



Profession of Arms Seminar 11 – 13 January 2011

EVENT REPORT



UNIFIED QUEST 2011 *The Army Future Study*

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Introduction and Background

The Profession of Arms Seminar was the fourth of six major events in a series produced for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) associated with Unified Quest 2011 (UQ11)—see Figure 1. UQ is the Army’s annual Title 10 Future Study Program comprised of a series of seminar games, seminars, workshops, and conferences that culminate in April 2011 with a Senior Leader Seminar hosted by the Army Chief of Staff. It is the Army Chief of Staff’s primary mechanism to explore enduring challenges and the conduct of operations in a future operational environment.




Figure 1. Unified Quest 2011 Sequence of Events

UQ consists of broad studies of future joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations in order to isolate and frame issues vital to future force development in a format that is suitable for integration into concept and capability development. UQ also examines and develops solution strategies for enduring operational and generating force challenges. The purpose of UQ11 is to assist Army leaders to understand, visualize, describe, and direct efforts to ensure the Army remains prepared to achieve its strategic purpose as an integral element of land power in the

21st century operating environment through an examination of the Army Concept Framework¹ and Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC).

In adapting to the demands of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to the strategic realities of the 21st Century, the Army has not been able to thoroughly examine challenges that have affected the Army as a Profession of Arms. Army leaders are cognizant that the Army is not a profession simply because the members of the Army say that it is—the American people make that judgment. The Army cannot take for granted current public opinion that clearly considers the Army a profession today. In October of 2010, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Commanding General of TRADOC to execute a “Review of the Army Profession in an Era of Persistent Conflict.” The purpose of the Unified Quest 2011 Profession of Arms Seminar was to kick off this year-long Army-wide assessment which will review Soldiers' and leaders' understanding of what it means to be professionals—expert members of the Profession of Arms—and encourage a recommitment to a culture of service, and the responsibilities and behaviors as articulated in the Army ethic.

Table 1. UQ11 Key Tasks

1. Determine Army Leader Development implications from the Army Concept Framework and provide interim solution strategies to ensure the right mix of training, education, and experience for all leaders.
2. Evaluate the Army Concept Framework in Alternative Futures for sufficiency and recommend revisions for subsequent publication.
3. Evaluate Cyber Operations within the context of the Army Concept Framework to identify concept shortcomings and capability gaps.
4. Determine how to organize the future Army for ground combined arms maneuver and wide area security in the context of Full Spectrum Operations.
5. Evaluate Homeland Operations within the context of the Army Concept Framework to identify capability gaps and recommend required capabilities.
6. Evaluate select Warfighting Challenges through the lens of the Army Concept Framework to develop interim solution strategies and first order capabilities to improve the combat effectiveness of our current and future force.

This event provided an opportunity to gather key observations related to the highlighted task in Table 1—UQ11 Key Tasks. To a lesser degree, this event provided an opportunity to evaluate select AWFCs through the lens of the Army Concept Framework to develop interim solution strategies and first order capabilities to improve the combat effectiveness of the current and future force—another UQ11 Key Task.

¹ The Army Concept Framework is a set of future concept documents developed by TRADOC to provide a clearly defined structure and enable the Army to refocus its force development efforts after more than 8 years of war. For this event, this term is used to refer to the Army Capstone Concept (ACC), Army Operating Concept (AOC), and six Army Functional Concepts (Mission Command, Intelligence, Movement & Maneuver, Fires, Protection, and Sustainment). Of these, the AOC is considered to be the primary focus for this event.

Unified Quest will incorporate results from recent and on-going Army efforts into events this year and identify outcomes from events that support future plans for ongoing Army capability development. Army Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) are the enduring first order capabilities the Army must develop to ensure current and future force combat effectiveness. Interim solutions to Warfighting Challenges guide concept and force development work and learning plans associated with Warfighting Challenges help prioritize learning efforts including experimentation, seminars (such as Unified Quest), wargames, and research and development.²

This report serves primarily to capture panel discussions and learning that occurred during the UQ11 Profession of Arms Seminar. It discusses the top issues from across plenary and the four panels at the event. This event was held under the Unified Quest non-attribution rules; hence this report summarizes main points from each panel without reference to persons or affiliation. It is designed to inform UQ stakeholders, stimulate discussion and debate, and contribute to the design of subsequent UQ events. In addition, it is a source document in determining insights and recommendations for the Senior Leader Seminar.

Event Overview and Design

TRADOC conducted the Profession of Arms Seminar 11-13 January 2011, at the Booz Allen Hamilton conference center in McLean, Virginia. A seminar venue was chosen to bring together more than 120 subject matter experts and senior leaders representing Army and Joint Force staffs, commands, and organizations; military and academic institutions; and liaison officers from Australia, Canada, France, Israel, Netherlands, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. Following a welcome by the director of the Army's Concept Development and Learning Directorate and the chief of the TRADOC Future Warfare Division, participants received a presentation on the Army's Profession of Arms Campaign by the Director, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), to provide a common foundation of understanding for later discussions.

Participants were then organized into four panels, each charged with three tasks: (1) Examine proposed key attributes of the Profession of Arms and assess whether they are an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms and Army Ethos; and (2) determine current strengths and (3) current weaknesses as a profession and as professionals across the areas of Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (figure 2— Profession of Arms Seminar Design).

² For more information, see Army Warfighter Challenges website (<https://wiki.kc.us.army.mil/wiki/AWFC>)




Figure 2. Profession of Arms Seminar Design

All participants reassembled the morning of the second day for a presentation by and dialogue with General Fred Franks, US Army, Retired. Participants then returned to their panel rooms and continued work.

A framework of three major lines of operation using five key attributes and four panels shown in figure 3 was used during the seminar. Panel 1, Individual, focused on the perspective of individual members of the profession across five cohorts; Soldier, Non-commissioned Officer, Warrant Officer, Officer, and DA Civilian. Panel 2, Unit, took the perspective of units when addressing how the key attributes relate to units at all echelons, particularly in the areas of Army Culture, command climate, and readiness. Panel 3, Institution #1, adopted an institutional perspective to determine how the key attributes are integral to concepts, doctrine, and professional military education. Panel 4, Institution #2, focused on how the key attributes relate to Army Policy, Programs, Systems, and Regulations as they set conditions for the Profession of Arms to promulgate across the enterprise.




Figure 3. Profession of Arms Seminar Analytic Design Framework

Each group was responsible for producing a paper that summarized the work accomplished over the course of the seminar. On the final day of the event, panel leaders presented their group's conclusions to a panel of more than 50 senior leaders, including the Chief of Staff of the Army. The discussion and dialogue that took place among panel participants and the senior leaders highlighted some ideas and generated additional insight. Following the senior leader dialogue, the panels reconvened to reflect on and discuss the implications of the morning's discussions on the conclusions they had reached during the seminar.

Event Outcome

This event report focuses primarily on the panel discussions, foreign liaison officers' luncheon, Senior Panel discussion, and emerging insights. Because of the non-attribution policy of UQ, specific quotes are not attributed to panel participants, with the exception of the Chief of Staff of the Army's comments at the Senior Panel discussion. The report gives particular emphasis to the results of the panels' discussions on the key attributes, but only reflects what was stated in the panels themselves. No post-processing, research, or similar modification has intentionally altered the intent of the

participants' comments, thereby maintaining the intellectual integrity of the panel and its members to the greatest degree possible.

The outcomes from this event reflect the scope and focus of panel discussions due to event design including the space and time available for panel deliberations. Qualitative data collected is limited by the selection and availability of event participants, their participation in panel deliberations, and the ability of analysts to accurately record observations of panel discussions.

Examination of the Profession of Arms Key Attributes

Overview

Four panels in the seminar were tasked to examine the Profession of Arms key attributes for accuracy, comprehensiveness, and strengths and weaknesses within the context of DOTMLPF-P. Panel 1 focused on the perspective of the individual (practitioner of the Profession of Arms), Panel 2 that of units and organizations (where the Profession of Arms is practiced), and Panels 3 and 4 focused on the perspective of the institution (bureaucracy of the practice of the Profession of Arms).

Multiple panels suggested that when the current list of attributes is finally agreed upon, the Army Values, Creed, and Ethos should also be reviewed in order to provide a framework in which all these concepts were ordered. This would help to identify and remove duplication and redundancy.

Several panels addressed the issue of when a person becomes a Soldier, and when the Soldier becomes a professional. It is interesting to note that in the Army, even in basic training, recruits are always referred to as Soldiers. In the Marines and Air Force, it is different – Marines are referred to as “recruits” or “candidates.” While some participants felt that calling a Soldier “Soldier” from the beginning created a sense of inclusion and was positive, others felt that it created a sense of entitlement and was negative. Panel 1’s recommendation was that all enter the profession upon taking the oath. Increasing levels of expertise and responsibility are cultivated and certified along the professional trajectory.

The question of “who is and is not a member of the Profession of Arms?” carried throughout the Seminar. Is a Department of the Army civilian part of the Profession of Arms, or is it limited to Soldiers? If only the Soldiers – is it all Soldiers? While panels were encouraged to postpone the discussion since it was beyond the scope of the seminar and their specific tasks, the question continued to arise. During the Senior Panel discussions, a participant asked the CSA for his thoughts. The CSA replied that he was not prepared to offer a definitive answer. He stated that he wanted the Profession to be “inclusive,” but that the Army needs to “think its way through [the question].”

ARFORGEN came up numerous times in multiple panels, which all arrived at a similar conclusion that ARFORGEN is both a strength and a weakness. However, ARFORGEN is simply the Army’s organizational reaction to a requirement; the root

causes are better described as the policy, procedure, and practice adopted by the Army when force generation requirements resulted in the decision to adopt a cyclic readiness model over the previously practiced tiered readiness model. The examination of the key attributes below details unforeseen negative consequences of current force generation policies and practices.

Expertise ↔ Skill

As defined in *The Army Profession of Arms White Paper*, the Army's expertise is the specialized skill to build, to advise on, and to ethically apply lethal land combat power under Joint Command for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of offense, defense, and stability and/or civil support.

While it may be clear what expertise means when applied to the individual, it is less clear when applied to the unit or the institution. It is also unclear what expertise means when applied to full spectrum operations. Is the expertise needed to hand out meals ready to eat (MREs) in Haiti the same expertise that is needed to conduct major combat operations? How does the Army define expertise? Panel 3 asserted that the Army should consider, in particular, the unique expertise it has of the *lethal* and *ethical* application of combat power.

Furthermore, multiple panels discussed ARFORGEN in the context of expertise, concluding that one of its weaknesses is the way it limits the ability of units to retain proficiency in mission sets and readiness. Force generation practices, policies, and procedures driven by operational demands (frequent deployments) have resulted in a compressed cycle of building, employing, and dispersing the people that make up a unit. This challenged the unit's ability to form teams that harness individual expertise into collective task accomplishment. The deliberate centralized top-down driven processes employed in the generation of forces have removed the requirement for officers to develop and manage unit training. As timing permits, the opportunities, responsibility, and authority to do this should be pursued to push down to unit leaders.

At one point in their discussions, Panel 3 proposed replacing "skill" with "competence," explaining that competence is a better word, since it implies how the Army applies its skills over time. It also proposed adding "learning" as an additional attribute, but eventually agreed that learning is already covered under expertise.

Panel 4 recommended changing the attribute of skill to "expert." The proposed new definition is as follows:

"Professional – Skill – The skill of the professional Soldier is an expert in the capability to ethically and effectively apply the profession's expertise as part of a team or unit. The professional Soldier's skill evolves with rank and position and is drawn from all four knowledge domains of the profession of arms: military-technical, moral-ethical, human development, and political-cultural. Individual certification in such skills, both of competence and character, is essential for the Army to remain a trusted and effective profession."

Service ↔ Duty

In at least one panel, when the participants thought of adding additional attributes to the key attributes, it came to realize that most of them already encompass the qualities the new attribute sought to cover. For instance, Panel 3 suggested adding “fortitude,” “toughness,” and “tenacity,” but realized these were already covered under duty. However, some attributes may be more highly prioritized than others. Panel 3 recommended elevating “service” for the profession and “duty” for the professional to the top of the list, reasoning that these are the most important attributes, and those from which all others should logically flow.

Panel 2 had a much different discussion on service, however. The participants in that panel asserted that there is a current anecdotal trend for a self entitlement mentality. This potentially originates from a number of areas, the first of which is the continuing devaluation of public service in American society. People are no longer as willing to give of themselves as a public servant. The panel’s observation was that fewer members of the population value service to the nation on a personal level. One of the biggest implications for the Army is in the way it recruits Soldiers. Instead of appealing to a core value of service, the Army must adapt and offer incentives to the individual Soldier. This has already begun to manifest itself in the way the Army recruits.

The panel also offered anecdotal evidence of Soldiers being unwilling to accept or take positions that do not meet their immediate needs, and of officers refusing command opportunities. This “self-centered” sentiment was echoed in Panel 3 with a discussion of instructor positions not being “desirable.” The panel noted the disproportionate number of civilian instructors to military instructors. Although the civilians dominate, they have over 5,000 years of experience; however, other participants felt that overall, the Army is inadequate (in terms of credentials) at the major schools and has a lack of qualified personnel as instructors.

On a positive note, most participants seemed to feel that even after nine years of war the idea of service to the nation is functioning well overall as Soldiers prepare for deployment and execute their mission. All cohorts within a unit understand the sacrifices that are required in defense of the Nation. It was felt that *service to the nation* should be elevated to the top of the list of attributes since it is the most important attribute in being a Soldier and a professional.

Panel 1 felt that “duty” needed to be expounded upon. What actions follow under duty? Although the current definition mentions the “robust concept of duty,” participants wanted to know what that meant, specifically.

Values ↔ Character

Panel 2 asserted that although the current set of Army values is well understood and supported at the unit level, using values as a single teaching point or metric misses the broader requirement for the profession. As the Army moves forward into the future, and into new and different challenges, values alone may not be sufficient to sustain the moral and legal foundations of the Army’s Ethic. This panel used the example of loyalty in a street gang and within the Army. While members of a military unit and members of

a street gang may both exhibit loyalties, the consequences of such loyalty are very different. American society is continually changing, and there is a widening gap between Army and societal values. This realization caused more than one panel to question if the Army values are still the “correct” values, or, if they are as “useful as they could be in their current form.” One of the panels also suggested the Army should dedicate more time and effort to support the moral development of its warriors.

The values/character attributes also caused multiple panels to touch on the politicization of the retired officer corps, and the role politics plays in the military in general. Although there was never a clear conclusion out of the panels on what the answer to this issue should be, this issue has been brought up at previous UQ events as well. While it is clear that the military is held to a higher standard, the pool from which the military draws its members is society at large. Left unaddressed were questions such as: If there are significant differences in the values of the profession of arms and the values of the society from which it draws its members, why is that the case? What are the differences, and what are the implications for the Army?

Trust ↔ Trust

Panel 3 spent additional time in panel discussing candor after the topic was raised during the plenary keynote address. The participants felt strongly about candor being an essential value, and part of the attributes, though never recommended candor as an addition; rather, they felt that it was encompassed under trust, and that “trust would not be possible without candor.” That idea also linked the panel to the concept of the profession self-policing, which was a topic also mentioned in Panel 1. There, the participants felt it was a matter of trust with the public, where the public trusts the military to police itself, but a slip of that trust could have deep impacts.

Panel 1 also discussed risk and its interplay with trust. They felt that especially in decentralized operations, commanders must be willing to trust their subordinates and also to underwrite some of the risk they are taking. This is not to suggest that Soldiers should be foolish, but more that if a Soldier makes an honest mistake, his commander should not necessarily force the Soldier to bear the full burden of that mistake alone.

Panel 2 also brought up the weakness of ARFORGEN in the context of trust, stating that the modularity hurts unit level trust. In other words, the unit cohesion gets lost through modularity and ARFORGEN, which damages any trust the unit may have previously developed.

Panel 1 suggested changing the professional attribute of trust to instead read “trustworthy.” Their new definition thus read:

“Professional – Trustworthy – Army professionals must be worthy of the trust placed in them by the American people. This requires the ethical conduct of our Soldiers and civilians and their shared confidence that all will fulfill their obligations. Army leaders must embody and constantly foster such trust to inspire Soldiers and civilians to become expert and professional.”

