Academy, but there are many generals who paint. I do not know any generals who are first class interpreters in Russian, Arabic or classical Cantonese, but almost any young officer able and willing to do so may study a language for two or three years and will often spend some of this time abroad at his employer's expense. If he is of unusual capacity as a scientist he might find himself, after a first at Cambridge or London, reading for a doctorate. The young officer can paint, sail boats, play a musical instrument, join an expedition, learn mathematics, bundle down the Cresta—help himself in short to a variety of pursuits active or reflective, not as things he has to struggle to do but as things which the system in which he has made his life encourages and sometimes even helps to pay for.

Make no mistake about it: the military establishment is not a philanthropic body. It has good reason to encourage these things. First, there are skills (and a very wide range of them) whose availability in armed forces is deemed important. Secondly, there are activities which develop the mental, moral and physical qualities required in the efficient fighting man. Thirdly, the life must be attractive to the right young men if the function of armed forces is to be efficiently discharged. The things I speak of as examples fall under one or more of these heads, most under all three.

Some men are dissatisfied if they are too far separated from the earth upon which they live and what happens on and round it. I realized myself as a young officer that I should not have been content doing anything for a living in which it was never important to me what time the sun rose. Dawn, dusk, moonrise and moonset, what the wind does, the shape and size of woodland, marsh and hill, currents and tides, the flow of rivers and the form of clouds, whether the leaf is on the tree or the branches are bare, the seasons, the weather and the stars—these are matters of compelling importance in the lives of sailors, soldiers, airmen, some of more importance to one, some to another; and so, too, at all times and above all, are people.

In measuring the worth of any way of life a study of its average products will not tell you what you want to know. Those who display its essential characteristics in exceptional degree are more informative, a Colonel Newcome, let us say, or a Jos. Sedley. Perhaps even more misleading than to regard the average is to look only at the worst. To see how bad men can be in any profession is to learn little about it worth knowing. Ask instead what opportunities it gives the *μεγάθυμοι*.

The profession of arms is an essential social institution offering an orderly way of life, set a little apart, not without elegance. "The performance of public duty is not the whole of what makes a good life," said Bertrand Russell, in language that would have pleased Cicero; "there is also the pursuit of private excellence."[13] Both are to be found in the military life. It gives much and takes more, enriching freely anyone prepared to give more than he gets. It will remain with us for as long as man continues to be what he is, too clever and not good enough. This looks like being a long time yet.

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

These three lectures have been set down pretty faithfully as they were given, with a few short passages, omitted in order to shorten them for delivery, now restored. If they had been written in the first place for publication they would have been put together differently, and might then have been without some of the rough patches of which I am aware and towards which I ask indulgence.

Source material has been used very freely—too freely perhaps. Phrases inadvertently borrowed have certainly slipped in, but there has not been time or opportunity for the rewriting which alone could prune these out, and I can only ask to be forgiven for them.

I relied a good deal in parts on those two basic works, Delbrück's *Geschichte der Kriegskunst* and the *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften* of Max Jähns. I acknowledge a debt to Bertrand Russell's *Power* and an even greater one to Andrzejewski's *Military Organization and Society*. Anyone who knows Michael Parker's *Roman Legions*, Liddell Hart's *Foch* and J. U. Nef's *War and Human Progress* will see how greatly I am in their debt, and the same is true of the collection of essays edited by Edward Meade Earle under the title *Makers of Modern Strategy*. I used Babeau's *Vie Militaire sous l'Ancien Régime* freely and gratefully in the passages on seventeenth and eighteenth-century France.

I made much use of an important book by Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, and another by Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, and only wish that equally valuable work of the same sort had been done on other armed forces than those of the United States, with which these two books are mostly concerned.

I re-read much of Toynbee with pleasure and profit, using more than one of his ideas and probably some of his words. Critics of *A Study of History* claim that the grand design has collapsed and the whole great edifice lies in ruins. If this is so there is still more profit to be had from wandering around the treasures in these ruined choirs than from any visit to the tight little weatherproof prefabs set up in their suburban rows by some of his detractors. I know I am not alone in returning to Toynbee with pleasure.

I freely used and acknowledge a considerable debt to a disappointing book in Alfred Vagts' *History of Militarism*. It is a most valuable guide to source material, but anyone who knows his sources as well as Vagts clearly does should have written a much better book. It shows too little detachment and too much emotion, and sometimes more spleen than scholarship; but no book I know in this field gives a better introduction to the material.

By contrast Barbara Tuchman's *August 1914* is a model of sensible and correct use of sources. I used it gratefully when I could and only wish the limits on my own efforts had not prevented my using it more.

Professor Michael Roberts' inaugural lecture at Queen's University, Belfast, on *The Military Revolution 1560–1660* is something any army officer who studies his profession should know. I have leant upon it heavily.

For one incident I drew freely and with gratitude on sources which I did not know before, indicated by Alan Clark in *The Donkeys*. Dr. Kitson Clark of Trinity gave me good advice on the period of which he is a master and was indulgent enough to come to the lectures. The Vice-Chancellor of Queen's University, Belfast, Dr. Michael Grant, another Trinity man, was also kind and helped me to avoid some errors. So did Mr. J. Cook, headmaster of Campbell College, Brigadier H. A. Lascelles and Lt.-Col. John Strawson.

The published form of these lectures makes detailed running documentation difficult. They are not in any case intended as a work of scholarship. I hope there is sufficient documentary support where it is required and that I have not forgotten anyone to whom I am indebted.

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"Yours is the profession of arms . . . the will to win . . . the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be duty, honor, country."

General Douglas MacArthur

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