Development ↔ Leadership

Multiple panels mentioned the 95%+ promotion rates for officers to Lieutenant Colonels. One panel identified this as a weakness, while another questioned the type of message it sends. Related to this, numerous panels discussed PME and its especially devalued role due to the high OPTEMPO of the current conflicts. Conversely, promotions boards have disproportionately valued operational experience, and the resulting message is that education is “less valuable,” and less likely to influence assignments or promotions. PME is often deferred. Even when it is not, participants asserted that it lacks the rigor it needs. One participant shared his perception that, barring any egregious conduct, students are able to simply show up and know that they will pass.

Panel 3 identified a list of problems which relate to the Profession of Arms and development and leadership: high suicide rate (higher per capita than society at large), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), high divorce rate, high rates of attrition, almost half of accessions into officer corps are through OCS, and high attrition of junior officers. Some participants shared anecdotal evidence that these issues are an institution-wide problem, and multiple participants shared stories of the disconnection between Soldiers and their leadership. While the participants listed these issues and accepted them as negative, the panel did not expound further upon them. These panel members felt the disconnection was the cause of Soldiers not getting the attention or, in some cases, the discipline they need. The panel leader also suggested that “discipline” may be added as a value to help address the issue.

In their discussion on development, Panel 1 concluded that “development” is too narrow an attribute for the profession. They suggested changing the profession’s attribute of “development” to “stewardship” for the profession and “leadership” for the professional. Thus the new definitions read:

“Profession – Stewardship – The fundamental requirements of the profession are the continual creation and sustainment of expert knowledge, expert practice, and the development of citizens into Soldiers and Soldiers into leaders of military competence and moral character. Stewardship ensures that the Army is always prepared to meet promptly and effectively the security needs of the American people, particularly through periods of transition.”

“Professional – Leadership – Army leaders are the stewards of the profession. At every level, they must demonstrate strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, high moral character, and serve as role models. Army leaders must act decisively, to accomplish the mission within the intent and purpose of superiors, and in the best interest of the profession. Army leaders must develop cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual attributes in themselves and others through progressive and sequential coaching, teaching, and mentoring.”

Suggested Addition: Indomitable ↔ Resilient

Originally, Panel 3 had discussed adaptable for the professional and agile for the profession, although the panel seemed to agree that the overarching attribute was learning. However, although the discussion to do so happened apart from the panel, during the senior leader discussion the panel leader briefed a suggestion to add

“indomitable” to the profession and “resilient” to the professional. The reason given was that a doctor can lose a patient even if he does all the right things, and it is okay – he is still a doctor. For the Army, as a Profession, losing a war is unacceptable to the Nation. So, linking back to the Army Ethos, as an institution the Army needs an attitude of not accepting defeat. The Panel 3 leader stated, “That is what we tried to capture in that word. It may be the wrong word, but it conveys the idea we want to capture which wasn’t in that original list.” The thought was to pair resilient with indomitable because the professional Soldiers the Army needs in order to be unbeatable have to be resilient.

Foreign Liaison Officers’ Luncheon

On the second day of the seminar, the Chief of Future Warfare Division hosted a luncheon with the TRADOC Foreign Liaison Officers (FLO) to explore the larger discussion of the Profession of Arms. FLOs from seven partner nations attended. This discussion revealed a number of insights on how the discussion surrounding the profession of arms is developing in other countries.

Other countries are examining the profession of arms, but the result of their examinations varies widely. One FLO stated that the military environment is the “best regarded organization in [his] country,” while a second representative from that country echoed the thought by saying that “people are staying on because the conditions of service have become markedly improved” and “there is a strong sense that it is a profession, it is elitist.” Another country is content with the level of public approval, though they admit it is less than that enjoyed by those in the US. They are also observing what the US does in this campaign and the effectiveness of the results – will the Soldiers buy into it, or will it remain more ethereal? Others are more focused on the political military relationship, ethics, and ethical issues.

Effective strategic communications tends to improve a Western society’s understanding of and appreciation for the military as an institution. One army achieved a more favorable public image four to five years ago when senior officers began to speak out forcefully, while another army gained popular support by honestly depicting its successful operations abroad. Yet a third maintained a positive image by aggressively and publicly punishing a unit that murdered a Somali man in the early 1990s during the humanitarian relief mission in Somalia.

Participants explored the possibility that there is a stark contrast between the different services in regards to the profession of arms. While some militaries have a distinction, others have one military ethic for all services. In addition, multiple countries mentioned the inextricable link between societal and military values.

In other Western armies, military ethics is a more widespread and better developed concept than “profession of arms.” Many armies share many of the same or similar attributes or values. However, the key attributes appropriate for one military may be unsuitable for another. For instance, one FLO felt that “reliability and trustworth[iness]” would be accurate, “selfless service” is probably a step too far. Participants in the luncheon felt the explicit listing of military values is important for morale and motivation as younger generations enter military service in the West. One FLO described a culture

changing from an order of “jump” receiving a “yes sir, how high?” to now one of explaining the benefits of jumping and the results of achieving those benefits. However, the origin of this culture shift is unclear, especially because this Army also utilizes conscription.

Senior Panel Discussions

On the final day of the Seminar, all participants gathered as part of a dialogue between the panel leaders (who briefed the results of their panels), the participants, and senior Army leaders (including the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander of the Combined Arms Center).

The dialogue produced multiple observations listed below; some of which sparked further discussion when the panels reconvened in the afternoon:

Toxic Command Climate

During Panel 3’s outbrief, the topic of “toxic command climates” surfaced. The term “toxic command climates” had been brought up during the panel’s discussions about candor following the guest speaker’s plenary presentation. A participant suggested candor and two-way communication between subordinates and senior commanders as a way to avoid a “zero-defects, risk-averse Army.” Another challenged that approach, pointing out that putting candor on a list of values is not going to eliminate this problem. The use of 360-degree evaluations as a way for commanders to look at themselves was also offered.

One senior participant expressed the opinion that it would be useful to red-team the Army as a profession by investigating what it would take to destroy or critically damage the profession. Noting that in every environment there is toxic leadership, he pondered the root cause of a toxic climate. He wondered if it was just that the Army had been at war for nearly 10 years, or was it an absence of professional military development. When leaders stop leading, he observed, when they stop having the discipline and stop treating people with dignity, respect, fairness and consistency then the result is a degradation in the climate of the unit and ultimately of the profession. He asked if this was because the Army has stopped developing its future leaders as some claim. When the Army allows its leaders to selectively disregard orders, he pointed out, then it is establishing a culture of disobedience and that culture of disobedience attacks the profession. At the end of the day, he concluded, if the Army does not allow its commanders to use their judgment to develop their junior leaders so they can become senior leaders, then the Army has a problem.

Both Panel 1 and Panel 3 re-addressed this topic in their afternoon sessions following the Senior Panel discussions. Panel 1’s participants offered a plethora of theories with a myriad number of causes for toxic leadership, both real and perceived. Some felt it was more a function of not caring. Others felt it was personality, unsuitability, or lack of preparation and qualification for the leadership role. Differing generational perspectives on accountability and tolerance of criticism were also offered as possible contributing factors – perhaps more towards the perception of toxic leadership than a true toxic

leader. One member of the panel made the key observation that there is a spectrum of leadership that runs from toxic, abusive, ineffective, to incompetent.

The discussion in Panel 3 revealed that participants thought toxic leadership is on an upswing and decidedly contagious, but not necessarily pervasive. The panel agreed that minimizing toxic leadership is important for the Army, and many seemed to agree with one member's assertion that leaders can and should be fired, but that no one will do so. Leaders in the Abu Ghraib scandal, for instance, were simply "moved on." This is in contrast to the US Army during WWII, when Eisenhower had no problem firing leaders, and it did not kill their careers afterwards, because they were sent back to the US for training and got another chance.

Professional Military Education

Many of the panels noted the current lack of, and strain on, PME caused by the OPTEMPO the Army is experiencing. Panel 3 briefed that PME overall lacks the rigor it deserves. A very senior Army leader acknowledged the issue of trying to "jam people into a leader development paradigm that [the Army] had when [it] was not at war." He also countered by saying that "ARFORGEN is a reality and the necessity of doing combat tours is a reality." He also stated that "Every one of those leaders who [the Army is] not certifying because they are not going through school is getting promoted through evaluation every day in the cauldron of combat. That, to me, is not necessarily a bad certification."

Panel 1 discussed these comments further in their afternoon session. One person stated that the profession needs to be intentional about its educational goals and its system for achieving them. We should not just adjust to current circumstances, as this will put us in a continuous state of change. Another person said that he interpreted the Chief's comments differently. He heard a challenge to the institutional Army to have some of the agility to adapt to circumstances that the Army is requiring of individuals. It was not a matter of not valuing PME but simply a challenge to adjust to the reality the Army confronts.

Panel 3's discussion of PME in the afternoon session again reiterated their belief that, if the Army is going to be truly introspective in this campaign, PME (specifically officer training) needs to be more rigorous.

Panel 4 discussed the issue of risk, in the context of preparing the Army for the next transition. The panel, while agreeing with the value of experience gained in combat, also noted that any shortfall of PME might have an adverse effect as individuals rise to positions of greater responsibility. The Army should therefore seek to identify ways to mitigate this risk now; failure to do so might have significant consequences in the medium to long term.

The Four C's: Courage, Candor, Competence, and Commitment

The CSA commented that the discussion during the senior dialogue, and the Army White Paper, reminded him of the four leadership values: courage, candor, competence, and commitment (the four Cs). One CSM made a suggestion of possibly

going back to the four Cs. Although the CSA specifically mentioned that he is *not* directing to bring them back, he felt the Army should think about them, especially as they relate to expertise and strength of character.

Regarding this topic, Panel 4 observed that Army Values have evolved since their inception in 1997. For instance, candor probably crosses particular values of integrity and courage. If this is the case, then perhaps the acrostic of “The Four C’s” needs refinement (there is no ‘C’ in leadership).

Making the Concepts of Values and Attributes Applicable to Soldiers

One CSM made a comment during the dialogue that in order to get buy-in from the junior leadership and Soldiers in the Army, the values and attributes have to be applicable. Changes must be relevant, relatable and tangible. Leadership is going to have to bring the concept down to reality and to the Soldier’s level in order for them to understand it. Furthermore, another participant echoed this sentiment by saying that if his Soldiers get an e-mail from CAPE, they are more likely to ignore it than if it comes directly from someone they know in their chain of command.

Expertise and Strength of Character

In his closing remarks, the CSA summarized the two main points coming out of the White Paper and the Senior Panel dialogue. He identified the first as expertise. Expertise, he said “Separates the Professional from everyone else.” The second was strength of character. He said he thought they are the two fundamental aspects of being a professional. Regarding strength of character, he said:

“[It] covers a wide, wide range of the attributes and values that we talked about. It is the ability to do the right thing when the going gets tough. Whether it’s having the candor to tell your boss when he is wrong, whether it’s having the courage to commit to battle when you know there will be significant loss of life, or the courage to commit two or three decades of service to this country. Another thing about strength of character is that it allows you to apply lethal force ethically and morally. I always try to boil things down to the simplest parts, and as I thought about it, I realized that expertise and strength of character. When we first started off with the Center for the Professional Military Ethic up at West Point three or four years ago, one of the things that was driving me to focus on this was the complexity of the operations our Soldiers face today. If you don’t have a strong moral compass or strong moral character going into these operations, the ethical dilemmas presented to you will tie you in knots. Again, though, it all goes back to strength of character.”

Several participants in Panel 3 quickly raised the “strong moral compass” comment into the afternoon conversations. Most participants seemed to agree with CSA’s basic premise, as well as the anecdotal evidence that Soldiers are currently exhibiting a strong moral compass. However, there was an assertion that the US Army does not currently subscribe to a moral theory as an institution. This sparked a great deal of debate. Panel 3 was largely divided on this subject of an objective guideline for a Soldier’s morality. Does it currently exist? If so, where? What is it based on? Where does it come from? Similarly, Panel 4 participants asked, “How does a values-based organization drive the moral development of its professionals?”

Panel 3 participants offered various suggestions. One suggested, simply, “Attend Sunday school.” Another countered by saying that, although it would be possible to ground the Army’s ethics in, essentially, Judeo-Christian morality, not every Soldier is a Christian, and the US Army cannot make them so. Another participant disagreed completely with the premise that the US Army does not already have this moral guideline. His assertion was that the US Constitution is the moral compass that guides the Army and the actions of Soldiers, and the source from which their morality is derived. One member of the panel also suggested that doctrine should cover the “strong moral compass,” since doctrine is the basis for training.

Emerging Issues

During the seminar, several issues emerged which were common across multiple panels including the Senior Panel discussions. These emerging issues, developed in the Integration and Analysis panel and covered below, will be further examined as appropriate during the remaining UQ11 events, and potentially addressed during the Senior Leader Seminar in April.

Effects of Modularity and ARFORGEN on the Force

When considering the attributes of the Profession of Arms and those professionals that compose this profession across the cohorts, a common thread emerged that has a potential corrosive effect on the profession. The Army has been in sustained combat operations in two countries for nearly a decade. Unlike previous generations in which the Army has undergone a significant buildup of forces to meet the threat, today’s Army was faced with waging this war with the forces it already had. To meet the demands of a protracted war, the Army undertook a massive transformation in the way that it organized combat formations, switching from a division-oriented structure to one built around the idea of “plug and play” modular Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs).

The Army also changed the method in which it generated combat forces for deployment. For nearly thirty years before the operational demands of current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army had maintained a tiered approach to readiness – maintaining certain organizations such as the XVIII ABN Corp and supporting bases at higher level of readiness capable of responding to contingency requirements. To meet a constant demand for a relatively higher percentage of the force over an extended time required a new readiness approach built around a cyclic model. This enabled the Army to use all forces and stationing bases to generate the necessary forces and power to support combat demands. ARFORGEN is a success because of how it synchronizes training, new equipment fielding, personnel, and helped to create modularity. It allows the Army to meet the challenge by integrating doctrine strength into the refit and rest cycle. Modularity is also a strength because it allows the Army to meet diverse mission requirements. While the combination of these two changes has enabled the Army to meet its Title 10 responsibilities, there have been several unintended consequences that have a potentially negative effect on the sustainment of the Profession and the professional force. There are three factors that must be monitored and mitigated in order to maintain the standards of the Profession.

1. **Unit Cohesion:** Under the previous models of readiness, Combat Divisions maintained organizational integrity and habitual relationships with subordinate and higher level elements. The organizations were built and trained to deploy and fight together. Over a period of time a steady but controlled turnover was planned for and accounted for. This allowed units to maintain unit cohesion and esprit de corp. A core NCO leadership that often grew up in that unit upheld organizational standards and traditions. Under modularity/ARFORGEN, BCTs are generated for deployment, deployed, and then literally disbanded after redeployment. This lack of continuity has had a definitive effect on unit cohesion and garrison effectiveness.
2. **Trust:** The Army's decision to embrace modularity and the ARFORGEN model has affected the attribute of trust between command echelons. Division HQs will deploy with BCTs with which it does not have a training/habitual relationship. The traditional relationships of higher level commanders being able to mentor and assess lower level commanders no longer exist. This point also surfaced during UQ09. Commanders at all levels are now thrown into combat having to not only execute missions but they must grapple with how to develop a working relationship and trust under the stress of operations.
3. **Development:** Closely related to the trust factor are the challenges of developing leaders/professionals under the current OPTEMPO. Because dwell times are nominal coupled with a "can do" culture that places a premium on being in the fight, getting young leaders in the PME courses that will be needed to develop potential has become a challenge for the institutional Army. In terms of training, ARFORGEN's weakness is that it stipulates how training should be carried out and does not let officers (company and battalion commanders) develop their own training management skills and experience. Because experience has taken precedence over education in the journey towards professional certification, there is fear that the Army's culture may become anti-intellectual. Some participants emphasized that a lack of opportunity for self-reflection and assessment that PME offers may be a contributing factor to a perceived trend of toxic command environments.

The Effect of a Transition to a Garrison Force

By 2015 it is possible that the US Army's presence in Afghanistan will be substantially smaller than it is today and, as a result, the Army will have evolved into a largely CONUS-based "garrison force" that is similar to the Army of the mid-1990s. This transition, if it occurs, will affect the service's vision of what it means to be a member of the profession of arms.

The last nine years of war have created a vision of the profession of arms where proficiency is largely defined by a Soldier's operational skills and leadership capability in combat environments. PME has been heavily deemphasized as experience became the dominant pillar of Army professional development. Perhaps most importantly, the skills required to manage a unit and its personnel during a prolonged stay at home station have atrophied greatly since the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

If the Army does end up transitioning to the posture of a garrison force, professional proficiency for unit commanders and senior NCOs could be defined very differently than it is today. Metrics such as the safety record during weapons training, the number of disciplinary infractions among junior enlisted personnel, the quality of equipment maintenance, the number of junior officers attending PME, the completeness of personnel records and paperwork, and the unit's readiness rating could become the main indicators of professional proficiency. The quality of the training in military ethics given to all Soldiers in a unit will also rise in importance as an indicator. Even as the vision of the meaning of the profession of arms changes, unit commanders and senior NCOs will have to keep their Soldiers prepared to perform well in a combat environment on short notice. This transition will create new and challenging demands for the Army's combat and combat support branch officers.

The speed and effectiveness with which the Army adjusts to the new vision of the profession of arms will go a long way towards determining how strong and vibrant the notion of the military profession will be in a future garrison force.

Military Values and the Cultural Aspect

Both the nation and the military have long histories and traditions that have shaped and forged their values. By virtue of its mission, the military's values are based on a different set of cultural and ethical norms that are not present in all areas of our nation. Soldiering is a violent profession. Soldiers, by the very nature of their profession, must be willing to take the life of another. However, no such requirement exists in American society.

As the Army shifts a larger percentage of members to a garrison environment, a different cultural divide may emerge among those who served in combat zones and those who did not. A similar divide emerged following Desert Storm; a relatively short conflict, but one involving nearly half of the Army serving in uniform at the time. A question will arise regarding the technical competence of those who did not formally attend PME during the war. Part of the curriculum that is taught involves actions not directly related to the application of force or combat related norms. The future of the Army as a result of ten plus years of conflict is unknown. Adaptability will be the key to success in the future as well.

As the Army continues to adapt to this new reality, a change in how the Army recruits, trains, retains, and approaches Comprehensive Soldier Fitness will be critical in sustaining the profession over time. It is critical that the Army begin to address these issues prior to the final withdrawal of Soldiers from the combat zone.

Effects of Expediency and Short Term Tradeoffs on the Force

The environment of expedience was a common thread of discussion among participants. While some identified this as a weakness, at least one panel recognized that the ability of the profession to adapt to meet the needs of the Nation was a strength; and many of the cited "expediencies" were, in fact, the adaptations required to meet those needs. In the end, the participants recognized that it is important to

understand any unintended consequences of the adaptations, what impact they might have going forward, and any future risk they create so the Army can make corrections and mitigate the risks.

Two examples of the necessary adaptations that emerged during this event were Modularity and cyclical readiness (often collectively referred to by participants as ARFORGEN). These significant adaptations have served well in providing trained and ready forces for the current fights, but there is concern that ARFORGEN creates barriers to trust and cohesion, especially among units outside of the BCT structure. Participants in the Senior Panel further cited “by-name” staffing requests as an adaptation intended to mitigate the trust issues cited above. Although the first concern is primarily one of current effectiveness, the second has significant risk of future consequences on the Army as a profession. Soldiers are requested by name for repeated operational assignments based on proven operational competence. Others, who may be equally competent, may not have the opportunity to prove themselves in key operational roles. As the Army selects those it will advance and retain, it risks eliminating talent that has remained unproven.

Cohort leads within the Profession of Arms Campaign should assess the impact of recent adaptations on the professionals in their respective cohorts in order to identify risks to the profession. For each risk they identify, cohort leads (in coordination with the associated attribute leads) should develop and recommend mitigation strategies and measures of effectiveness.

Balancing Candor and Loyalty

The current era of nearly ten years of persistent conflict has been a rousing, inspirational work – entrusted to the Profession of Arms by the nation. One positive result of this challenge has been the tremendous loyalty manifested by military service members to their nation, their leaders and their organizations. A dark side to this loyalty, however, is that it may come at the cost of candor, encouraging Soldiers to close ranks to keep internal corruption under wraps rather than candidly air their concerns.

Panels devoted considerable discussion to the inclusion of “candor” as an Army value or attribute to balance this perceived shortfall. Candor is a more complex concept in today’s operating environment than it was when originally embraced as one of the four leadership competencies in the Army of the 1980s. In the current context of decentralized operations in the social media age, candor necessitates trusting our service members with the discretion to regulate what information they convey to the world, intentionally or otherwise.

An additional challenge is applying candor at the strategic level-- senior leaders must advise the civilian administration on the use and commitment of armed forces, under the scrutiny of today’s transparent media environment, making the perception that military leaders act as advisors rather than advocates of a specific course of action more essential than in past conflicts. The trend away from remaining apolitical among retired general officers further enhanced the need to temper candor with the traditional

constraints associated with military professionalism reflecting the subordination of the armed forces to their civilian masters.

Candor and loyalty have a utility to the profession of arms; they are not optional behaviors and were identified as essential to the moral and ethical application of armed force. In the profession of arms, Soldiers carrying out their duties with professionalism earns the trust of the client, the American people; professionalism requires the discretion to artfully manifest and balance the tension between candor and loyalty.

Conclusions and Way Ahead

This event generated a number of insights on the Army Profession of Arms which will help meet CSA's UQ11 key task of: "Determine Army Leader Development implications from the Army Concept Framework and provide interim solution strategies to ensure the right mix of training, education, and experience for all leaders." The combination of panel discussions, the foreign liaison officer luncheon, plenary time, and the Senior Panel discussions all contributed to identifying important implications for the key attributes, as well as for strengths and weaknesses across DOTMLPF-P. Although the seminar yielded both positive and negative aspects of the Profession of Arms, the simple fact that the Army is being introspective is a great deed in itself. As CSA said in his closing remarks, "[Army] culture – and this is a positive part – will cause us to focus on the negative because we want to fix everything and make it perfect. Therefore, I am glad we are focusing on the plusses and the minuses. No other organization could accomplish what [the Army has] accomplished over the last decade." The participants resoundingly agreed.

TRADOC will oversee a series of quarterly Army-wide Profession of Arms forums to discuss feedback received during the review and several conferences will focus on the Profession to encourage dialogue within the force. An interim assessment for the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army in June will include results from a series of studies, surveys, focus groups, historical analysis of the profession, and grass-roots dialogue to assess key attributes such as the Army's expertise, service, trust, values, and human and leader development. Assessments will occur across the Active, Reserve, and National Guard forces, and across Soldier, non-commissioned officer, officer, warrant officer, and civilian cohorts. A dialogue will be conducted across the force to inspire and engage Army professionals through professional development discussions. A final report on the dialogue, an assessment update, and recommendations to reinforce the Profession of Arms will be provided to the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army in December 2011. By the end of 2011 the Army hopes to have learned enough to clearly articulate what is foundational to the Army as a profession.

Future Warfare Division will provide the seminar results to the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic for incorporation into the Review of the Army Profession in an Era of persistent Conflict.

In addition to the Army-wide Profession of Arms campaign, some of the themes emerging from this event will be carried forward and incorporated into the design and execution of the UQ11 Combined Arms Maneuver and Wide Area Security Operations Wargame in February and the Homeland Operations Wargame in March 2011. Some themes will be carried forward and influence the design and conduct of the UQ12 Future Game.

Profession of Arms Seminar

11 – 13 January 2011



Panel One ***INDIVIDUAL***



Panel Paper

Panel Participants

BG Mathews	Commandant, ADA School (Panel Leader)
LTC Clinton Marquardt	Initial Military Training - Enlisted
Mr. Lon Flurer	Warrant Officer Career Course
Ms. Natalie Lui Duncan	ACU
Prof. James Kievit	Army War College
Mr. Bob Kiser	Command and General Staff College
CH (MAJ) Larry Dabeck	Command and General Staff College
LTC Bill Speier	Center for the Army Profession and Ethic
Dr. Jon Falleson	Center for Army Leadership
LTC Michael Kiene	Army Corps of Engineers
Mr. Michael D. Burke	CADD – Operational Level Doctrine
Dr. Bruce Avolio	Univ. of Washington, (CAPE Rep)
MAJ Ed Cox	USMA/Dept. of Soc. Sci.
MSG Julie Gurreo	USASMA Student
LTC Anthony Adrian	NGB
COL Keith George	Accessions CMD
SGM Patrick Fensom	USASOC
CDR Philip Emanuel	US Navy
Mr. Dom Dilulio	US Coast Guard
Lt Col Ian Astley	MN Partner - UK
COL Jan Kruidenier	MN Partner - NL
SGM Garrett Savard	USAR G-35
COL Fitz Fitzpatrick	USAJFKSWSC
LTC (P) Glenn Waters	USMA/SCPME
BG (R) Nick Jans (Wed. only)	Australian Defence College
Mr. Warren Fontenot	Facilitator
Mr. Ron Davids	Paper Writer
Mr. Charles Holden	US JFCOM Analyst
MAJ Hotaling	SMDC Analyst
Wanda Majors	CAPE
Mr. Terry Johnson	ARCIC HD
Ms. Jenn Swartz	Rappourteur

“It is crucial that our military leaders understand leadership as a social skill, rather than a logical or mathematical-based, decision making one.”

Black Hearts: A Study in Leadership, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Christopher, PhD., U.S.Army, Retired

Background and Introduction

In October 2010, at the Association of the United States Army Convention, the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. George Casey, announced the initiation of a year-long campaign to study the Profession of Arms. This campaign is designed to be a comprehensive review to examine the state of the Army profession after a decade of war in order to make recommendations for changes to Army policies and programs to strengthen the institution. The campaign has three Lines of Operation (Individual, Organizational, and Institutional) and will involve all the major cohorts comprising the Army. The campaign seeks to leverage the successes of the Army, address weaknesses, and maintain itself as a profession.

Army leadership considers the timing of the study to be critical because, after nine years of combat, it is necessary to reflect objectively on the strengths that have sustained soldiers and also on the challenges that they face as a profession and as individual professionals. Gen. Martin Dempsey, current TRADOC Commander and recently nominated to become the next Chief of Staff of the Army, believes that the Army is in a period of transition. It confronts an era of persistent conflict, while managing the operational requirements of conducting two wars. These situations have also had impact on leader development, so the Army leadership needs to examine its status as a profession and also the way it is developing leaders of character. During this campaign, the Army also intends to discuss its commitment to education, efforts to sustain the bond of trust between the Army and the American public, and the broader impact of decentralized operations.

Command Sgt. Maj. Frank Grippe, of I Corps at Fort Lewis, Wash., an Institute of Land Warfare panel member, enumerated some of the personal challenges that soldiers and leaders currently face. He included higher suicide rates, higher sexual assault incidents, and higher drug and alcohol abuse. Despite these negative trends, the Army characterizes its professionalism campaign as a proactive one as opposed to being a reaction to any specific problem. This assertion would seem to be supported by the results of the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being survey that was conducted Aug. 1, 2009 – June 15, 2010. This survey revealed that military personnel currently on active duty have a higher well-being index score (71.9) (both in total and in each age group surveyed) than either all US workers (68.9), or employed veterans (67.6). Active duty military personnel who are younger than 45 years of age report considerably less depression and stress than do employed veterans and US workers in general.

A group of military personnel, Department of the Army civilians, foreign liaison officers, and other subject matter experts met at the Booz Allen Hamilton facility January 11th – 13th, 2011 to discuss The Profession of Arms. Participants were provided several

references and reading materials already written about the subject, including the Profession of Arms White Paper, the Army Operating Concept, documents regarding the Profession of Arms Campaign, and the current version of FM 1.0.

Panel 1 was charged with examining the Profession of Arms from the perspective of the individual professional to accomplish three key tasks:

1. Examine the key attributes of the Profession of Arms and assess whether they are an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms and Army Ethos.
2. Determine current strengths across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) as a profession and as professionals. Recommend what should be sustained in order to strengthen the Army (consider all cohorts and key attributes).
3. Determine current weaknesses across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) as a profession and as professionals. Recommend solutions to strengthen the Army.

The Panel began its deliberations by reflecting on Gen Dempsey's assertion that the Army is in a period of transition and managing transitions is one of the most important responsibilities that senior Army leaders have. Major problems do not necessarily have to exist in the Army to require these transitions. Some of the institutional adaptations like ARFORGEN and shifts in the focus of the field of expertise have resulted in the emergence of tensions and frictions that themselves need to be managed. ARFORGEN is an effective mechanism for preparing and deploying brigades, but can have negative effects.

A complete renovation of the institution is not required, but adjustments, rebalancing, and realignments should be considered where appropriate. For example, the sustainment of a high level of professional expertise is in part a function of the quality and experience of the staffs assigned to TRADOC and its schools. In some cases, because of the shortage of qualified instructors and combat developers, the quality of PME has been affected. Over time, high promotion rates, combined with a perception that the priority is on training and that preparing your team, not on military education has resulted in the attitude that PME isn't necessary. One panel member asserted that most senior NCOs will say that PME is very important, but at the same time that NCO will also say that sending candidates to schooling is a challenge that has to compete with a wide range of operational requirements and is difficult to sustain.

Sixty seven percent of the most recent ILE course students were already branch qualified when they arrived at the school. In many cases, this means that the core curriculum is 'old news' – soldiers are being taught things that they have already mastered in the field environment. All of these situations, defacto, result in the diminishing of the perceived value of PME. This has become the case despite the fact that the training curricula for officers, warrant officers, and NCOs have consistently been restructured and improved over the past five years or so, and the Army as a whole is

moving toward more frequent, shorter blocks of professional education and integration of distance learning options. There has been improvement and progress, but it has come at a slower pace than the changes in the operational environment.

The panel reviewed and discussed the draft definitions of the profession of arms and the Army professional soldier. They had no major issues with the definitions as written, but one participant did suggest that the second definition should be broadened to read 'the Army Professional' and not narrowed to just the soldier. The panel leader asked that if there was general agreement on the definitions, does the Army have the right training regimen and support processes to get us where we want to be?

Field Manual 1.0 talks in terms of the Army having to train to meet the greatest threat. It also speaks to a moral dimension, asserting that we go to war over ideas. Are we lacking a Big Idea right now? One member raised the issue that there are some skills that are not currently needed in the circumstances of the operating environment, but they may potentially be required at some point in the future and these skills need to be husbanded in order to be available when the need arises. A discussion ensued on ensuring that we train with respect to full spectrum operations.

Considerable discussion was devoted to the aspect of 'expertise' as crucial to the identity of the Profession of Arms. A majority of this discussion centered on Military-Technical Expertise. The other three categories identified in the White Paper, Human Development Expertise, Moral-Ethical Expertise, and Political-Cultural Expertise, were addressed but much of the discussion seemed to imply that they were separated somehow from the Military-Technical Expertise. Regarding Technical Expertise, the discussion focused on the soldiers technical skills to do his job. Technical proficiency is an evolutionary process and we should not expect new recruits to be professionals upon entry into the military. There is essentially a trajectory for professional development that has both a time and proficiency component, so that the longer a soldier serves, the greater is his capability to perform competently. Professional development for all Soldiers should be progressive and sequential throughout their Army career. One panel member remarked that he was personally surprised, when he consistently encounters Army personnel with ten years of experience who still view their career as 'only a job.' In some instances we try to take a scientific definition of Army professional and attempt to apply it across the full range of social norms.

One member commented that the Army Leader Development Strategy is based on the three pillars of education, training, and experience. The Army has exceptional experience, but the institution cannot mold experience – it just happens. Training has continued because of the operation requirements that units and soldiers face. The education pillar has suffered as a result of the nine years of war.

Ethical expertise focuses on the application of those technical skills on and off the battlefield. It was offered that we need to have soldiers that are not only good in combat but good at doing it all, in and out of combat. A question was raised regarding self

policing...how do we measure ethical conduct? Not all soldiers need to be professionals as long as we have enough professionals to lead, fight and win conflicts. There was a different perspective regarding the military profession in terms of “an Art or a Science” as it relates to technical skills and ethics.

The Civilian cohort does uphold the Constitution, but it does not face the enemy and it does not manage the violence that is Armed Conflict. Professionalizing civilians represents a different set of challenges, in that they do not have the same PME programs or expectations of the requirements for advancement. They typically are hired having a requisite skill set. In a sense, they are hired already developed. Forty percent of the civilians are on a structured career path that is designed to provide advancement within a narrow expertise area, basically a vertical stovepipe. The real weakness is a lack of PME programs for generalists. Comptrollers or acquisition corps programs have a more coherent career progression path. With the civilian cohort, it can be just a job, not a part of the profession of arms and they can still be very effective, but does that make them a professional by our definitions?

The topic of certification or self policing received quite a bit of attention. One participant used the metaphor of ‘keeping the herd healthy by culling the weak out.’ Competition provides an important motivation to make progress on professional development. The overall talent pool will potentially be weaker or less capable without competition. High promotion rates can also potentially reward mediocrity. Another panel member offered that certification doesn’t even occur in some areas of expertise now. Certification gates are unclear or watered down. The criteria is cookie-cutter in nature and it centers around command. This doesn’t support other critical competencies like regional expertise or JIIM except as secondary priorities. Ideally, certification should progress as rank & responsibilities progress.

Task 1: Examine the key attributes of the Profession of Arms and assess whether they are an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms and Army Ethos.

The panel reviewed the key attributes for both the Profession and the Professional. After some initial discussion about possibly adding the attribute of strength to the existing list, the panel began to revise the verbiage associated with the attributes. As indicated below, major revisions were made to each attribute. The attribute of *trust* associated with the professional was modified to read *trustworthy* and the attribute of *development* was changed to *stewardship* for the profession and *leadership* for the professional.



Expertise

(Draft – Predecisional)



PROFESSION

Expertise

The Army’s expertise is its specialized skill to build, to advise on, and to apply lethal and ethical land combat power under Joint Command for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of **combat, security, engagement, and relief/reconstruction**. It is based on the **cumulative expert know-how – both theoretical and practical** – the Army has developed through its history and forms the basis for the development of professional Army Soldiers, civilians, and units.

PROFESSIONAL

Skill

The skill of the professional Soldier is the **capability to ethically and effectively apply the profession’s expertise** as part of a team or unit. The professional Soldier’s skill evolves with rank and position and is drawn from all four knowledge domains of the profession of arms: military-technical, moral-ethical, human development, and political-cultural. Individual **certification** in such skills, both of competence and character, is essential for the Army to remain a trusted and effective profession.



Service

(Draft – Predecisional)



PROFESSION

Service

Under our Constitution the Army exists to **serve the American people** when and where called upon to do so. There is no other reason for its existence. Service in the Army profession means subordination to our civilian authorities, subordination of Army interests to national interests, and subordination of personal needs to the needs of the mission being ready, if need be, to **sacrifice in the defense of the Republic**.

PROFESSIONAL

Duty

Duty is the service each Soldier is ~~voluntarily obliged~~ **committed** to provide through the Army to the **American people**, to their unit, and to each other. **Soldiers and civilians serve with excellence in all they do as they willingly fulfill each of their personal and professional obligations**. It is the robust concept of duty aggressively pursued each day by mature self-motivation that makes a Soldier a professional.



Values

(Draft – Predecisional)



PROFESSION

Values

The values of the Army are those principles, standards, and qualities of intrinsic and special worth to those who serve within the profession of arms. Army values flow from the Founding of our Republic and its evolving national culture and, when melded with the imperatives of military effectiveness, establish the moral and legal foundations of the profession’s Ethic. That Ethic, in turn, inspires and regulates institutional and individual behavior in the application of land combat power.

PROFESSIONAL

Character

Character is a person’s moral and ethical qualities. Building character is the acquisition, internalization, and application of the values, ideals, and beliefs of the Army profession. Well-developed moral character in our Soldiers enables them to act courageously, ethically, and effectively – consistent with the trust of their comrades and the American people, especially in the crucible of mortal conflict. The responsibility for the development of such strength of character rests with the profession, its lead Army values flow from the Founding of our Republic and its evolving national culture, and when melded with the imperative of military effectiveness, they all serve to found our moral and legal foundations. ers, and the individual.



Trust

(Draft – Predecisional)



PROFESSION

Trust

Trust in the profession is the confidence and faith that the American people have in the Army to render its unique service honorably and successfully, including the American people and their representatives, coalition partners, Army families, and the media, among others. This trust of the American people is foremost and the foundation of our professional status. It is earned and sustained by being ethical and effective in what we do as America’s Army and from it flows, in turn, the legitimacy and autonomy we enjoy as a profession to develop and practice our expertise.

PROFESSIONAL

Trustworthy

Army professionals must be worthy of the trust placed in them by the American people. This requires the ethical conduct trust-worthiness of our Soldiers and civilians and their shared confidence, rests in themselves, in their leaders, and in their comrades, that all will fulfill their obligations, to the Nation, the mission, each other, and to the Soldiers’ families. Army leaders must embody and constantly foster such trust to inspire Soldiers and civilians to become expert and professional.



Stewardship

(Draft – Predecisional)



PROFESSION

Stewardship

The fundamental requirements of the profession are the continual creation and sustainment of expert knowledge, expert practice, and the development of citizens into Soldiers and Soldiers into leaders of military competence and moral character. Stewardship ensures that the Army is always prepared to meet promptly and effectively the security needs of the American people, particularly through periods of transition.

PROFESSIONAL

Leadership

Army leaders are the stewards of the profession. At every level, they must demonstrate strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, high moral character, and serve as role models. Army leaders must act decisively, to accomplish the mission within the intent and purpose of superiors, and in the best interest of the profession. Army leaders must develop cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual attributes in themselves and others through progressive and sequential coaching, teaching, and mentoring.

Task 2: Determine current strengths across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) as a profession and as professionals. Recommend what should be sustained in order to strengthen the Army (Consider all LOOs, cohorts and key attributes).

The common threads throughout many of the strengths that were listed were “adaptability and innovation”. Over the course of 9 years in conflict, the Army has learned to be flexible, adaptable and innovative in each DOTMLPF domain when compared to the Army prior to 9/11.

Doctrine

In the area of doctrine, emerging concepts, informed by field experiences and experimentation are incorporated into doctrinal publications in a timely manner. Examples of this include the concept of operational adaptability leading to the development of Mission Command, and the Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design leading to the inclusion of Design in FM 5-0. One member characterized the Army doctrinal development process as introspective, seeking both relevance and validation. He also observed that if doctrine is turned too quickly, then it won’t necessarily coherently inform operational requirements. An additional benefit is that often the Army leads the process of doctrine development to the point that it stimulates both the joint and coalition forces to reevaluate and update their doctrine.

Relating to this, operational lessons learned and field experiences are routinely turned into TTPs. The Army has expanded the officer/NCO leadership capability as a result of the incorporation of SFA requirements, which have enhanced conventional force capabilities.

Organization

Regarding Army organizations, the Army can place people to meet the most pressing needs by raising promotion rates to meet the increased demand. The modular force construct results in Army leaders at large having familiarity and knowledge of a wider range of branches and domains, which also leads to increased confidence in those branches and domains. Organizational re-design initiatives like Company Intelligence Support Teams (CoIST) and Personal Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR) have forced the migration of some capabilities from the operational to the tactical level. This also results in the development of highly qualified soldiers. Additional observations included noting that the competitive program for Command Sergeants Major is working and the establishment of the professional career SES allows for greater capability to execute installation missions and provides continuity.

Training

All soldiers are riflemen and have developed competency in warrior tasks and drills. The process of life-long learning, necessitated by an environment of persistent conflict, capitalizes on Soldier's talents, attributes, and inherent abilities. Institutional programs of instruction have been revised to improve Soldier's ability to operate effectively in the current environment. Blended learning maximizes Soldier potential and unit strength. The civilian education system has been upgraded to improve management and leadership skills.

Material

Better use of the civilian and military contracting, acquisition, science and technology innovation initiatives have resulted in better protection of Soldiers. There is a real focus on getting the best equipment down to the Soldier in a timely manner, Rapid Fielding Initiative, (RFI). Combat modernization has been correctly focused on survivability/protection.

Leadership

The Warrior Ethos of never leaving a fallen comrade has been manifested by the development of programs like the Warrior Transition Unit (WTU), Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) treatment initiatives, and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) treatment initiatives. Leadership effectiveness has increased due to repeated deployments in this era of persistent conflict. Due to the non-linear battlefield and persistent conflict, the opportunities for leadership for female NCOs/Officers have emerged.

Personnel

The Army does a good job of leveraging its values and creating Soldiers of character. Values are codified in doctrine and this both enables and enhances the development of Soldiers. The Army has expanded command and Key Developmental credit opportunities like Security Force Assistance, STB, and Rear Detachments.

Task 3: Determine current weakness across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy as a profession and as professionals, and where points of tension exist now or are perceived to exist in the future, and what elements must be addressed in order to strengthen the Army (across cohorts and key attributes).

Doctrine

Currently, FM-1's description of the professional needs to be expanded to include the Warrant Officer, Corps, Soldiers and possibly civilians. Due to cuts in resourcing for TRADOC/installations has resulted in PME not being developed and updated quickly enough. There also is a need to examine and validate the current values. One proposal was to add initiative to the list, but it is really more of an action that can result from values.

Organization

Because of assured promotion rates, the Army places people where they need them most. This can result in the experience level of the soldier lagging behind their rank or responsibility in some instances. Key instructional and developmental positions are being filled by contractors without current theater experience because soldiers are not available to fill the positions. In general, due to optempo, there has been a loss of unit cohesion, traditions, and identities.

Training

The group identified the largest number of weaknesses in this domain. High optempo and perstempo driven by ARFORGEN degrades the ability and opportunities to properly develop and mentor Soldiers. An unintended consequence of field demands result in PME backlogs and in many cases Soldiers don't feel a compelling reason to attend. Warrant Officers require more PME to prepare them for the full range of responsibilities they face. There is a need to relook mandatory training across all cohorts. Certification programs have been degraded. Certain branches require specific advanced technical training and skill in order to operate independently in the operational environment. New equipment training is not always synchronized with equipment fielding. There is a general need to get back to basics – "the Lost Art of" An oversensitivity to cultural awareness has emerged.

Material

At the Junior Officer level, the Army has lost a basic understanding of property accountability and maintenance procedures. Rapid fielding initiatives have resulted in a loss of standardization and supervision of Soldiers.

Leadership

It is necessary to reevaluate leadership at all levels, for all cohorts, to address systemic problems after nine years at war. Mentorship practices in general have atrophied. Are we becoming out of balance regarding experience, training, and education? Should deployment credit be synonymous with certification?

Personnel

Command tours and KD assignments need clearer definition. The pace of ongoing operations degrades the quality of character education at all levels. Rapid and high promotion rates degrade the profession. Marketing military strengths (IRT ILE) is not effective; this impacts PME attendance. With post-conflict reductions, how does the institution take care of itself and its people?

Facilities

Installation/Army personnel management infrastructure and architecture are insufficient or outdated. Contact with our “client,” the American people has diminished as the Army consolidates its footprint. There is an imperative to manage the growth/contractions/changes associated with BRAC. The example given was the issues arising over where to billet soldiers and their families during building/closing transitions. In some instances soldiers had to be distributed across a number of buildings instead of being able to place unit personnel together.

Policies

ARFORGEN rotations do not support the development or retention of regional expertise. Army IT policies need to be more consumer-friendly. PME is required for major command slating. Does the current company grade OER provide an accurate assessment in terms of developing Junior Officers? NCOER/OER counseling, mentoring and coaching has been degraded through the implementation of automation.

After the panel had completed its list of strengths and weaknesses, the Panel Leader broke the group into two sections and assigned each of them topics to develop “Issue / Discussion / Recommendation” slides. The content of those slides follows:

1. Values

Issue: Do we have the right ones?

Discussion: Some problems may be driven by a value that is lacking, e.g., empathy.

Are they relevant?

Are we missing any?

Are these the ones we want? “A person of...”

Candor

Initiative

Reverence for life

Recommendations: Conduct a study during the campaign year to determine if we have the right Army values.

Thorough examination

What a Soldier must have

Well defined (e.g., honor)

When, where, and how they are internalized and inculcated (trajectory)

How well they are internalized

Education, training, and assessment

2. Professional

Issue: When does a Soldier or DA civilian become a professional?

Discussion: Professionalism is a combination of experience, education, character, judgment, and other characteristics.

Some are inherent and some are trained.

Professions require selection, development, and an ability for self regulation.

This occurs through a lifelong pursuit in leader development.

Managed by career professionals according to established standards.

Recommendation: All enter the profession upon taking the oath. Increasing levels of expertise and responsibility are cultivated and certified along the professional trajectory.

3. Stewardship

Issue: “Development” is too narrow an attribute for the profession.

Discussion:

Build professionals with cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual qualities.

Continual creation and sustainment of expert knowledge and practice

Self regulation

Recommendation: Substitute “Stewardship” for “Development,” as stewardship includes preservation of the full range of attributes.

Conclusion

Panel 1 discussions throughout the seminar thoroughly explored the key attributes of the Profession of Arms and the Professional from the perspective of the individual. The panel recommended revisions to all of the attributes, but most significantly the attribute of *trust* associated with the professional was modified to read *trustworthy* and the attribute of *development* was changed to *stewardship* for the profession and *leadership* for the professional. The panel identified ARFORGEN, Mission Command, and the Army Values as significant strengths of the profession and ARFORGEN, PME/ certification, and the loss of “the Basics” as the significant weaknesses.

END OF PANEL PAPER

ADDENDUM – Final insights and conclusions following Panel Presentations and the Senior Leader Dialogue.

Panel 1 reconvened following the Senior Leader Discussion. Most of the discussion centered around two of the comments made by Gen. Casey. Regarding PME, he at one point stated that the institution should make it easier for soldiers to complete PME, rather than simply revert to the paradigm that existed prior to the nine years of combat. He also stated that he thought that combat was a pretty good form of professional certification.

The panel noted the social component of being exposed to other branches, specialties, and perspectives that results from centralized PME. The difficulty of certifying the uniformity of standards was raised as an issue that arose four to five years ago when there was an extreme backlog of students not being sent to NCOES and the resulting suggestion that combat experience be allowed to serve in lieu of PME certification. One person stated that the profession needs to be intentional about its educational goals and its system for achieving them. We should not just adjust to current circumstances as this will put us in a continuous state of change. Another person said that he interpreted the Chief’s comments differently. He heard a challenge to the institutional Army to have some of the agility to adapt to circumstances that the Army is requiring of individuals. It was not a matter of not valuing PME but simply a challenge to adjust to the reality the Army confronts. In actuality, there are multiple agencies or institutions that are responsible for some phase or piece of career development across the lifecycle of a Soldier. Each of those agencies develops relevant efficiencies and procedures that may or may not be synchronized with the other institutions or phases. No single entity is responsible for total oversight of the process and this in itself potentially leads to some inefficiencies.

Regarding the second comment, panel members reiterated that experience is only one of the pillars of the Leader Development Model. Combat experience and the tasks required in combat are not uniform nor consistent when considering different locations or different time periods. In nearly all cases, the range of tasks required for certification

is broader and more comprehensive than the set of tasks required in combat. Certainly, effectiveness and success in combat provide a key measure of certification, but it should not be the only measure that is used to assess certification.

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Profession of Arms Seminar

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Panel Two ***UNIT / ORGANIZATION***



Panel Paper

Panel Participants

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Dr. Harvey Burgess	ACU
Prof William Braun	SSI, AWC
Mr. Ricky Steele	CGSC
MAJ Pete Jennings	CAPE
Mr. Clark Delavan	CAL
Mr. Mark Smith	ARCIC
COL Scot Ransbottom	USMA G5
CH COL Kenneth Stice	TRADOC Command Chaplain
Mr. Larry Reid	SALT, CAC, LD&E
MAJ Dan Buer	NGB
MSG Jon Gregory	USASMA Student
COL Donald Galli	FORSCOM CDR
CSM Richard Stidley	FORSCOM CSM
COL Robert Whalen	FORSCOM CDR
SGM Ray Devens	FORSCOM SGM
LTC Bruce McKinnon	CAN
LTC Kim Por Kerk	SING
Lt Col Mo Azar	US Air Force
COL Lester Niblock	USMC
COL Amidror Boaz	IDF
COL Mike Schellinger	Dir. USAR AV
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Mr. Ron Clock	Facilitator
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Mr. Pat Slattery	US JFCOM Analyst
Mr. Donald Long	SMDC Analyst
Dr. Lisa Saum-Manning	RAND
Mr. Darren Mathis	Rappporteur

Background and Introduction

“The distinguishing feature of the military profession from other professions is that the level of sacrifice required may be supreme. Lawyers, doctors etc make sacrifices in pursuit of their profession – but are not asked or expected to make that final sacrifice.”³

The Army’s senior leadership recognizes that after ten years of war and the initial redeployment of forces from Iraq, the Army at all levels is entering the initial stages of a transition to a new norm. Whether that is a continuation of the current “era of persistent conflict” or something completely different is irrelevant—a transition is underway. Now is an appropriate time for the Army as an institution to reflect on its collective experience after ten years of war and prepare for the future.

The Army Capstone Concept and Operating Concept identify transitions and the management of effective transitions between operations as critical to mission success. Yet, transitions apply to organizations as well, and how transitions unfold define not only what an organization must address but the directions it can go. How the Army addresses transitions from an institutional perspective will define what and where the organization will go.

Through the lens of the unit/organization, the Panel’s assigned tasks were to:

- Examine the key attributes of the Profession of Arms and assess whether they are an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms and Army Ethos.
- Determine current strengths across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) as a profession and as professionals. Recommend what should be sustained in order to strengthen the Army.
- Determine current weaknesses across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy as a profession and as professionals, and where points of tension exist now or are perceived to exist in the future, and what elements must be addressed in order to strengthen the Army.

Key Attributes

The Panel deferred discussion of the “appropriateness” of the key attributes to the end of the seminar and began by looking at the Army’s key attributes strengths and weaknesses. In general the Panel believed that the Army was doing an excellent job as a profession but had areas that could be improved.

³ Based on an address by Allen Hawke, Secretary of Department of Defence, Australia: Hawke, A. (2001, August 28). *The profession of arms - people's initiative*. Retrieved from <http://army.gov.au/media/2001/ACF3A2.doc>, accessed 11 January 2011.

Expertise

As defined in The Army Profession of Arms White Paper, the Army's expertise is the specialized skill to build, to advise on, and to ethically apply lethal land combat power under Joint Command for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of offense, defense, and stability and/or civil support. As applied to the individual, a soldier's expertise and how he attains expert knowledge is easily understood; how they internalize the code, less so. Soldier development through training, education and experience has a long history within the Army.

Unit expertise is more difficult to define, especially in light of ten years of war. What is unit expertise as it applies in full spectrum operations? Can a unit—BCT, Division, Corps—attain unit level expertise based on the complex and broad mission requirements of the current fight? ARFORGEN limits the ability of units to retain proficiency in mission sets and readiness, if personnel manning policies dismantle unit leadership. Likewise, unit deployments focus on a limited mission set for a theater deployment – to the exclusion of other mission sets.

Further, units by themselves do not possess expert knowledge. Frequent deployments challenge the unit's ability to form teams that harness individual expertise into collective task accomplishment. It is the individual soldier trained to standard, under effective leadership, which creates units that execute missions to standard. The quality of Soldiers coming out of IMT and other military schools as well as combat experience enables units to adapt to and accomplish assigned missions. A solid foundation in military education permits mental agility and creates the opportunity for operational adaptability and mission success.

The Panel identified the following strengths and weaknesses for the attribute of expertise:

Strengths:

- Common goal of success/excellence
- COIN Ops
- Adaptability
- AAR system
- Combat experience
- Unit effectiveness and ability to win

Weakness:

- ARFORGEN personnel policies
- Difficulty in maintaining expertise in FSO

Development

Unit leaders understand the need to support the professional development of Soldiers. Panel members acknowledged the importance of attending military schools as playing an essential role in the ability of the unit to meet mission requirements and as foundational for operational adaptability. Yet the current environment/optempo creates a “Say Do Gap”—delaying education for mission requirements. The “say do gap” is manifested by commanders holding on to “critical” personnel prior to deployment, policy exceptions for MEL requirements for promotion, and Soldiers not understanding the value of continuing military education as a part of professional development.

The Panel identified the following strengths and weaknesses for the attribute of development:

Strengths

- Operational Experience and assignments
- USR, AAR, MASF, Awareness of unit development
- Willingness to send to PME on time
- Mentorship programs
- Developmental Culture
- Great current PME system

Weakness

- Preventing PME attendance
- “The say-do” Gap
- OPTEMPO—are we too busy to learn?

Trust

Trust is an inherently personal and human attribute that has both internal and external components at the unit level. Units develop internal trust from the ability of individual Soldiers to execute expert knowledge to standard over time. As individuals train together, their level of trust increases from one of individual certification/confidence to one of collective expertise. In today’s operational environment, desynchronization of personnel policies and ARFORGEN challenge the ability of units to build cohesion and individual relationships.

Similar to internal trust, external trust between units takes time to develop through training. This is not a lack of trust in the institutional Army’s ability to train a unit to an appropriate readiness level; rather this is the continued evolution of expert knowledge across the larger organization. Like ARFORGEN, modularity and its concept for plug and play units challenges the formation of external trust especially at echelons above the BCT. Homestation habitual relationships are severed, and new formations require units to rebuild trust for temporary relationships during deployments.

The Panel identified the following strengths and weaknesses for the attribute of trust:

Strengths:

- Solid NCO Corps/Leadership
- Solid Moral/Ethical culture
- Culture of confidence (training leaders equipping)
- AAR feedback and candor

Weakness:

- Lack of personnel continuity/high turnover
- Modularity degrades cohesion at BCT and DIV

Values

Values represent only one part of a larger Army ethic. The current set of Army Values is well understood and supported at the unit level. However, using values as a single teaching point or metric misses a broader requirement for the profession. As the American culture continues to evolve and blend with other cultures, values alone may not be sufficient to sustain the moral and legal foundations of the Army's Ethic. For example, both a military unit and a gang may exhibit loyalty but the consequences of such loyalty are very different. The moral and ethical underpinnings of the value of loyalty are not the same nor accepted by society. The Panel acknowledged the widening gap between Army and societal values – therefore, the need to dedicate more time and effort to support the moral development of its warriors.

The Panel identified the following strengths and weaknesses for the attribute of values:

Strengths:

- Healthy culture of self-regulations
- Well defined articulation, support and application of Army values

Weakness:

- Isolation and differences between Army and Nation's value/culture
- Candor no longer always accepted
- Human element sometimes falls short

Service

After nine years of war the idea of service to the nation is functioning well within units as they prepare for deployment and execute their mission. All cohorts within a unit understand the sacrifices that are required in defense of the Nation. However, there appears to be an anecdotal trend for a self entitlement mentality that originates from several general areas. The first is the continuing change in the American Society's willingness for public service. Fewer members of the population value, on a personal level, service to the Nation. This is manifested in the way the Army must attract and recruit Soldiers through incentives rather than a baseline value for service. Additionally, as Soldiers delay attendance at schools for the needs of their unit, they are reluctant

upon redeployment to accept or take positions that do not meet their immediate needs. Panel member offered anecdotal evidence of officers refusing command opportunities.

The Panel identified the following strengths and weaknesses for the attribute of service:

Strengths:

- Strong culture of service and sacrifice
- Shared experience
- All volunteer force

Weakness:

- What's in it for me mentality (entitlement) promoted by recruiting methods
- Public acknowledgement of sacrifice
- Services high price for families

Recommendations

- Focus additional efforts to internalize moral and ethical development...beyond IMT
- Concur with intent to conduct Profession of Arms Campaign
- Evaluate recruiting, retention, and marketing methods
- Force compliance with PME policies..."Walk the Talk"

Conclusion

After nine years of war, the Profession of Arms and the Profession are working well across the Army. The key attributes contained in the Profession of Arms White Paper are a solid representation of what is required at both the individual and organizational levels to sustain and continue to develop the Profession. While Army units are performing well in the current operational environment, the Army Institutionally must remain vigilant and prepared as the Force transitions from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We must ensure that the art and science generally required for those Echelon Above Brigade structures, processes and formations that are not currently exercised remain consistent and valid into the future of the profession. Each cohort will experience different pressures and perceptions requiring an open and flexible approach to how the Army educates, trains, and provides experience to the Force increasing the expert knowledge of the Profession of Arms.

The panel then turned to the issue of "toxic leadership" which, in fact, never arose during Panel 1 discussions. The question was asked, do we have a system that doesn't reward excellence? In fact, some young Captains or Majors are being placed into command or S3/XO positions without the requisite experience and/or PME to prepare them for those responsibilities. One person offered the perspective that they had

experienced toxic leadership from team up to brigade command-team level and, in general, it was more a function of not caring than holding soldiers to unrealistically stringent standards. Contributing factors were battle fatigue, distorted expectations, and a lack of expertise in their field. Personality is also a matter of importance. The question was asked, what is the source of toxic leadership? Advancement in rank is no longer a measure of competency and a potential source of tension, so where is the motivation for this? Another member recounted that in doing several post-deployment interviews he had heard several outlandish stories, but the interviewees did not characterize the issue as toxic leadership. In most instances, they cited unsuitability or lack of preparation and qualification for the leadership role. Another person offered that, institutionally, the Army has migrated to managing risk aversion with standardization, processes, and checklists. Differing generational perspectives on accountability, tolerance of criticism in public, etc., also contributes to perceptions about whether any specific leadership style is toxic or not. Another member made the key observation that there is a spectrum of leadership that runs from toxic, abusive, ineffective, to incompetent. There are probably few true character flaws in Army leaders, given the day to day peer scrutiny that routinely occurs. It is really necessary to examine the environment that we have asked people to operate in. He cited the example of looking at police and firemen. Seldom is toxic leadership mentioned as a problem in firemen, but it is a legitimate issue with police. Operating regularly in an environment with great potential for personal harm can effect the way leaders will operate. One member related that several young officers who made the decision to leave the service, did so because they did not want to have to deploy again to do the kinds of things that they observed Majors and Lieutenant Colonels doing. As Captains and Lieutenants, they were with soldiers, doing important work "where the action is." In their minds, field grade officers were generally staff officers relegated to the FOB, implementing guidance from others, largely unable to significantly influence what was going on, and that is not what they wanted to do.

Profession of Arms Seminar

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Panel Three ***PME / DOCTRINE & CONCEPTS***



Panel Paper

Panel Participants

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Mr. Joe Craig	WOCC
Prof. Charles D. Allen	AWC
Mr. Ralph Reed	CGSC
CH (LTC) Mark Fairbrother	CAPE
LTC James Lowe	CAL
Mr. Robert Toguchi	ARCIC
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Ms. Kim Summers	Dir, School of Command Prep
Dr. Gary Rauchfuss	INCOPD
CSM David Yates	USASMA
LTC Russ Godsil	Intelligence CoE
Mr. Wes Farmer	Mission Command CoE
SGM James Addie	Maneuver CoE
MAJ Lewis Booth	Fires CoE
COL Jennifer Curry	Maneuver Support CoE
LTC Norbert Fochs	Sustainment CoE
Mr. Grey Welborn	JFKSWFC
LTC Michael Sauer	AMEDD
Mr. Tom Pappas	TRADOC G2
MAJ Chris Williams	HQDA G3/5/7 SSP
Mr. Dave Carrithers	SMDC
BG (R) Nick Jans	AUS
COL Betrand Darras	FR
COL Jessie James	USAR Dep, G3/5/7
COL Frank McClary	ARCIC, CD&E
Professor Jamie Cullens	AUS Defense College
Mr. Lennie Edwards	Facilitator
Ms. Nicole Jobe	Paper Writer
Mr. Dan Kneisler	US JFCOM Analyst
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Mr. Chris Rizzi	RAND Analyst
MAJ Bob Underwood	USMA Dept of Eng and Philo Analyst
Ms. Carey Weaver	Rappourteur

“As someone told me recently, ‘you’re not a profession simply because you declare yourself to be a profession...you have to earn the title every day.’ We need to review, reemphasize, and recommit to our profession.

We need to ensure that our leader development strategies, our training methodologies, and our personnel systems all contribute to defining us as a profession.”

--GEN Martin E. Dempsey, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

Background and Introduction

Various military personnel, foreign liaison officers, and other subject matter experts gathered at the Booz Allen Hamilton facility January 11th – 13th, 2011 to discuss The Profession of Arms. Participants drew from several materials already written about the subject, such as the Profession of Arms White Paper, which addresses why the Army needs a campaign to understand the Profession of Arms and the Professional Soldier and is intended to facilitate an Army-wide dialogue about the Profession of Arms.

Panel 3 was one of two panels looking at the Army institution. During the plenary presentation which framed the Profession of Arms Campaign, the Center for the Army Profession and Ethics (CAPE) differentiated the institutional panels by the fact that the institutional level sets the conditions for the profession, and the individual, as part of the unit, practices the art of the Profession.

Looking at the situation through the perspective of Professional Military Education (PME), doctrine, and concepts, the panel addressed three key tasks:

1. Examine the key attributes (Expertise, Service, Values, Trust, Development) and assess whether they are an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms and Army Ethos.
2. Determine current strengths (DOTMLPF-P) as a profession and as professionals, and what elements must be sustained in order to strengthen the Army (across LOO's, cohorts, and essential attributes).
3. Determine current weaknesses (DOTMLPF-P) as a profession and as professionals, and recommend solutions to strengthen the Army (across LOO's, cohorts, and essential attributes). Identify where points of tension exist now or are perceived in the future.

The Army is facing a drawdown in forces at the conclusion of the two current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. After nearly a decade of war, the Army should be introspective both during this transition period, look toward the future, and examine the profession. An important, but unstated, assumption is that training and learning (e.g. PME) has the capacity to fix some of the weaknesses the Army is facing. Or, as GEN Dempsey states in the quote above, the Army should ensure the training methodologies contribute to defining the Profession.

In addition to the shift in the number of troops, the changing nature of conflict will certainly affect the profession. Nation building, humanitarian and disaster relief, stability

operations and other similar operations are operational capabilities required of the U.S. Army and will continue to be so. How these changes will affect the key attributes – or, indeed, if they should – was a point of discussion in the panel with no clear answer.

Task 1: Examine the key attributes of the Profession of Arms and assess whether they are an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms and Army Ethos.

How does the Profession of Arms relate to the key attributes?

- Expertise $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ Skill
- Trust $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ Trust
- Development $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ Leadership
- Values $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ Character
- Service $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ Duty

The panel spent a great deal of their time focused on the key attributes, but did not clearly define the relationship between the Profession of Arms and the key attributes. The panel discussed and debated multiple issues relevant to the Profession of Arms: Why does the Army exist? Is its sole purpose war? Deterring war? Is there such a thing as an ethical use of force?

Although it was suggested to postpone the discussion of “who’s in and who’s out,” the panel nonetheless continued to broach the topic and struggle with it during their attempt to frame the discussion. One participant suggested that the panel (and, by extension, senior Army leaders and perhaps policymakers) answer the question “why is it in the interest of the nation to have the military be a profession?” (As opposed to a job or an occupation).

As the panel began to focus on the key attributes, they discussed whether “selfless” should be added to the “service” attribute. One participant made the argument that any profession (and even most jobs) offers service. The Army, or Profession of Arms, in contrast, offers “selfless service.” Another participant cautioned that adding selfless would then broaden the Profession of Arms to Army civilians, and really, to anyone who is serving. Yet another participant encouraged moving “service” to the top of the list in order to imply that it is the most important attribute, under which all the others should logically follow. There was also a suggestion to place duty higher on the list. Two new additions were suggested: accountability and adaptable $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ agile.

In many cases, the panel felt that the attributes already include or encompass the additional attributes that were suggested. For instance, fortitude, toughness, and tenacity were suggested as additions, but the panel felt these qualities were already nested under duty. In addition, duty is probably included in values. Learning was also proposed, but assumed to be included under expertise. Effectiveness was proposed as a key attribute, but again the panel agreed that this was already encompassed in the other attributes. In the case of adaptable $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ agile, the panel felt that the overarching attribute was learning (i.e. adaptable implies that one recognizes change is necessary

and acts quickly, whereas learning implies that one is gaining knowledge of how to change, but may not do so quickly).

The panel was asked “How are the key attributes integral to Army concepts, doctrine, and professional military education?” However, the panel touched only briefly on doctrine and concepts. The panel determined that FM-1, FM-3, and FM-5 should be updated by the Army. Because concepts drive doctrine, which in turn drives PME, some panel members thought it would be appropriate to add the key attributes into institutional training.

The panel addressed the question: “What adjustments or additions to the key attributes, or to their working definitions, are recommended to improve them as an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms, and why?” In response, the panel broke up into separate breakout groups and proposed changes to the definitions, which are attached to this paper (ADDENDUM 2). The groups also suggested some changes to the key attributes, as outlined in the following table:

PROFESSION OF ARMS ATTRIBUTES						
Change 2	Change 1	ORIGINAL		ORIGINAL	Change 1	Change 2
Service	Service to Nation	Service	↔	Duty	Duty	Duty
Expertise	Expertise	Expertise	↔	Skill	Skill	Competence
Values	Values	Values	↔	Character	Character	Character
Trustworthy	Trust	Trust	↔	Trust	Fidelity	Trust
Leadership	Development	Development	↔	Leadership	Leadership	Leader
Adaptable			↔			Agile

Task 2: Determine current strengths across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) as a profession and as professionals. Recommend what should be sustained in order to strengthen the Army (Consider all LOOs, cohorts and key attributes).

GEN (R) Fred Franks gave a speech about the Profession of Arms in the plenary discussion on the second day, then joined the discussion in some of the panels. During the question and answer portion, GEN Franks broached the subject of after action reviews (AARs). One of the SGMs in the session informed the plenary audience that, in his experience, AARs are alive and well, especially after the Army culture has begun to move away from self-punishment where Soldiers were reluctant to share, for fear of “putting a noose around their necks.”

While discussing the strengths of the Army, the panel felt that the AAR culture was integral to the institutional Army today and this helped the Army adapt itself in 2003 after realizing that their doctrine was flawed in that context. Whereas other Armies (other nations, other time periods) have been tied down to single, inflexible doctrines in the past, the panel praised the U.S. Army’s ability to rapidly adapt and the fact that doctrine did not interfere or impede. Similarly, AAR culture allows for changes which are driven from the bottom-up, with Soldiers communicating to their superiors what is and is not working on the ground. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are also highly adaptable, and move much more quickly than doctrine does.

TTPs are also what allow the Army to capitalize on the AAR culture. Another strength is the effectiveness with which the Army revised and distributed doctrine and TTPs. The operating force was able to have technological reachback to the schoolhouse, which was extremely helpful. The current effectiveness may be a reflection of the current crises, however, because today, emphasis of certification is on deployment experience and the education certification piece is missing.

On another positive note, there is a strong emphasis on whole-of-government and interagency approaches to training and education today; Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) has become more and more important. However, integrating instruction and training with interagency partners can be challenging. JIIM is now being emphasized in concepts in terms of Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM) and Wide Area Security (WAS), requiring a whole-of-government approach. Doctrine is also emphasizing the importance of JIIM capabilities. Army scenarios are being expanded (homeland defense/civil support scenario) to ensure we have JIIM capabilities addressed.

Participants mentioned a few other instances of strength the Army has recently displayed. One participant felt the adaptability of the force is notable, and participants emphasized the importance of adaptability. One participant countered, saying that our weaknesses are that we do not develop senior leaders with broadening experiences (further covered in the weakness section, below), and we do not develop different ways of thinking for problems. For instance, Air Land Battle tenets of Agility Initiative Depth, and Synchronization was good for Desert Storm, but not appropriate for other conflicts. Another participant added that the operating force is, by necessity, adaptable and will always find a way to “get the job done.” On the other hand, the real issue is the institutional Army, which is bureaucratic and typically does not produce adaptability.

PME itself is a strength overall because the structure of PME is correct, it has the right schools, and has mostly right content.

ARFORGEN is a success because of how it synchronized training, new equipment fielding, personnel, and helped to create modularity. It allowed the Army to meet the challenge by integrating doctrine strength into the refit and rest cycle. Modularity is also a strength because it allowed the Army to meet diverse mission requirements. However, later in the discussion, another participant countered that he felt these two “strengths” of ARFORGEN and modularity were, in fact, weaknesses (as elaborated upon in the weaknesses section).

Task 3: Determine current weakness across Army doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy as a profession and as professionals, and where points of tension exist now or are perceived to exist in the future, and what elements must be addressed in order to strengthen the Army (across cohorts and key attributes).

During the discussion on strengths, participants simultaneously highlighted a number of issues they felt were weaknesses. The panel widely agreed that PME has been undervalued and underemphasized across the institution. Participants felt that because of the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the current conflicts, operational experience has been disproportionately valued by promotions boards. Education is therefore “less valuable,” and less likely to influence assignments or promotion. The panel agreed that the promotions protocol needs to be revised in order to reverse this trend.

Although the panel acknowledged the importance of certification in acknowledging a professional and professionalism, the Army standards are currently very thin. NCOs, for instance, are “certified” by completing a multiple-choice exam in Non Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). Additionally, since lifelong learning is so important, certification needs to reflect that and be required of all Soldiers. The Army conducts some level of certification in PME for individuals and Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) for units, but needs to improve the process.

The Army War College did a study examining 30 brigade command selects from 2006 – 2007, mapping out the individuals’ previous 18 or 19 assignments, color coding them green for traditional, purple for joint, and amber for something else. Of the 30 selects, only a few blocks were not green. Accordingly, the Army is not developing its senior leaders with broadening experiences or different ways of thinking. Speaking candidly, he said that there is a perception that the Generals do not have the necessary credibility with civilian leaders and policymakers and there is a lack of Senior officers selected for three or four star joint positions. The Combined Arms Center (CAC) is attempting to address this problem by moving in the direction of increasing educational opportunities between formal PME rotations. The Army is also addressing the outsourcing of its instructors. Although civilians dominate the instructional staff at CAC, they have over 5,000 years of military experience combined. However, there were other participants

who felt that overall, the Army is inadequate (in terms of credentials) at the major schools and have a lack of qualified personnel as instructors. Further, those who design and develop curriculums do not have sufficient academic credentials. Overall, the group felt that Army education is out of balance, and beholden to and overridden by the operational needs.

The group discussed whether or not the Army values were useful, and seemed to conclude that although they are needed and necessary, they were not as useful as they could be in their current form. For instance, integrity and honor are listed separately, although they mean the same thing. Candor was emphasized both in the panel and during GEN Franks' speech in plenary. Trust is not possible without candor, and this involves, to a certain extent, self-policing and encouraging lower-ranking officers and enlisted soldiers to speak truth to power (or up the chain of command). One participant shared an anecdote from the UK perspective that British officers widely see the U.S. officer corps as infected with sycophancy, especially from the Captains to LTC level and above, where people become "yes men," fall victim to group think, etc.

One participant provided a list of problems for the Soldier and the Army as a whole which relate to the Profession of Arms: the suicide rate in our soldiers, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), high divorce rate, high rates of attrition, almost half of accessions into officer corps are through OCS, 95% promotion rates for officers to LTC, the politicization of the retired officer corps, high attrition of junior officers, and an overreliance on contractors. The Tim Kane article in *The Atlantic* on the loss of the best and the brightest in the Army officer corps highlights this perceived problem within the institution ("Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving," January/February 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/why-our-best-officers-are-leaving/8346/>). The Wanat report also indicates some concerns about the professionalism of the Army. One of the participants stated that the recent Division Commander Study revealed a span of control that is problematic. In response, another stated that while deployed, the division commander senior rated 195 LTCs. One senior participant stated that he conducted 280 patrols each year to ensure that LTCs were being visited, requiring him to accompany patrols seven days a week.

The aforementioned list spurred further discussion on PTSD and suicide, with an assertion that these are potential risk indicators, weak signals, or signposts. Other participants shared anecdotal evidence that supports the assertion that these issues are an institution-wide problem. Citing survey data, one panel member informed the others that the suicide rate is higher per capita in the Army than society in general by a factor of two. Multiple participants shared anecdotal stories of the disconnection between Soldiers and their leadership. Because of this disconnect, Soldiers are not getting the attention or, in other cases, the discipline they need.

Another issue is the integration of the reserve component (RC), and how to keep the reserve force employed and integrated once the Army begins to draw down in the current conflicts. One participant felt confident that it will be entirely possible to maintain the RC as an operational reserve. Participants agreed that the operationalization of the

reserve component has been a positive result for both the Army and the Reserve component because it has broken down walls that previously existed between the two. A survey of the reservists of the most recent class at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) showed that 97% of the reserve component felt that they were an active and positive part of the Army as a whole. One method of keeping them involved which has already been proposed would be to use them for theater security cooperation missions in support of the combatant commands.

The group also repeatedly discussed political neutrality in Soldiers, and debated as to whether or not this should be expressed as one of the key attributes. The participants also deliberated on the rank level of the Soldier to whom the neutrality should apply. Should it only apply to higher levels of command and leadership, or to all Soldiers? One participant asserted that a lack of neutrality would be a threat to the long term professionalism of the Army. As a possible solution, the value of self-discipline, or more simply, discipline, is extremely important and may supersede the issue of neutrality, because one should be disciplined in terms of not allowing political views to leak into one's profession as a Soldier.

One point emphasized (which was also brought up in the previous UQ event *Army Concept Framework: Leader Development Implications Seminar* in panel 3, Army Profession) is that the Army is very good about telling Soldiers when they are failing the institution, but the reverse does not hold true. However, the current seminar is a starting point in the currently broken or at least flawed process for allowing Soldiers to tell the institution that it is failing. Two clear examples of this are Abu Ghraib and Walter Reed (though there was significant disagreement over whether this resulted from failure of systems or failure of leadership).

Cyber/EMS was also identified as a weakness. Although the Army is starting to invest more into cyber, it is having difficulties getting trained cyber personnel, because it is competing with other services and the private sector.

Additionally, although civilian education is now beginning to be emphasized, it remains problematic. This is primarily because it does not necessarily give civilian servants the appropriate knowledge of how the Army operates in order to do their jobs. For instance, civilians can move laterally into high level GS positions straight from the civilian world.

ARFORGEN is a weakness because it stipulates how training should be carried out and does not let officers (company and battalion commanders) develop their own training management skills and experience. It also separates commanders from their senior level officers. Modularity is a weakness because leadership structure and chain of command shifts constantly. There is a tension between modularity and cohesion, and as the French military learned since it modularized in the 1990s, as the operational tempo increases, that places increased strain on the modular structure of the military and necessitates a greater reliance on cohesion instead. Modularity strains the Army and has overloaded the training system because of its unintended consequence of economizing the Army, and, in doing so, it emphasizes efficiency over effectiveness.

The panel identified what it felt was a large gap in doctrine, stating that the Army has no doctrine that speaks to our Army about learning. The group agreed that although it is evident that PME is integral in developing the leaders and the attributes in the leaders, it has suffered as one of the three pillars of training relative to experience. On a positive note, however, changes to curriculum have been able to move outside of the bureaucratic process, thereby making them able to adapt more quickly.

Conclusions

Overall, the panel seemed to be driven by sentiments originally expressed at the outset of the seminar, in plenary: because the Army is facing a time of transition, now is a good time for introspection. Although the Army has room for improvement in many areas, it is still doing a relatively good job overall. Regarding the implications for the Profession of Arms, the simple fact is that the nation went to war with an Army that was too small for the tasks ahead of it. However, a sign of professional health is that the Army figured out how to do more with less over an extended period of time. Overall, the Army is an extraordinarily resilient organization. Now, the Army must learn to ratchet down and adjust the force to a different OPTEMPO, and accordingly determine the resulting impacts on the force.

END OF PANEL PAPER

ADDENDUM 1 – Final insights and conclusions following Panel Presentations and the Senior Leader Dialogue.

The panel quickly responded to the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)'s comment that the Army and the Soldier need a "strong moral compass." This sparked a great deal of debate in the panel. Many participants seemed to agree with the assertion that most Soldiers are currently demonstrating this in the field today. One participant provided anecdotal evidence of tactical restraint. However, there was an assertion that the U.S. Army does not currently subscribe to a moral theory as an institution. The panel was largely divided on this subject of an objective guideline for a Soldier's morality. Does it currently exist? If so, where? What is it based on? Where does it come from?

Participants offered various suggestions. One suggested, simply, "attend Sunday school." Another countered by saying that, although it would be possible to ground the Army's ethics in, essentially, Judeo-Christian morality, not every Soldier is a Christian, and the U.S. Army cannot make them so. One foreign liaison officer (FLO) offered his perspective that the U.S. creed focuses on the professional (which is good), but a creed is a good place to give moral guidelines, as theirs does (e.g. "In combat...you will act without passion or hate.") He also said that, if possible, the Army's moral theory should be the same as (or derived from) that of the nation. Furthermore, the ethic, creed, and key attributes should all have some sort of deliberate relationship, so it is clear to the Soldier what purpose each one serves. Another participant disagreed completely with

the premise that the U.S. Army does not already have this moral guideline. His assertion was that the U.S. Constitution is the moral compass which guides the Army and the actions of Soldiers, and the source from which their morality is derived.

Regarding doctrine, one participant felt that it should cover the “strong moral compass,” since doctrine is the basis for training. One participant also felt strongly that the current lessons needed to be captured, so as to preserve them for future leaders and Soldiers. Other participants disagreed with this notion, however; citing the differences between the Vietnam War and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as an example of why it may not be useful in the future.

The panelists continued to debate the order of the key attributes, saying that although service to nation is first now, experience may be more appropriate for the first priority position. Panelists expressed surprise at the addition of “indomitable” to the list of key attributes which the panel leader presented to CSA, since it was not on the slide when they were dismissed yesterday. However, it was unclear whether or not they agreed with the addition.

Another topic of discussion was the idea of “toxic leaders,” which was originally mentioned in the morning plenary discussion. Participants felt toxic leadership was on an upswing and decidedly contagious, but not necessarily pervasive. One participant quoted a source, saying “How many toxic leaders can the organization handle? Zero.” Another felt that zero was unrealistic, but that the question was the right one. More than one participant said that leaders could and should be fired, but no one will do so. Leaders in the Abu Ghraib scandal were simply “moved on.” This is in contrast to the U.S. Army during WWII, when Eisenhower had no problem firing or reassigning leaders, and it did not end their careers.

When given the opportunity to offer last comments, multiple panel members used the opportunity to comment further on PME. Specifically, one panelist felt that if the Army is truly being introspective, and examining itself honestly as a profession, then it needs to make PME (specifically, from his experience, officer training) more rigorous. He asserted that, so long as the Soldier shows up to the course, and does not break the law or demonstrate serious moral ineptitude, then they will pass. His suggestion was to hold Army officers to a higher standard. Adding to the discussion, another participant related the lack of rigor to bureaucracies. He opined that the easy courses are more a reflection of a commander’s desires to facilitate the bureaucracy than anything else – stating that if a commander sends his Captains to the Captain’s career course, he wants the certainty of knowing that they will succeed and be ready to take command, not wonder what percentage will pass.

ADDENDUM 2 – During the discussions on the key attributes, panel 3 separated into two sub-groups to review and suggest revisions to the attributes themselves and their respective definitions. The following outlines their suggestions, including the original version, change one from group one, and change two from group two.

Definitions: The Profession of Arms

ORIGINAL	The Army is an American Profession of Arms, a vocation comprised of experts certified in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.
CHANGE 1	The U.S. Army is an American Profession of Arms, a vocation comprised of experts certified in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of serving the American people.
CHANGE 2	“The Army is an American profession of arms, led by a cadre of experts in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

Definitions: The Professional Soldier

ORIGINAL	An American Professional Soldier is an expert, a volunteer certified in the Profession of arms, bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the nation and the Constitution, who adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the Army profession of arms.
CHANGE 1	An American Professional Soldier is an expert at land combat power skills , a volunteer certified in the Profession of Arms , bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the nation and the Constitution, who adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the Army profession of arms.
CHANGE 2	“The Army Professional is an expert in the ethical application of land combat power, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, committed to performance of duty with unlimited liability, bonded with other Soldiers in a shared identity of service, and who is a steward of the Profession of Arms.”

PROFESSION OF ARMS ATTRIBUTES						
Change 2	Change 1	ORIGINAL		ORIGINAL	Change 1	Change 2
Service	Service to Nation	Service	↔	Duty	Duty	Duty
Expertise	Expertise	Expertise	↔	Skill	Skill	Competence
Values	Values	Values	↔	Character	Character	Character
Trustworthy	Trust	Trust	↔	Trust	Fidelity	Trust
Leadership	Development	Development	↔	Leadership	Leadership	Leader
Adaptable			↔			Agile

Key Attribute: Expertise

Title	PROFESSION	
Profession: Expertise	ORIGINAL	The Army's expertise is its specialized skill to build, to advise on, and to apply lethal and ethical land combat power under Joint Command for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of offense, defense, and stability and/or civil support. It is based on the cumulative expert know-how – both theoretical and practical – the Army has developed through its history and forms the basis for the development of professional Army Soldiers, civilians, and units.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	The Army's unique expertise is its specialized skill to build, to advise on, and to apply lethal and ethical land combat power under Joint Command for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of offense, defense, and stability and/or civil support. It is based-on the cumulative expert know-how – both theoretical and practical – the Army has developed through its history and forms the basis for the development of professional Army Soldiers, civilians, and units.

[no change]	CHANGE 2	The Army's expertise is in the effective and ethical application of land power. It encompasses strategy, operations, JIIM, civil-military relations, logistics, and ethics. This knowledge requires formal and theoretical education, technical and operational training, and long experience.
Title	PROFESSIONAL	
Professional: Skill	ORIGINAL	The skill of the professional Soldier is the capability to ethically and effectively apply the profession's expertise as part of a team or unit. The professional Soldier's skill evolves with rank and position and is drawn from all four knowledge domains of the profession of arms: military-technical, moral-ethical, human development, and political-cultural. Individual certification in such skills, both of competence and character, is key for the Army to remain a trusted and effective profession.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	The skill of the professional Soldier is the capability to ethically and effectively apply the profession's unique expertise as part of a team or unit. The professional Soldier's skill evolves with rank and position, must remain apolitical , and is drawn from all four knowledge domains of the profession of arms: military-technical, moral-ethical, human development, and political-cultural. Individual certification in such skills, both of competence and character , is key for the Army to remain a trusted and effective profession.
[no change]	CHANGE 2	[no change]

Key Attribute: Service

Title	PROFESSION	
Profession: Service	ORIGINAL	Under our Constitution the Army exists to serve the American people when and where called upon to do so. There is no other reason for its existence. Service in the Army profession means subordination to our civilian authorities, subordination of Army interests to national interests, and subordination of personal needs to the needs of the mission being ready, if need be, to sacrifice in the defense of the Republic.

Profession: Service to Nation	CHANGE 1	Under our Constitution the Army exists to serve the American people when and where called upon to do so. There is no other reason for its existence. Service to the Nation in the Army profession means subordination to our civilian authorities, and subordination of Army interests to national interests and executing fully and subordination of personal needs to the needs of the mission demanded by those authorities. It also means being ready , if need be, to sacrifice in the defense of the Republic.
[no change]	CHANGE 2	The Army serves the American people under the Constitution, carrying out the policies of the United States Government.
Title	PROFESSIONAL	
Professional: Duty	ORIGINAL	Duty is the service each Soldier is voluntarily obliged to provide through the Army to the American people, as well as to their unit and to each other. Each professional Soldier is to serve with excellence in all that they do as they willingly fulfill each of their personal and professional obligations. It is the robust concept of duty aggressively pursued each day by mature self-motivation that makes a Soldier a professional.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	Duty is the service each Soldier is voluntarily obliged to provides through the Army to the American people , as well as to their unit and to each other. Each professional Soldier is to serves with excellence in all that they do as they willingly fulfill each of their personal and professional obligations and is ready to sacrifice his life if required to execute his mission. It is the robust concept of duty aggressively pursued each day by mature self-motivation that makes a Soldier a professional.
[no change]	CHANGE 2	[no change]

Key Attribute: Values

Title	PROFESSION	
Profession: Values	ORIGINAL	The values of the Army are those principles, standards, and qualities of intrinsic and special worth to those who serve within the profession of arms. Army values flow from the Founding of our Republic and its evolving

		national culture and, when melded with the imperatives of military effectiveness, establish the moral and legal foundations of the profession's Ethic. That Ethic, in turn, inspires and regulates institutional and individual behavior in the application of land combat power.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	[no change]
[no change]	CHANGE 2	The values of the Army are those principles, standards and qualities to those who serve within the profession of arms. Army values flow from the Founding of our Nation and its evolving culture. It establishes the moral and legal foundations of the Army's Ethic. Values, in turn, inspire and regulate institutional and individual behaviors in the application of land combat power.
Title	PROFESSIONAL	
Professional: Character	ORIGINAL	Character is a person's moral and ethical qualities. Building character is the acquisition and internalization of the values, ideals, and beliefs of the Army profession. In the crucible of mortal conflict, well-developed moral character in our Soldiers enables them to act courageously, ethically, and effectively consistent with the trust of their comrades and the American people. The responsibility for the development of such strength of character rests with the profession, its leaders, and the individual.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	Character is a person's moral and ethical qualities. Building character is the acquisition and internalization of the Army Values, ideals, and beliefs of the Army profession. In the crucible of mortal conflict, well-developed moral character in our Soldiers enables them to act courageously, ethically, and effectively consistent with the trust of their comrades and the American people. The responsibility for the development of such strength of character rests with the profession, its leaders, and the individual.
[no change]	CHANGE 2	[no change]

Key Attribute: Trust

Title		PROFESSION
Profession: Trust	ORIGINAL	Trust in the profession is the confidence and faith that external groups have in the Army to render its unique service honorably and successfully, including the American people and their representatives, coalition partners, Army families, and the media, among others. The trust of the American people is foremost and the life blood of our professional status. It is earned and sustained by being ethical and effective in what we do as America's Army and from it flows, in turn, the legitimacy and autonomy we enjoy as a profession to develop and practice our expertise.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	[no change]
[no change]	CHANGE 2	Trust in the profession is the confidence that internal and external groups have in the Army to provide its unique service honorably, legitimately, and successfully. The trust of the American people is foremost and essential for our professional status. It is earned and sustained by being ethical and effective in what we do as America's Army.
Title		PROFESSIONAL
Professional: Trust	ORIGINAL	Army professionals must be worthy of the trust placed in them by the American people. The trust-worthiness of our Soldiers, their shared confidence, rests in themselves, in their leaders, and in their comrades, that all will fulfill their obligations to the Nation, the mission, each other, and to the Soldiers' families. Such trust has to be fostered by Army leaders to renew constantly the inspiration of our volunteer Soldiers to become the "expert and professional" that they need to be.
Professional: Fidelity	CHANGE 1	[no change]
[no change]	CHANGE 2	[no change]

Key Attribute: Development


Title	PROFESSION	
Profession: Development	ORIGINAL	Human development is the intentional growth fostered by Army systems, processes, and know-how to build professionals over careers of service with the cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual attributes required to be effective in chaotic and lethal combat environments. The development of citizens into Soldiers and Soldiers into leaders of military competence and moral character forms the capacity for professionals to practice their art by the repetitive exercise of discretionary, highly moral, judgments.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	[no change]
Profession: Leadership	CHANGE 2	Beyond mission accomplishment, leadership of the Army as profession of arms includes the stewardship over time of its expert knowledge, its practical expertise, and the development of Army professionals at all levels, such that the Army is always prepared to meet promptly and effectively the security needs of the American people.
Title	PROFESSIONAL	
Profession: Leadership	ORIGINAL	Beyond mission accomplishment leadership of the Army as profession of arms includes the stewardship over time of its expert knowledge, its practical expertise, and the development of Army professionals at all levels such that the Army is always prepared to meet promptly and effectively the security needs of the American people. The ability to lead in military professions is founded on the ability to lead one’s self; through developing cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual attributes. Leading by personal and moral example is the standard for the Army.
[no change]	CHANGE 1	[no change]
Profession: Development	CHANGE 2	Human development is the intentional growth fostered by Army systems, processes, and know-how to build professionals over careers of service. The ability to lead in military professions is founded on the ability to lead one’s self; through developing cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual attributes. Leading by personal

and moral example is the standard for the Army. The development of citizens into Soldiers and Soldiers into leaders of military competence and moral character forms the capacity for professionals to practice their art by the repetitive exercise of discretionary, highly moral, judgments.

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Profession of Arms Seminar

11 – 13 January 2011



Panel Four ***POLICIES | PROGRAMS*** ***SYSTEMS | REGULATIONS***



Panel Paper

Panel Participants

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“Every profession is a conspiracy against the laity.”

– *George Bernard Shaw*

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Army is re-examining the Profession of Arms because “I believe that we’re an Army in transition,” said General Martin Dempsey, Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).⁴ The transition, he asserts, is based on institutional adaptations made in response to the decade-long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq—harbingers of persistent conflict. Indeed, ten years of war should make leaders mindful of unforeseen consequences from institutional adaptations, especially those affecting the Army Profession and the character of its leaders, despite mounting internal and external pressures to manage the Army.

The *transitions* General Dempsey speaks of are immensely complex. To appreciate the complexity one must understand that transitions (or phase changes) for individuals, groups, and organizations are occurring in multiple domains and dimensions, all of which have unique operating qualities and attributes. To assume that these entities are homogeneous would be incorrect. Therefore, multiple levels of analysis at the individual, group, and organizational levels must be undertaken to fully appreciate the nature of transitions and the culture which adapts to them.⁵ Transitions are also occurring faster than they once did; in the past, sharper conceptual and doctrinal lines could be drawn to arrive at solutions—training was different, learning was different, Army *culture* and the *world* were different.

For these reasons, this seminar (and this panel in particular) serves two important roles. First, the event is a key milestone in General Dempsey’s year-long Campaign of Learning and the Profession of Arms study. It is important work! Outcomes from this panel will help refine and shape the Army’s assessment of the Profession, including how the Army adapts its culture for the future. These outcomes will also provide information which will then be used to develop data points (and recommendations) for Army policymakers and program directors. Second, the seminar convenes subject matter experts (SME) from within the institution to focus on a number of pressing issues concerning the five professional attributes—including an examination of institutional policies and procedures—to discern strengths or weaknesses as the Army reaches for better understanding

⁴ “An Interview with Martin E. Dempsey,” Prism 2. No.1, Interviews. pp 151-155. Dec 2010.

⁵ Along these lines, we notice that the Profession of Arms study (CAPE White Paper) omits an examination of distinct “groups” in the Army, beyond the recognition of cohort elements. At one end of the spectrum is the Profession (the Army) and at the other end is the Professional (the Soldier). However, omitting the interactions, connections, diversity (differences in type), and interdependencies across groups is an important analysis that ought to occur. For example, specific generating and operating force functionalities within the cohorts themselves. By extension there are other distinct groups within the military: African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and so on, which may or may not (yet) be U.S. citizens. There are also gender groups, and the important generational groups. Most importantly, perhaps, is the arrival of new group of professionals that will emerge with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.

about the complex nature of transitions and their influence on the Profession of Arms.

BACKGROUND

The Secretary of the Army and Army Chief of Staff directed a year-long review of the Army profession. General Dempsey is leading the review and has placed the Profession of Arms as a key objective for TRADOC's Campaign of Learning. To initiate the review, the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) produced a paper that addresses: (1) the Army as a profession of arms, (2) the Army's professional culture, (3) the Army ethic, and (4) the Army ethic and external relations.⁶ The paper's thesis focuses on renewing an understanding of the Army profession, which is based on the current operations focus and the "many profoundly important influences on the U.S. Army over the past decade." (p.1) CAPE's White Paper therefore serves as an important start point for the year-long review, the ensuing dialogue, this seminar, and this panel.

The Profession of Arms Seminar addressed a number of issues relative to CAPE's White Paper, HQDA Execution Order, and CG TRADOC's guidance. Prior to focusing on that, however, we identified some underlying assumptions (within the 3-5 year timeframe) to frame our discussions:

- The Army will deploy less often
- The US labor market will remain weak
- Budget constraints will be realized
- Volunteers will be technically savvy

THE ARMY PROFESSION

1. In light of the profession and professional key attributes, we discussed whether the attributes are an accurate and comprehensive reflection of the Profession of Arms and Army Ethos. In other words, what attributes should be kept, dropped, or combined; and what changes ought to be made to their definitions.

Observation: Yes, the attributes and their definitions are accurate and comprehensive for the Profession of Arms. In fact, they can be considered as "first principles" for the profession. However, we refined the definitions with minor modifications to capture better the essential nature of the profession and the professional.

Observation: Army Values ought to be revisited because of evolving challenges since their inception (1997) through the current period. For instance, candor probably crosses particular values of

⁶ "The Profession of Arms," Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), pp 1 – 18, December 2, 2010. Note: Distribution is unlimited, but not approved for reference or citation.

integrity and courage. If this is the case, then perhaps the acrostic needs refinement (there is no 'C' in leadership).

Listed below are the changes we recommended to the profession and its professional attributes –

Expertise (Profession) Note: additions are coded in green font. The line-throughs are self explanatory, and the red font reflects the highlights already included in CAPE's briefing that was presented during the first day of the Seminar:

The Army's expertise is its specialized skill to build, to advise on, and to ~~apply~~ **manage under Joint Command** ~~lethal and ethical land combat power, both lethal and non-lethal under Joint Command~~ for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of offense, defense, and stability and/or civil support. It is based on the **cumulative expert know-how – both theoretical and practical** – the Army has developed through its history and forms the basis for the development of professional Army Soldiers, civilians, and units.

Skill (Professional). We recommend changing "skill" to "expert." Other changes included:

The ~~skill of the~~ professional Soldier is **an expert in the capability to ethically and effectively apply the profession's expertise** as part of a team or unit. The professional Soldier's skill evolves with rank and position and is drawn from all four knowledge domains of the profession of arms: military-technical, moral-ethical, human development, and political-cultural. Individual **certification** in such skills, both of competence and character, is essential for the Army to remain a trusted and effective profession.

Service (Profession)—no change. However, minor changes were recommended for the *professional* "duty" attribute:

Duty is the service each Soldier is **voluntarily** obliged to provide **under the Constitution** ~~through the Army~~ to the **American people**, as well as to their unit and to each other. Each professional Soldier is to serve with excellence in all that they do as they **willingly fulfill each of their personal and professional obligations**. It is the robust concept of duty aggressively pursued each day by mature self-motivation that makes a Soldier a professional.

Values (Profession). No changes were recommended for the professional "character" attribute):

The values of the Army are those **principles, standards, and qualities of intrinsic and special worth essential to the profession of arms.** ~~to those who serve within the profession of arms.~~ Army values flow from the Founding of our Republic and its evolving national culture and, when melded with the imperatives of military effectiveness, establish the **moral and legal foundations of the profession's Ethic**. That Ethic, in turn, inspires and **regulates institutional and individual behavior** in the ~~application~~ **management** of land combat power.

Trust (Profession):

Trust in the profession is the **confidence and faith that external groups have in the Army to render its unique service honorably and successfully**, including the American people and their representatives, coalition partners, Army families, and the media, among others. The trust of the American people is foremost and the life blood of our professional status. It is **earned** and sustained by being ethical and effective in what we do as America's Army and from it flows, in turn, the **legitimacy essential to the limited and autonomy** we enjoy as a profession to develop and practice our expertise.

Trust (Professional):

Army professionals must be worthy of the trust placed in them by the American people. The trust-worthiness of our Soldiers, their shared confidence, rests in themselves, in their leaders, and in other members of the profession their comrades, that all will fulfill their obligations to the Nation, the mission, each other, and to the Soldiers' families. Such trust has to be fostered by Army leaders to renew constantly the inspiration of our volunteer Soldiers to become the "expert and professional" that they need to be.

Development (Profession):

Human development is the intentional growth fostered by Army systems, processes, and know-how to build professionals over careers of service with the cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual attributes required to be effective in chaotic and lethal combat environments. The development of citizens-volunteers into Soldiers and Soldiers into leaders of military competence and moral character forms the capacity for professionals to practice their art by the repetitive exercise of discretionary, highly moral, judgments.

Leadership (Professional):

Beyond mission accomplishment leadership of the Army as profession of arms includes the stewardship over time of its expert knowledge, its practical expertise, and the development of Army professionals at all levels such that the Army is always prepared to meet promptly and effectively the security needs of the American people. The ability to lead others in military professions is founded on the ability to lead one's self through developing cognitive, physical, emotional, and spiritual attributes. Leading by personal and moral example is the standard for the Army.

2. Next, we focused on the current strengths of the profession relative to the standing (Army) policies and procedures.

Observation: Discussions about the profession's strengths (and weaknesses) focused on characteristics and dimensions of existing Army policies and procedures; however, they typically do not focus on the characteristics and dimensions of policies external to the Army (this is not a criticism). Rather, it is a suggestion: there's value in exploring and then exploiting the strengths of other professions that reside outside the Army.

We "brainstormed" many strengths relative to the profession and its standing policies and procedures. This long list of strengths was then discussed to determine if there was overlap and/or redundancy. The list, which we consolidated and prioritized, is captured in Annex A.

3. Complementing the profession's strengths, we examined what weaknesses exist in the profession today, relative to the standing (Army) policies and procedures.

Observation: The Army's publication system (its processes and procedures) appears to lack the capacity to adapt quickly. The system still reflects many of the industrial age processes—staffing, input, and approval—that form a key Human Resource cluster affecting the profession of arms in many adverse ways.

Observation: A perception exists that the profession suffers from an identity crisis.

Observation: The challenges and weakness do not exist in a vacuum and cannot be considered in isolation. Certain challenges have the capacity to overwhelm the capacity to adapt. This is principally because the leading edge of the institution (organizations, units, and individuals) and the environment change much more rapidly than the institution.

Like the profession's strengths, we "brainstormed" weaknesses resident in policies and procedures. This consolidated list is capture in Annex B.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Profession of Arms Seminar was an exercise in inquiry, not advocacy. In the process of that inquiry, the panel explored the profession and the professional attributes and the strengths and weaknesses of policies and procedures as they relate to the Profession of Arms. We were constrained in the amount of time to explore these areas, but nonetheless contributed to the dialog in important ways by addressing three of the eight CG TRADOC focus questions.

Any discussion of the Profession of Arms among practitioners will generate a certain amount of emotional response. One reason to explain this is may be that the levels of investment varies. Each practitioner invests (or has invested) time and energy developing their professional skills, knowledge, and attributes, including those of the Solders and civilians with whom we have worked.

Conflict over the past decade has changed the institution—some of those changes have been positive, some negative. Regardless, as practitioners, we want to see the strengths sustained and the weaknesses improved especially as we begin disengaging from a decade-long conflict. In that process, emotions can run high primarily because the investments and experiences of Soldiers and leaders vary, ultimately generating unique perspectives. But emotion is indeed a positive sign for the Army as dialogue about the profession continues. We think this paper contributes to that dialogue.

ADDENDUM to Profession of Arms (POA) Paper. Panel 4, Day 3; January 13, 2011

Panel members reconvened after the senior plenary session adjourned to discuss implications of the plenary session on the panel's task; i.e., institutional policies and procedures affecting the profession of arms.

While time was short, panelists considered three issues: first, how do Army values contribute to or enhance the profession of arms beyond the influence on the Army's identity? Second, what's the difference between the influence of an *attribute* or a *value* on the profession of arms? And third, how does a values-based organization drive the moral development of its professionals? As interesting as these issues were, panelists did not explore them further.

On a separate issue, one panelist noted that the CAPE White paper was written for mid-level officers (i.e., O-4). This same panelist remarked that while the paper was intended for mid-level officers, it was designed to conduct analyses at multiple levels. (Note: this issue was not fully explored either.) Unrelated to any of the above issues was the following comment: "The chief professional in the Army is the Army Chief of Staff."

The panel adjourned at 1330 hrs.

ANNEX A (Profession and Professional Strengths)

Human Dimension

- Recruiting & retention
- CSF
- Resiliency
- Culture of investment in human capital
- Support to Families
- Wounded Warrior Programs
- Identity of service

Adaptability

- Adaptive junior leaders
- Institutional adaptability
- Response to current operational requirements
- Integration of RC augmenters
- Ad hoc adaptability

Learning Organization

- PME (Professional Military Education)
- Info sharing (formal)
- Informal info sharing
- Ad hoc adaptability

Army Culture

- Brother/sisterhood
- Identity of service
- Values based
- Self regulating
- Culture of Service
- UCMJ

Reserve Component

- Integration of RC augmenters
- Operational reserve

Transparency/Trust

- Media embed
- Image respect and admiration of the American public and in some places around the world

ANNEX B (Profession and Professional Weaknesses)

Professional development

- Mentoring
- Broadening experiences; Institutional and Individual incentives
- Junior Officer Gaps OPD
- PME

Gaps in expertise

- Doctrinal Inertia/slow adaptation
- Collective training, Full spectrum ops
- The Art of command in garrison
- Civil-Military Relations Norms

Erosion of Army culture

- Erosion of customs and traditions
- Erosion of professional ethic (correlated to the length of war)

Institutional Capacity Adaptation

- Tension between decentralization and hierarchical bureaucracy
- BAD bureaucracy
- ARFORGEN not institutionalized
- Human Capital Management Systems
 - Overfocus on extrinsic motivation for retention
 - Antiquated Manning and requirement determination systems
 - Lack of integrated AC/RC Personnel System
 - Civilian Personnel Management System

Few defined standards for certification

- Self Regulation
- Promotion system
- Role of PME

Strategic Communication- (STRATCOM between the Army and the Public, as well as internally)

- Rebranding

Key Terms and Definitions

Note: The purpose of this document is provide standardized terminology used in documenting observations, emerging insights, implications, conclusions, and recommendations related to Unified Quest 2011 study issues.

A		source
Ability	The power to perform an observable activity at the present time. Evidence through activities or behavior that is similar to those required on the job, e.g., ability to write reports, ability to plan and organize.	DA Pam 350-58 Draft v2.7
Army Concept Framework	Set of future concept documents, developed by TRADOC to provide a clearly defined structure and enable the Army to refocus its force development efforts after more than 8 years of war.	TRADOC Pam 525-5-1 19 Aug 2010
Army Culture	The system of shared meaning held by its Soldiers, “the shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution over time.	CAPE glossary
Army Ethic	The moral values, principles and martial virtues embedded in its culture that inspire and regulate ethical behavior by both Soldiers and the US Army in the application of land combat in defense of and service to the Nation.	CAPE glossary
Army leader	Anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.	FM 6-22, Army Leadership 12 Oct 2006
Army Leader Development Program	CG TRADOC led activity which leads all aspects of Army leader development.	DA Pam 350-58 Draft v2.7

Glossary

Army Warfighter Challenges	Army Warfighting Challenges are the enduring first order capabilities the Army must develop to ensure current and future force combat effectiveness.	https://wiki.kc.us.army.mil/wiki/AWFC
Assessment	<p>(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and progress of an operation.</p> <p>In the training context, the leader’s judgment of the organization’s ability to perform its mission-essential tasks and, ultimately, its ability to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission.</p> <p>A method used to determine, from performance, the proficiency and potential of a leader. Ideally, assessment is characterized by an objective judgment against a criterion-based standard.</p>	<p>FM 3-0, Operations 27 FEB 08</p> <p>FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations 12 Dec 2008</p> <p>DA Pam 350-58 Draft v2.7</p>
Assumption	(joint) A supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action.	JP 1-02
B		source
Behavior	An action or reaction to specific situations based on attitude, beliefs, and values.	DA Pam 350-58 Draft v2.7
C		source
Center for Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE)	The CAPE is the Army Force Modernization Proponent for the Professional Military Ethic and Character Development and is located at the United States Military Academy. The CAPE coordinates with Army Staff, TRADOC, the Chaplains Corp, Joint Forces, Coalition Forces, University Partners, and other civilian organization (e.g. state, local, and federal first responders) to create, share and disseminate knowledge.	http://acpme.army.mil/
Certification	Verification on a go/no-go basis that an individual as having achieved standards for given task(s) under specified conditions	DA Pam 350-58 Draft v2.7

Glossary

<p>Character</p>	<p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSIONAL: Building character is the acquisition and internalization of the values, ideals and beliefs of the Army profession. In the crucible of mortal conflict, the well-developed moral character of our Soldiers enables them to act courageously, ethically, and effectively consistent with the trust of their comrades and the American people. The responsibility for the development of such strength of character rests with both the profession and the individual.</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>
<p>Coaching</p>	<p>The guidance of another person's development in new or existing skills during the practice of those skills.</p>	<p>FM 6-22, Army Leadership 12 Oct 2006</p>
<p>Community of practice</p>	<p>Groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly.</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>
<p>Concept</p>	<p>A concept is a notion or statement of an idea—an expression of how something might be done. A joint concept is a visualization of future operations that describes how a commander, using military art and science, might employ capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. It need not be limited by current or programmed capabilities.</p>	<p>Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan JUL 2004</p>
<p>Critical thinking</p>	<p>A deliberate process of thought whose purpose is to discern truth in situations where direct observation is insufficient, impossible, or impractical.</p>	<p>FM 6-22, Army Leadership 12 Oct 2006</p>

Glossary

D		source
Development	<p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSION: Includes the Army systems, processes, and know how in human development to build professionals with the cognitive, physical, emotional and spiritual attributes required to successfully perform in military operations and chaotic and lethal combat environments. The development of citizens into Soldiers and Soldiers into leaders of military competence and moral character forms the capacity for professionals to practice their art by the repetitive exercise of discretionary, highly moral judgments. The expertise to ethically and effectively exercise such judgment is developed over careers of service.</p>	CAPE glossary
Doctrine	Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application	DA Pam 350-58 Draft v2.7
Duty	<p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSIONAL: Duty is the service each Soldier is voluntarily obliged to provide through the Army to the American people, as well as to their unit and to each other. Each professional Soldier is to serve with excellence in all that they do as they fulfill each of their personal and professional obligations. Without a robust concept of duty, aggressively pursued each day by mature self-motivation, a Soldier cannot be a professional.</p>	CAPE glossary
E		source
Education	Education focuses “how to think” (as opposed to training, which focuses on “how to do”)	DA Pam 350-58 Draft v2.7

<p>Expertise</p>	<p>The Profession of Arms requires expert knowledge (i.e. expertise), and that expertise is manifested as unique skills in the individual professional and by Army units.</p> <p>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERTISE: Enables the Army to socialize, train, educate and develop volunteers to become Soldiers and then to develop those Soldiers to be leaders within and future stewards of the profession.</p> <p>MILITARY-TECHNICAL EXPERTISE: Enables the Army to conduct effective offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations on land at each of the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.</p> <p>MORAL-ETHICAL EXPERTISE: enables the Army to fight wars and employ combat power morally, as the American people expect and as domestic and international laws require.</p> <p>POLITICAL-CULTURAL EXPERTISE: Enables the Army to understand and operate effectively in our own and in other cultures across organizational and national boundaries, including the vital fields of civil-military relations and media-military relations.</p> <p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSION: The Army’s expertise is its specialized skill in building and applying lethal and ethical land combat power under Joint Command for the conduct of full spectrum operations inclusive of offense, defense, and stability or civil support. It is based on the cumulative expert know-how – both theoretical and practical – the Army has developed through its experience and forms the basis for the development of professional Army Soldiers and units.</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>
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Glossary

H		source
Human dimension	That which encompasses the moral, intellectual, and physical components of Soldier, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in full spectrum operations.	Human Dimension Concept TRADOC Pam 525-3-7 JUN 2008
I		source
Institutional training domain	The Army's institutional training and education system, which primarily includes training base centers and schools that provide initial training and subsequent professional military education for Soldiers, military leaders, and Army civilians.	FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations 12 Dec 2008
J		source
JIIM	Joint – Interagency – Intergovernmental – Multinational	Recommended by TRADOC for inclusion in JP 1-02
L		source
Leader development	The deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive process, grounded in the Army values, which grows Soldiers and civilians into competent and confident leaders capable of decisive action.	FM 6-22, Army Leadership 12 Oct 2006
Leadership	<p>The process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.</p> <p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSIONAL: Within the practice of the military professional's art, leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization. This capability is grounded in cognitive, physical, emotional and spiritual development that enables the leader to make and inspire support of decisions and accept responsibility for all actions and consequences. The ability to lead in military professions is founded on the ability to lead one's self; leadership by personal example is the standard for the Army. Leadership stewards the Army as a profession and is a key source of combat power.</p>	<p>FM 6-22 Army Leadership 12 OCT 06</p> <p>CAPE glossary</p>

Glossary

M		source
Mentorship	The voluntary developmental relationship that exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect.	AR 600-100
Moral component	In relation to the human dimension, it consists of three elements; warrior spirit element, moral-ethical development, and socio-cultural awareness.	Human Dimension Concept TRADOC Pam 525-3-7 JUN 2008
Moral-ethical	In relation to the human dimension, Soldiers aligning individual and professional values in such a way that their constantly evolving personal set of values, beliefs and behaviors are internally consistent with the ethical norms of the profession.	Human Dimension Concept TRADOC Pam 525-3-7 JUN 2008
O		source
Operational adaptability	<p>A quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation.</p> <p>The ability to shape conditions and respond effectively to changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and timely actions.</p>	<p>TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The Army Operating Concept, 19 AUG 2010</p> <p>TRADOC Pam 525-3-0 21 DEC 09</p>

Glossary

P		source
<p>Profession</p>	<p>An organization for producing uniquely expert work, not routine or repetitive work. Medicine, theology, law, and the military have traditionally been organized in western societies as social trustee forms of profession. Effectiveness, rather than pure efficiency, is the key to the work of professionals—the sick want a cure, the sinner wants absolution, the accused want exoneration, and the defenseless seek security. All clients of any profession want efficient service, but effective results from the profession’s expert practice are their overriding goal.</p> <p>PROFESSION OF ARMS: The Army is an American Profession of Arms, a vocation comprised of experts certified in the ethical application of land combat power, serving under civilian authority, entrusted to defend the Constitution and the rights and interests of the American people.</p> <p>PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: An American Professional Soldier is an expert, a volunteer certified in the Profession of Arms, bonded with comrades in a shared identity and culture of sacrifice and service to the nation and the Constitution, who adheres to the highest ethical standards and is a steward of the future of the Army profession.</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>
S		source
<p>Service</p>	<p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSION: The Army exists to serve the American people; there is no other reason for its existence. Service in the Army profession means subordination to our civilian authorities. It also means subordinating personal needs to the needs of the mission and being ready, if need be, to sacrifice in the defense of the Republic. The Army must stand ready to practice its expertise when and where called upon to do so.</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>

Glossary

<p>Skills</p>	<p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSIONAL: The skill of the professional Soldier is the capability to ethically and effectively apply the profession’s expertise as part of a team or unit. The professional Soldier’s skill is associated with rank and position and drawn from all four knowledge domains of the profession of arms: military-technical, moral-ethical, human development, and political-cultural. Individual certification in such skills, both of competence and character, are essential for the Army to remain a trusted and effective profession</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>
<p>T</p>		<p>source</p>
<p>Trust</p>	<p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSION: Trust in the profession is the confidence and faith that external stakeholders and supporters of the profession have in the Army including the American people and their representatives, coalition partners, Army families, the media, and others. The trust of the American people is foremost and the life blood of our professional status. It is earned and sustained by being ethical and effective in what we do as America’s Army and from it flows, in turn, the legitimacy and autonomy we enjoy as a profession to develop and practice our expertise.</p> <p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSIONAL: Army professionals must be worthy of the trust placed in them by the American people. The trust-worthiness of our Soldiers, their shared confidence, rests in themselves, in their leaders, and in their comrades, that all will fulfill their obligations to the Nation, the mission, each other, and to the Soldiers’ families. Such trust has to be fostered by the Army leaders to constantly renew the inspiration of our volunteer Soldiers to become the “expert and professional” that they aspire to be.</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>

Glossary

V		source
<p>Values</p>	<p>ATTRIBUTE OF THE PROFESSION: The values of the Army are those principles and qualities of intrinsic and special worth to us as a profession of arms. Army values flow from the Founding of our Nation and its evolving national culture and undergird the institutional character of our profession. Melded with the imperatives of military effectiveness, they establish the moral and legal foundations of the profession's Ethic, the moral values, principles and martial virtues embedded in its culture that inspire and regulate ethical behavior by both Soldiers and the U.S. Army in the application of land combat in defense of and service to the Nation.</p>	<p>CAPE glossary</p>